Centrus Energy
This is the archived full research. Read the story
An American company that resells enriched uranium fuel to power plants and wants to build the first US-owned enrichment plant in decades, in Ohio.
The scores
Growth2/4 →
Revenue $442M to $449M in 2025 and $474M trailing; the business shrinks as Russian supply ends, and nothing new produces before 2029.
Business quality2/4 →
A reseller of others' enrichment with no moat today; the US-origin shelter applies only to a plant not yet built.
Financial position2/4 →
Net cash about $1.2B after September, but the build's cost is undisclosed and it raised equity and notes repeatedly to fund it.
Execution record2/4 ↑
The 2007 plan for this site ended in bankruptcy; the recent HALEU record is real but 16 machines.
Per share capture2/4 ↓
Shares up 21% in a year while revenue per share fell 10%, with 6,992,382 warrants and in-the-money notes above.
Potential3/4 ↑
US buyers need about 3.4 million SWU of non-Russian supply, with $2.4B of definitive contracts and DOE's $900M behind the plant.
Risk profile2/4 →
Over half of deliveries through 2027 are Russian, the waivers end after 2027, and the plant's cost is unknown.
Valuation1/4 ↑
About 313.9 times operating profit before depreciation, 154% of a three-stage value near $67.87 at an 8% return: priced for perfection, beyond the 20% margin.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Supply, backlog, cash and the market are filed or official; the plant's cost, size and margin are inferred or missing.
If it works 2.2× · if it fails you keep about 50%.
The Verdict
We rate Centrus Unattractive. Today it is a middleman reselling enrichment bought mostly from Russia and France, whose supply runs out after 2027, so the business is weak. The value rests on a new Ohio plant that customers and the government back, but whose cost and size nobody has disclosed, at a site where an earlier plan failed. The price sits above our value and our best case, paying up front for a plant of about 2 million units a year at today's high prices. As a bet it is priced for success: shareholders keep about a third if it fails.
The long caseUS law shuts out Russian enrichment, so utilities need a new American supplier; Centrus wins if it can build a plant on time and on budget.
How we weighed it
The price against our value
Against it
Price at 154% of our value
The price sits above our value and above the bull case.
The business
Against it
Weak
A weak business today, reselling supply that runs out soon.
Growth against what the price assumes
Cuts both ways
Signed demand for the plant now covers what the price pays for, but cost and size are unknown.
What could go wrong
Against it
Russian supply may stop early, the plant may cost more and an earlier plan at the site failed.
Against competitors
Cuts both ways
No filed rival compares directly; the price pays for a plant that does not yet exist.
How its group is behaving
Cuts both ways
Power producers move together on nuclear and AI demand news.
The latest news and report
Cuts both ways
Oklo turned its letter of intent into contracts with advance payments, but the plant's cost waits for the investor day.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
The trade agreement sets aside Russian quota for Centrus through 2028, and management reports strong order momentum and rising long-term prices (S03, S05).
On September's shares and cash the market value is about $3.1B and net cash about $1.2B, which leaves company value near $1.95B either way; and DOE's $900M pays for part of the HALEU build (C23, C09).
The contingent sales 'tend to relate to achievement of operational milestones' at a plant not yet built, and the $0.8B Technical Solutions backlog is a contract DOE does not intend to extend (S01).
- 2026-11-04editedQ3 2026 release: contingent backlog $5.4B, $5.1B definitive, from $3.0B and $2.4B
The company
Nuclear plants burn uranium that has been enriched: spun in thousands of fast centrifuges until the useful kind makes up about 5%. The industry measures that work in separative work units, or SWU.
Centrus buys SWU from Russia's TENEX and France's Orano and resells it to utilities on long contracts. It also ran a small 16-machine cascade in Ohio for the Department of Energy, which ends this year. It now plans its own plant, using an American centrifuge design.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Centrus is working with DOE on agreements to run the cascade privately on a commercial basis (S01).
General Matter, a US company, won an equal $900M HALEU award from DOE (S08), and a second US-origin enricher would end the claim to be the only one.
How it makes money
Almost all the profit is a margin between what Centrus pays its suppliers and what utilities pay it. Its suppliers' prices were fixed lower in 2018, so it earned $111.5M of gross profit on $346.2M of fuel sales in 2025.
That gap lasts only as long as the supply does. Over half of what it delivers through 2027 is Russian, and nothing else it holds can replace it.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
First-half 2026 LEU gross profit of $79.5M runs ahead of 2025's pace, and new sales at a $200 spot carry wider margins (C03, C14).
