Centrus buys enrichment, the step that readies uranium for reactors, from Russia's TENEX and France's Orano, and resells it to utilities on long contracts. It now plans its own Ohio plant.
The engineering work is mostly for the US government, building and running test centrifuges.
The company · 3 · How does it make money?
Buys enrichment cheaply, resells on long contracts
$5.1Bunder signed agreements
After 2027Russian supply ends by law
$2.2Bof cash
Centrus earns the gap between what it pays its suppliers and what utilities pay it.
Is it a good business? · 4 · What gives it an edge?
Only the plant would protect it
TENEX, Orano
make almost all it resells, so it has no edge there
US design
rules bar foreign designs for military uses
$900M
government award for the plant
An earlier plan at the same Ohio site failed, so the American design must still prove itself at scale.
Is it a good business? · 5 · What is the catch?
Others are building first
Urencoalready runs a large US plant
Oranoplans a Tennessee plant from 2031
General Matterbuilding in Kentucky
Listed rivals: SLX.AX · CCJ
Utilities can buy from whoever offers supply first, at any scale.
Is it a good business? · 6 · What does its record show?
Profit fell as trading costs rose
Sales, $M
298.3
293.8
320.2
442.0
448.7
454.5
Dec 2021Dec 2022Dec 2023Dec 2024Dec 2025last 12 mo
Sales$298M → $454Msales, 2021 to the past year
Kept38% → 23%kept per $1 after buying supply
Profit23% → −1.3%operating profit per $1
The plant's costs land years before any plant revenue, so profit is near zero.
Is it a good business? · 7 · How much room is there to grow?
The prize is the Russian gap
About 3.4Munits a year of Russian supply ending
13 millionunits bought by US reactors, 2025
About $1.4Bwhat they paid that year
Filling the gap would be worth roughly $680M a year in sales, shared with whoever else builds.
Is it a good business? · 8 · Who is in charge?
A chief from a rival enricher
January 2024Amir Vexler became chief executive
2025a new finance chief and site head
Under 1%of Class A shares owned by directors
Vexler ran Orano's American arm, a rival enricher, before joining Centrus.
The story right now · 9 · Why does the Russian ban matter?
US law stops Russian enrichment after 2027
About 3.4Munits a year to replace
$3.0B → $5.4Bcontracts waiting on the plant
7 Decemberfirst investor day at the site
US reactors bought much of their enrichment from Russia. A US law ends that after 2027, so utilities need new suppliers, and Centrus loses the supply it resells.
The story right now · 10 · Why is the new plant risky?
Today's business ends before the new one starts
Resells Russian supplyEnds after 2027.
Plans its own plantContracts signed.
Cost unknownNot disclosed.
New shares to fund it$500M in September.
The price pays up front for a large plant at today's high enrichment prices, before its cost is known.
The story right now · 11 · What changed lately?
Contracts for the plant jump to $5.4B
$5.1Bunder signed agreements
26%fall in sales to $55.5M
$2.2Bof cash
$500Mof new shares and warrants sold
Mixed quarter
On the call the plant's cost and size were again put off to the 7 December investor day.
The story right now · 12 · What is everyone arguing about?
America's enrichment champion, or uncosted?
Many investors think
America's enrichment champion with contracts waiting
We think
Today's trading ends, and the plant is uncosted
The contracts are real and growing, the best evidence against us.
The price and our view · 13 · What is a share worth?
The price pays for a plant before its cost is known
$67.87what we think a share is worth · the last close is of that
$67.87our value
Attractive below $54.30
Neutral
Unattractive above $81.44
$62.65gloomy: growth halves, less kept per $1
$67.87our estimate: experts' path, then slowing
$75.50sunny: growth beats the forecast by a quarter
Value per share in three futures. None is a prediction of the share price.
We estimate what a share is worth from the cash the business should earn over many years. Our rule: buy only when the price is at least a fifth below our estimate, as a cushion for being wrong.
The price and our view · 14 · What if it all works?