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY 2025) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Enrichment (SWU) sales | 66.6% | Resells enrichment bought mostly from Russia's TENEX and France's Orano to utilities under long-term contracts. |
| Uranium sales | 10.6% | Sells natural uranium to utilities, some of it taken as payment for enrichment; volumes swing quarter to quarter. |
| Technical Solutions | 22.8% | Contract work for DOE, chiefly running the HALEU cascade at Piketon; production funding ended on 30 September 2026. |
Who runs it
Amir Vexler has run Centrus since January 2024; before that he ran Orano's American arm, a rival enricher. The finance chief and the head of the Ohio site both arrived in 2025. Directors and executives together own under 1% of the company. Their yearly bonus pays on trading results, progress toward enriching again, and revenue, profit and cash; their shares vest on a three-year profit goal, and that profit includes interest earned on money raised from shareholders.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Net income, the long-term award's only test, includes interest on cash raised from shareholders: $16.3M of Q2 2026's $16.8M (C03), so the goal can be met by raising money rather than by enriching.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
For the fuel it resells there is no moat: anyone with supply can sell the same thing.
The plant is different. US rules bar foreign-designed enrichment from military uses, and Centrus says its centrifuge is the only American design ready to deploy. That is why the government picked it for a $900M award. But the government picked General Matter, a private rival, for an equal award, and holds a free right to use Centrus's design for its own purposes.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
General Matter, a US company, won an equal $900M HALEU award from DOE (S08), and a second US-origin enricher would end the claim to be the only one.
General Matter received an identical $900M HALEU award and Orano the LEU one, so DOE is funding rivals on both halves of Centrus's plan (S08).
US buyers paid an average of $108.70 per SWU in 2025, so most enrichment still sells near half the spot price (S09).
The threat
Others are moving first. Urenco already runs a US plant of about 4.6 million SWU a year and is adding 700,000 by 2027. Orano plans a $5B plant in Tennessee from 2031, with its own $900M award, and General Matter is building in Kentucky. Utilities can buy from them directly, without a middleman.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
General Matter received an identical $900M HALEU award and Orano the LEU one, so DOE is funding rivals on both halves of Centrus's plan (S08).
The rivals: CCJ, and 4 more that are private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Not listed | Urenco USA, Eunice, New MexicoPriced against it: Not listed | Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon | On sale | Not listed |
| Not listed | Orano, Project IKE in Oak Ridge and its French plantPriced against it: Not listed | Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon | Announced | Not listed |
| Private | General Matter, Paducah, KentuckyPriced against it: Private | Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon | Announced | Private |
| CCJ | Global Laser Enrichment, owned by Silex and CamecoPriced against it: One segment only | Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon | In research | One segment only |
| Not listed | Urenco and Orano selling to utilities directlyPriced against it: Not listed | LEU trading business | On sale | Not listed |
How big it could get
How big this could get
US reactor owners bought 13 million SWU in 2025, paying an average of $108.70 each, about $1.4B. A quarter of it came from Russia, about 3.4 million SWU a year that US law stops after 2027.
That gap is the prize. At today's spot price of $200, filling it would be worth roughly $680M a year in sales, shared with whoever else builds.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The average is a contract price that lags the market: spot was $200 at the end of 2025 (S10).
US buyers paid an average of $108.70 per SWU in 2025, so most enrichment still sells near half the spot price (S09).
Waivers have been granted before, and some 2025 Russian deliveries may already sit in utilities' inventories (S01).
Who has signed
Customers have signed $5.1B of contracts for fuel from the new plant, payable only once it runs. The government signed a $900M order for its high-grade fuel. Four makers of small reactors, X-energy, Radiant, Antares and, since November, Oklo, signed contracts with advance payments, without saying how much.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The contingent sales 'tend to relate to achievement of operational milestones' at a plant not yet built, and the $0.8B Technical Solutions backlog is a contract DOE does not intend to extend (S01).
- 2026-11-04editedQ3 2026 release: contingent backlog $5.4B, $5.1B definitive, from $3.0B and $2.4B
General Matter received an identical $900M HALEU award and Orano the LEU one, so DOE is funding rivals on both halves of Centrus's plan (S08).
- 2026-11-12editedOklo's June letter of intent became definitive contracts with prepayments on 12 November
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 0.1% over the twelve months to Sep 2026, about the same pace as the 1.5% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is −1.3%, down from 16% in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 25¢ of each sales dollar, up from 15¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
The capital put into the business loses 0.3% a year after tax, down from 67% in the year to Dec 2023.
It used $296M of cash over the last twelve months, so the $2.24B it holds lasts about 7.6 years at that pace.
It holds $2.24B of cash against $1.18B of debt, $1.06B more cash than it owes.
The share count rose 61% in 4.8 years.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-11-10. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Sep 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $298M | $294M | $320M | $442M | $449M | $454M |
| Sales growth | +21% | −1.5% | +9.0% | +38% | +1.5% | +0.1% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 38% | 40% | 35% | 25% | 26% | 23% |
| Operating margin | 23% | 20% | 16% | 11% | 11% | −1.3% |
| Net margin | 59% | 18% | 26% | 17% | 17% | 17% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 0.7% | 5.0% | 4.4% | 3.9% | 3.8% | 9.5% |
| Selling, general and admin | 12% | 12% | 12% | 7.9% | 8.1% | 13% |
| Pay in shares | 4.1% | 0.6% | 0.7% | 0.3% | 1.3% | - |
| Capital spending | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.5% | 0.9% | 4.4% | 52% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $50.0M | $20.6M | $9.10M | $37.0M | $51.0M | −$59.5M |
| Free cash flow | $48.8M | $19.9M | $7.50M | $32.9M | $31.3M | −$296M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $194M | $180M | $201M | $671M | $1.96B | $2.24B |
| Debt | $108M | $102M | $95.7M | $479M | $1.17B | $1.18B |
| Net cash | $85.9M | $78.1M | $106M | $193M | $782M | $1.06B |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | - | - | 67% | 12% | 3.5% | −0.3% |
| Shares (diluted) | 13.9M | 15.0M | 15.5M | 16.4M | 19.9M | 22.4M |
What growth costs
Growing has made Centrus less profitable, not more. Office costs barely moved, but the enrichment it resells costs more as sales rise, and spending on the new plant now arrives years before the plant earns anything. Until the Ohio centrifuges run, each year of building eats into a thin trading profit.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The last report (4 Nov)
Quarter ended September 2026, filed figures.
Contracts waiting on the new Ohio plant rose to $5.4B at 30 September from $3.0B in June, and $5.1B of them are under definitive agreements. Total orders on the books reached $7.0B, running to 2040. A first new centrifuge shipped from Oak Ridge ahead of the year-end target.
The existing business shrank. Sales fell 26% to $55.5M, the loss after the cost of making what it sold widened to $10.6M, and cash stood at $2.2B. In October it paid $116.0M, partly in shares, for a supplier. On the call the plant's cost and size were again deferred to a 7 December investor day.
What it did to the thesisSigned demand for the plant now covers roughly what the price already pays for, so that gap has closed. The plant's cost and size, which decide the value, wait for the 7 December investor day, so Unattractive holds.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $-0.46 against $-0.47 expected.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
The contingent sales 'tend to relate to achievement of operational milestones' at a plant not yet built, and the $0.8B Technical Solutions backlog is a contract DOE does not intend to extend (S01).
- 2026-11-04editedQ3 2026 release: contingent backlog $5.4B, $5.1B definitive, from $3.0B and $2.4B
Centrus is working with DOE on agreements to run the cascade privately on a commercial basis (S01).
Consensus for Q3 revenue is about $64M (pack), far below the $176.1M of Q2, so the year leans on lumpy LEU deliveries (S15).
No plant cost, capacity or machine count was given on the call, and asked about Palantir savings of $300M and the capital cadence, management deferred to the Investor Day.
What management did with the money
Insiders in 2026Q3: 1 purchases and 2 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Priced for perfection. The price is about 154% of what we think the business is worth, at an 8% yearly return.
The shares have fallen from $464 in October 2025 to near their lowest in a year, and in September Centrus sold $500M of new shares and warrants.
In December it holds its first investor day at the Ohio site, where it says it will set out its long-term plan. That is when the plant's cost and size may finally be known.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The 2007 plan for the same site promised 3.8 million SWU by 2012 and ended in a 2014 bankruptcy (C12).