As a bet on the Ohio plant, it is fragile
Speculationthe kind of bet this is
2.2×if it works
50%kept if it fails
Multiples of the company's value when the bet was last struck, 16 Nov 2026.
The price already pays for the plant succeeding, and shareholders keep about a third if it fails.
The price and our view · 15 · How could we be wrong?
Russian supply could stop early
Russian supply stops earlyBiggest
Trading profit ends.
More new sharesShowing now
Sold in September.
The plant costs moreWatch
No figure yet.
The plant's sizeUnknown
Not disclosed.
An earlier plan at the same site failed, and rivals are building first.
The price and our view · 16 · How will we know?
7 December may cost the plant
Plant cost and size disclosedGood sign
Funded without many more sharesGood sign
Russia stops supply earlyBad sign
MAR 202731
Investor day, 7 December, then fourth-quarter results. Companies report every three months; each report is a test of the story.
Our view also changes on price alone: if the shares fall to within a fifth of our estimate, we move to Neutral.
The price and our view · 17 · So, what do we think?
A plant priced as if built, cost unknown
$67.87our value
Attractive below $54.30
Neutral
Unattractive above $81.44
UnattractiveHigh conviction
Centrus resells enrichment bought mostly from Russia and France, and that supply runs out after 2027. Its value rests on a new Ohio plant whose cost and size nobody has disclosed, at a site where an earlier plan failed.
↑ ↓ to move · C for contents
What it does
More about the company
Who it is
Nuclear plants burn uranium that has been enriched: spun in thousands of fast centrifuges until the useful kind makes up about 5%. The industry measures that work in separative work units, or SWU.
Centrus buys SWU from Russia's TENEX and France's Orano and resells it to utilities on long contracts. It also ran a small 16-machine cascade in Ohio for the Department of Energy, which ends this year. It now plans its own plant, using an American centrifuge design.
How it makes money
Almost all the profit is a margin between what Centrus pays its suppliers and what utilities pay it. Its suppliers' prices were fixed lower in 2018, so it earned $111.5M of gross profit on $346.2M of fuel sales in 2025.
That gap lasts only as long as the supply does. Over half of what it delivers through 2027 is Russian, and nothing else it holds can replace it.
Growth and profit
What growth costs
Growing has made Centrus less profitable, not more. Office costs barely moved, but the enrichment it resells costs more as sales rise, and spending on the new plant now arrives years before the plant earns anything. Until the Ohio centrifuges run, each year of building eats into a thin trading profit.
Its record
The numbers
Is it growing?Slow
Sales grew 0.1% over the twelve months to Sep 2026, about the same pace as the 1.5% in the year to Dec 2025.
Is it profitable?Losing
Operating margin is −1.3%, down from 16% in the year to Dec 2023.
Does growth pay off?Costly
Running costs take 25¢ of each sales dollar, up from 15¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
Does it earn good returns?Poor
The capital put into the business loses 0.3% a year after tax, down from 67% in the year to Dec 2023.
How long can it keep going?Long runway
It used $296M of cash over the last twelve months, so the $2.24B it holds lasts about 7.6 years at that pace.
Is the balance sheet safe?Net cash
It holds $2.24B of cash against $1.18B of debt, $1.06B more cash than it owes.
Are shares being diluted?Diluting
The share count rose 61% in 4.8 years.
Why it wins
The evidence
For the fuel it resells there is no moat: anyone with supply can sell the same thing.
The plant is different. US rules bar foreign-designed enrichment from military uses, and Centrus says its centrifuge is the only American design ready to deploy. That is why the government picked it for a $900M award. But the government picked General Matter, a private rival, for an equal award, and holds a free right to use Centrus's design for its own purposes.
Who could beat it
The rivals in full
Others are moving first. Urenco already runs a US plant of about 4.6 million SWU a year and is adding 700,000 by 2027. Orano plans a $5B plant in Tennessee from 2031, with its own $900M award, and General Matter is building in Kentucky. Utilities can buy from them directly, without a middleman.