How we value it
- Method
- Cash the business will produce, with any shortfall raised in new shares
- Required return
- 8%
- Long-run growth
- 4%
- Moat
- No moat
| Bear | Base | Bull | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | 4.4%, -4.8%, 0.2% | 8.8%, -3.2%, 0.4% | 11%, -1.6%, 0.5% |
| Normal operating margin | 7.9% | 9.9% | 10.9% |
| Return on new capital after year ten | 8% | 8% | 11% |
| Value a share | $62.65 | $67.87 | $75.50 |
- Price
- $105
- Priced on
- 6 Nov
- Price as a share of the base value
- 154%
- Starting growth the price pays for
- 43.6%
- Yearly return the price offers on the base case
- 5.4%
- Risk check: valued at 12%, the rate for a business not yet making a profit
- $59.66
Where each figure comes from
| Figure | Source | Where exactly |
|---|---|---|
| Sales, the last twelve months | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Operating margin today | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Tax rate | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Sales per dollar of new capital | Filed report | Annual report (10-K) for the period to 31 Dec 2025, filed 11 Feb 2026: the year's sales over its operating capital, held to between 0.5 and 6. |
| Shares | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the diluted share count. |
| Cash and investments | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Debt | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus for the years to 31 Dec 2026, 31 Dec 2027 and 31 Dec 2028, as it stood when the value was struck on 10 Nov 2026: the average of 11 to 14 analysts' revenue estimates, 8.8%, -3.2%, 0.4%. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Normal operating margin | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus operating margin for the year to 31 Dec 2028, as it stood when the value was struck on 10 Nov 2026, the average of 13 analysts' estimates, less stock pay and less the 10.7% the analysts add back on their adjusted basis: 9.9% in the base case. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Return on new capital after year ten | Our method's rule | Set by our reading of the moat: the 8% rate with none, 12% with an average one, 15% with a strong one; the bear case earns the rate. |
| The bear and bull cases | Our method's rule | Our method's spread: the bear case takes half the growth and a fifth off the margin, the bull a quarter more growth and a tenth more margin. |
| Price | Market price | FMP's closing price on 6 Nov 2026. |
What each case rests on
Bear caseGrowth runs at half the analysts' path, 4%, -5% and 0%, the margin settles a fifth lower at 7.9%, and new capital earns only the 8% rate: the downturn test.
Base caseRevenue grows 9%, -3% and 0% over three years, the analysts' path (C48), then fades toward 4%, closing 30% of the gap each year; the margin moves to 9.9%, the analysts' year-three figure after stock pay and on the filed basis (10.7% less).
Bull caseGrowth runs a quarter above the analysts' path, 11%, -2% and 0%, the margin reaches 10.9%, and new capital earns 11%.
What moves the base value
| Lower | Higher | |
|---|---|---|
| Growth in years 1 to 3, a quarter lower or higher | $67.64 | $68.10 |
| The normal margin, 15% lower or higher | $64.63 | $71.11 |
| Capital per dollar of growth, a quarter more or less | $67.70 | $67.98 |
| Return on new capital after year ten, at the rate or one step up | $67.87 | $71.90 |
| The rate, a point higher or lower | $63.88 | $74.46 |
| Long-run growth a point lower | $67.40 | - |
Value a share as growth and margin change
| Normal margin ↓ · growth → | 50% | 75% | 100% | 125% | 150% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 7.9% | $63.21 | $63.38 | $63.55 | $63.71 | $63.87 |
| 8.9% | $65.31 | $65.51 | $65.71 | $65.90 | $66.09 |
| 9.9% | $67.41 | $67.64 | $67.87 | $68.10 | $68.31 |
| 10.9% | $69.50 | $69.77 | $70.03 | $70.29 | $70.54 |
| 11.9% | $71.60 | $71.90 | $72.19 | $72.48 | $72.76 |
Growth is shown as a share of the base case's. Green: the price is at or under 80% of that value. Red: at or over 120%.
How we read the multiple
Counting its cash, the whole company is valued at about $1.95B. For the price to work:
- The existing trading is worth about $225M, since its supply runs out within a few years.
- That leaves about $1.7B for the plant.
- Valued at a common 11 times its yearly profit before interest, tax and wear, it must earn about $157M a year.
- At today's spot price and Urenco's margin, that takes about 2 million SWU a year, more than its signed contracts cover.
Against its own history. Buyers are paying far more for each dollar of today's profit than they used to, because they are paying for a plant that does not yet exist.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
On September's shares and cash the market value is about $3.1B and net cash about $1.2B, which leaves company value near $1.95B either way; and DOE's $900M pays for part of the HALEU build (C23, C09).
First-half 2026 LEU gross profit of $79.5M runs ahead of 2025's pace, and new sales at a $200 spot carry wider margins (C03, C14).
US buyers paid an average of $108.70 per SWU in 2025, so most enrichment still sells near half the spot price (S09).
Priced against its rivals
None of the listed rivals above sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
The bet: what it pays if it works
This is a bet that the Ohio plant gets built and sells about twice the fuel its customers have already signed for, filling part of the gap Russia leaves. Even then, valued like a steady fuel supplier, the company would be worth only a little more than today.
If the plant slips or costs far more, the old trading runs out and shareholders keep its last years of profit and whatever cash is left: about a third of today's value.
| Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon EBITDA in two to three years | Million SWU a year of new Piketon capacity needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $0 | about 0 at 38% kept | 0.2× |
| $210.00M (the big win) | about 3 at 38% kept | 2.2× |
| $292.00M | about 4 at 38% kept | 3.0× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $190.01M of Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon EBITDA (about 2 million SWU a year of new Piketon capacity at 38% kept); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $505.70M of Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon EBITDA (about 7 million SWU a year of new Piketon capacity at 38% kept), at the same multiple.
Each row is Domestic enrichment build-out at Piketon alone, plus the rest of the company (LEU trading business) counted at about $225.00M.
The steps it has to take
- Done DOE's $900M HALEU task order signed
- Done Financing contingency met on more than $3B of customer contracts
- Done Definitive HALEU contracts with prepayments from X-energy, Radiant and Antares
- Not started The plant's cost, capacity and schedule published at the first Investor Day due 2026-12
- In progress High-rate centrifuge manufacturing running in Oak Ridge due 2027-12
- Not started First new centrifuges online in Piketon due 2029-12
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 6 claims
First-half 2026 LEU gross profit of $79.5M runs ahead of 2025's pace, and new sales at a $200 spot carry wider margins (C03, C14).
The trade agreement sets aside Russian quota for Centrus through 2028, and management reports strong order momentum and rising long-term prices (S03, S05).
Contract prices lag spot by years and a first plant runs below a mature one's margin, so the contracts may earn less than this (S01, C13).
- 2026-11-04editedContingent backlog restated at $5.4B (C06); the same arithmetic gives about 2.3 million SWU
Waivers have been granted before, and some 2025 Russian deliveries may already sit in utilities' inventories (S01).
Where we disagree with the market
America's enrichment champion: the only US-owned centrifuge, $3B of contracts waiting for its plant, government money behind it, and a halved share price.
The trading that earns today's profit runs out, and the plant that replaces it has no published cost, size or margin yet.
The coverage counts the contracts; the filing says they depend on a plant nobody has costed. The contracts are real and growing, which is the best evidence against us.
We would be wrong if Centrus shows a plant of at least 3 million SWU a year at a sensible cost, with signed contracts above $3.5B. Over a quarter of the shares available are sold short.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The contingent sales 'tend to relate to achievement of operational milestones' at a plant not yet built, and the $0.8B Technical Solutions backlog is a contract DOE does not intend to extend (S01).
- 2026-11-04editedQ3 2026 release: contingent backlog $5.4B, $5.1B definitive, from $3.0B and $2.4B
The trade agreement sets aside Russian quota for Centrus through 2028, and management reports strong order momentum and rising long-term prices (S03, S05).
On September's shares and cash the market value is about $3.1B and net cash about $1.2B, which leaves company value near $1.95B either way; and DOE's $900M pays for part of the HALEU build (C23, C09).
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Russian supply stops early If permits are refused or Russia halts shipments before 2027 ends, Centrus cannot fill much of what it has sold.
- The plant costs more Orano's French expansion cost about $760 per unit of yearly capacity; a new US plant may cost far more.
- It has failed before A 2007 plan for this site promised 3.8 million SWU by 2012, cost $2.3B, and ended in bankruptcy.
- More new shares It sold shares and warrants in September; an expensive plant could need more.
- Rivals arrive first Urenco adds US capacity by 2027, two years before Centrus's first machines.
- The government's rights The government can use Centrus's centrifuge design for its own purposes without paying for it.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
A third waiver request covering 2026 and 2027 sales is pending, and TENEX has received its licences except for isolated delays (S01).
Orano is extending an operating plant with proven modules, so a new US hall should cost more per SWU, and Project IKE alone is a $5B plan (S11, S13).