Each rival
Urenco USA, Eunice, New Mexiconot listed
A utility replaces Russian SWU with Urenco's US plant, already at 4.6 million SWU a year and adding about 700,000, rather than waiting for Centrus's 2029 cascades.
Orano, Project IKE in Oak Ridge and its French plantnot listed
A utility contracts with Orano's planned $5B US plant, producing from 2031 with DOE's $900M LEU award, or its French expansion of 2.5 million SWU.
General Matter, Paducah, Kentuckyprivate
DOE and reactor developers source HALEU from a second US company with its own $900M task order and a federal site lease.
Global Laser Enrichment, owned by Silex and CamecoSLX.AXCCJ
A laser plant at Paducah enriches DOE's depleted uranium tails instead of new centrifuges; it holds a $28.5M DOE award.
Urenco and Orano selling to utilities directlynot listed
A utility buys from the enricher instead of from Centrus, which resells Orano's SWU and will lose TENEX's after 2028.
How big it could get
The market and who has signed
The market
US reactor owners bought 13 million SWU in 2025, paying an average of $108.70 each, about $1.4B. A quarter of it came from Russia, about 3.4 million SWU a year that US law stops after 2027.
That gap is the prize. At today's spot price of $200, filling it would be worth roughly $680M a year in sales, shared with whoever else builds.
Who has signed
Customers have signed $5.1B of contracts for fuel from the new plant, payable only once it runs. The government signed a $900M order for its high-grade fuel. Four makers of small reactors, X-energy, Radiant, Antares and, since November, Oklo, signed contracts with advance payments, without saying how much.
Who runs it
Leaders, pay and the cash
Who runs it
Amir Vexler has run Centrus since January 2024; before that he ran Orano's American arm, a rival enricher. The finance chief and the head of the Ohio site both arrived in 2025. Directors and executives together own under 1% of the company. Their yearly bonus pays on trading results, progress toward enriching again, and revenue, profit and cash; their shares vest on a three-year profit goal, and that profit includes interest earned on money raised from shareholders.
The last report
The latest report
Centrus's signed contracts for the new plant jump to $5.4B
What it did to the thesis Mixed quarter
Signed demand for the plant now covers roughly what the price already pays for, so that gap has closed. The plant's cost and size, which decide the value, wait for the 7 December investor day, so Unattractive holds.
The report
Contracts waiting on the new Ohio plant rose to $5.4B at 30 September from $3.0B in June, and $5.1B of them are under definitive agreements. Total orders on the books reached $7.0B, running to 2040. A first new centrifuge shipped from Oak Ridge ahead of the year-end target.
The existing business shrank. Sales fell 26% to $55.5M, the loss after the cost of making what it sold widened to $10.6M, and cash stood at $2.2B. In October it paid $116.0M, partly in shares, for a supplier. On the call the plant's cost and size were again deferred to a 7 December investor day.
What's happening now
The background
The shares have fallen from $464 in October 2025 to near their lowest in a year, and in September Centrus sold $500M of new shares and warrants.
In December it holds its first investor day at the Ohio site, where it says it will set out its long-term plan. That is when the plant's cost and size may finally be known.
Where we disagree
Both sides in full
The market
America's enrichment champion: the only US-owned centrifuge, $3B of contracts waiting for its plant, government money behind it, and a halved share price.
We believe
The trading that earns today's profit runs out, and the plant that replaces it has no published cost, size or margin yet.
The argument
The coverage counts the contracts; the filing says they depend on a plant nobody has costed. The contracts are real and growing, which is the best evidence against us.
We would be wrong if Centrus shows a plant of at least 3 million SWU a year at a sensible cost, with signed contracts above $3.5B. Over a quarter of the shares available are sold short.
What it's worth
How we value it
Valued on the analysts' revenue path for three years, each later year closing 30% of the gap to 4%, on official operating profit with stock pay a cost and tax paid in full; the thesis's own evidence is the check on that path.
The three cases
Bear case$62.65
Growth runs at half the analysts' path, 4%, -5% and 0%, the margin settles a fifth lower at 7.9%, and new capital earns only the 8% rate: the downturn test.