What we still do not know
- What the Ohio plant will cost, how much fuel it will make each year, and when it reaches full output.
- At what prices and volumes the $5.1B of contracts were signed, and how large the advance payments are.
- Whether the government will allow Russian deliveries in 2028, the last year of the supply contract.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The contingent sales 'tend to relate to achievement of operational milestones' at a plant not yet built, and the $0.8B Technical Solutions backlog is a contract DOE does not intend to extend (S01).
- 2026-11-04editedQ3 2026 release: contingent backlog $5.4B, $5.1B definitive, from $3.0B and $2.4B
- 2026-11-12editedOklo's June letter of intent became definitive contracts with prepayments on 12 November
A third waiver request covering 2026 and 2027 sales is pending, and TENEX has received its licences except for isolated delays (S01).
What would change our view
- Unattractive→NeutralThe price falls back within 20% of fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price falls to about $81.44, back within 20% of what we think the business is worth.about ≈$62.41 today, 36% below the last close
- Unattractive→AttractiveThe price falls 20% under fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price falls to about $54.30, 80% of what we think the business is worth.about ≈$12.96 today, 87% below the last close
- Unattractive→NeutralThe plant is sized and costed, and it is big enough
It needs all of:
- ○Centrus publishes what the plant will cost and shows it can make at least 3 million SWU a year.checked at the next results, due by 31 Mar
- ○Signed contracts waiting on the plant stay above $5B, from $5.1B.checked at the next results, due by 31 Mar
- Unattractive→AttractiveThe plant runs on time and the contracts keep growing
It needs all of:
- ○The first new machines run in Ohio in 2029, as planned.watched as it happens
- ○Signed contracts waiting on the plant pass $8B, from $5.1B.checked at the next results, due by 31 Mar
We would also be wrong if
- The government refuses more permits, or Russian deliveries stop, before the end of 2027.
- Centrus sells more shares before it publishes the plant's cost and size.
- Signed contracts waiting on the plant fall below $4B.
What is coming
- 4 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether contingent backlog grows past $3.0B, whether any plant cost or capacity is given, and spending against the $350M to $500M capital guide.
Every dated event ahead
- 4 November 2026 Q3 2026 results: Whether contingent backlog grows past $3.0B, whether any plant cost or capacity is given, and spending against the $350M to $500M capital guide.
- December 2026 First Investor Day at Piketon: The plant's cost, SWU capacity and schedule: whether it reaches the roughly 2 million SWU a year the price already pays for, and at what cost per SWU.
- February 2027 Q4 2026 results and the 2026 10-K: 2026 against the $450M to $500M revenue guide, Technical Solutions after DOE's production funding ended, and whether TENEX deliveries held.
- December 2027 Russian import waivers end for committed deliveries: Whether Centrus finds waivers or other supply for 2028, or the trading business starts running off as C20 expects.
Since we wrote this
- 17 NovBet moveBet re-struck: Priced for success to SpeculationRe-priced at the 16 November close; the rating moved from Expensive bet to Fair bet.
- 12 NovNewsOklo's fuel deal becomes binding; no volume, view holdsOklo turned its June letter of intent into definitive contracts with advance payments. No volume or price is given, so the value we put on the shares does not move.
- 11 NovThesis reviewUnattractive, high conviction: the view holds even in our best caseConviction re-graded on the new anchors: how robust the view is, not whether anything is still open.
- 9 NovThesis reviewStill Unattractive: priced at 151% of a value near $69.09Re-valued in three stages at an 8% return, the method now drawn on every thesis: the price sits beyond the 20% margin of safety.
- 9 NovBet moveBet re-struck: Speculation to Priced for successRe-priced at the 6 November close; the rating moved from Fair bet to Expensive bet.
- 5 NovEarningsThe call and 10-Q add a supplier purchase; plant cost still unpublishedCentrus paid $116.0M, partly in shares, for a supplier and said cost and capacity wait for the 7 December Investor Day, so the view holds.
- 4 NovEarningsSigned plant contracts jumped to $5.4B; plant cost still unpublishedDemand now matches what the price pays for, but cost and size wait for December's Investor Day, and the quarter's sales and loss worsened, so Unattractive holds.
- 2 NovBet moveBet re-struck: Priced for success to SpeculationRe-priced at the 30 October close; the rating moved from Expensive bet to Fair bet.