Our value$67.87
Revenue grows 9%, -3% and 0% over three years, the analysts' path (C48), then fades toward 4%, closing 30% of the gap each year; the margin moves to 9.9%, the analysts' year-three figure after stock pay and on the filed basis (10.7% less).
Bull case$75.50
Growth runs a quarter above the analysts' path, 11%, -2% and 0%, the margin reaches 10.9%, and new capital earns 11%.
The bet
Seen as a bet
This is a bet that the Ohio plant gets built and sells about twice the fuel its customers have already signed for, filling part of the gap Russia leaves. Even then, valued like a steady fuel supplier, the company would be worth only a little more than today.
If the plant slips or costs far more, the old trading runs out and shareholders keep its last years of profit and whatever cash is left: about a third of today's value.
What could go wrong
Every risk
The risks
Russian supply stops early
If permits are refused or Russia halts shipments before 2027 ends, Centrus cannot fill much of what it has sold.
The plant costs more
Orano's French expansion cost about $760 per unit of yearly capacity; a new US plant may cost far more.
It has failed before
A 2007 plan for this site promised 3.8 million SWU by 2012, cost $2.3B, and ended in bankruptcy.
More new shares
It sold shares and warrants in September; an expensive plant could need more.
Rivals arrive first
Urenco adds US capacity by 2027, two years before Centrus's first machines.
The government's rights
The government can use Centrus's centrifuge design for its own purposes without paying for it.
What we still do not know
What the Ohio plant will cost, how much fuel it will make each year, and when it reaches full output.
At what prices and volumes the $5.1B of contracts were signed, and how large the advance payments are.
Whether the government will allow Russian deliveries in 2028, the last year of the supply contract.
What changes our view
Every route to a new view
Every route to a new view
→ Neutral
The share price falls to about $81.44, back within 20% of what we think the business is worth.
→ Attractive
The share price falls to about $54.30, 80% of what we think the business is worth.
→ Neutral
Centrus publishes what the plant will cost and shows it can make at least 3 million SWU a year. Signed contracts waiting on the plant stay above $5B, from $5.1B.
→ Attractive
The first new machines run in Ohio in 2029, as planned. Signed contracts waiting on the plant pass $8B, from $5.1B.
The next test
It supports the case if
No plant cost or capacity is given, or one that puts the plant under 2 million SWU a year, with backlog flat or lower: the plant stays unpriced while the price pays for it.
It pressures the case if
A cost and capacity are given that put the plant at or above 3 million SWU a year at under $1,000 per SWU of capacity, with definitive backlog still above $5B.
We would also be wrong if
The government refuses more permits, or Russian deliveries stop, before the end of 2027.
Centrus sells more shares before it publishes the plant's cost and size.
Signed contracts waiting on the plant fall below $4B.
The verdict
Scores and how we weighed it
The scores
Growth
2 of 4
Business quality
2 of 4
Financial position
2 of 4
Execution record
2 of 4
Per share capture
2 of 4
Potential
3 of 4
Risk profile
2 of 4
Valuation
1 of 4
Evidence quality
3 of 4
How we weighed it
ValueNegative
The price sits above our value and above the bull case.
BusinessNegative
A weak business today, reselling supply that runs out soon.
GrowthMixed
Signed demand for the plant now covers what the price pays for, but cost and size are unknown.
RisksNegative
Russian supply may stop early, the plant may cost more and an earlier plan at the site failed.
RivalsMixed
No filed rival compares directly; the price pays for a plant that does not yet exist.
The groupMixed
Power producers move together on nuclear and AI demand news.
Latest newsMixed
Oklo turned its letter of intent into contracts with advance payments, but the plant's cost waits for the investor day.
In plain words
Our estimate of value
We forecast how much cash the business can earn over the next ten years and beyond, then ask what that stream is worth today to an investor who wants an 8% yearly return. We do it three times: a gloomy future, an expected one and a sunny one. We call a share Attractive only when its price is at least 20% below the expected estimate, and Unattractive when it is 20% above.