- 29 OctNewsCentrus shipped its first new centrifuge ahead of target, still with no plant cost. View heldCentrus shipped its first new centrifuge from Oak Ridge to Ohio.
- 28 OctBet moveBet re-struck: Speculation to Priced for successRe-priced at the 27 October close; the rating moved from Fair bet to Expensive bet.
- 26 OctBet moveBet re-struck: Priced for success to SpeculationRe-priced at the 23 October close; the rating moved from Expensive bet to Fair bet.
- 19 OctNewsCentrus bought its casing supplier for $116 million, and still gave no plant cost. View heldCentrus acquired Westerman Holdings, a centrifuge-parts maker.
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe bet now names what it ridesThe owner asked that every bet name the macro trend behind it, after BWXT's bet was missing its chief executive's case for nuclear over gas.
- 4 OctThesis writtenUnattractive, medium convictionWritten two months after the June-quarter print and three weeks after the September offering, with the shares near their 52-week low.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
Also checked 1 time with nothing new to act on.
Sources 23
Sources - 23
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-08-06segment results, backlog and its contingent part, the TENEX and Russian-waiver risk factors, the HALEU contract's end, DOE's task order, cash, convertible notes, share counts and the build planbacksC01C03C04C05C06C08C09C10C11C12C22C24C25C26C29C36C44C45
- S02primarycompany release2026-08-05quarter and half-year income statement, segment commentary, the non-GAAP reconciliation and 2026 guidancebacksC03C11C24C37C38
- S03primarycompany filing2026-02-11the business, competition and market size, supply contracts, customer concentration, the national-security rule, DOE's rights to the technology and the notes' termsbacksC01C02C04C06C07C11C12C15C22C31C40C44C45
- S04primarycompany release2026-02-10the 2025 income statement by revenue line, segment gross profit and the cash-flow statementbacksC02C36
- S05primarytranscript2026-08-06Centrus Q2 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP)the financing contingency, the 2029 date, the Oklo letter of intent, NNSA's sole-source intent, nearly 2 tonnes of HALEU, the December Investor Day and the analysts' questions on Russian supply and timing
Recall that Centrus is the only viable production-ready technology that can meet national security needs.
backsC08C11C29 - S07primarycompany filing2026-09-11the $500M offering: shares, pre-funded warrants, the four warrant series and their pricesbacksC23C26
- S08primaryregulator2026-01-05U.S. Department of Energy: DOE awards $2.7 billion to restore American uranium enrichment U.S. Department of Energythe three $900M awards: American Centrifuge Operating and General Matter for HALEU, Orano Federal Services for LEU
The following companies were awarded task orders totaling $2.7 billion to provide enrichment services for LEU and HALEU
backsC09C18 - S09primarygovernment data2026-07-29U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2025 Uranium Marketing Annual Report U.S. Energy Information AdministrationSWU bought by US owners and operators in 2025, the average price, and the shares by origin: 23% US, 26% Russia, 18% France, 14% UK, 8% Netherlands
The average price paid by the COOs for the 13 million SWU was $108.70 per SWU in 2025, up 11% from the $97.66 per SWU paid in 2024. In 2025, the U.S.-origin SWU share was 23%, and the foreign-origin SWU accounted for the remaining 77%. Foreign-origin SWU included 26% from Russia, 18% from France, 14% from the United Kingdom, and 8% from the Netherlands (Table 16).
backsC13 - S10primarycompany release2026-03-12revenue, EBITDA and its 38.4% margin, the order book, US cascades added in 2025, the capacity programme and the spot price of $200 per SWU
From an average US$193/SWU at the end of 2024, as reported by TradeTech and UxC, they reached an average of US$200/SWU by the end of December 2025.
backsC14C16C17 - S11secondarynews2024-10-11Urenco USA's capacity and 700,000 SWU addition due 2027; Orano's EUR1.7 billion, 2.5 million SWU French extension
The plant currently has a production capacity of 4600 tSWU per year.
backsC17 - S12secondarynews2007-04-16the 2007 licence: 11,500 machines, about 3.8 million SWU by 2012, $2.3 billion
Costs for the new plant are estimated at $2.3 billion.
backsC12 - S13secondarynews2026-01-06American Nuclear Society, Nuclear Newswire: DOE awards $2.7B for HALEU and LEU enrichment American Nuclear Societyeach awardee's plan: Orano's $5 billion Project IKE from 2031, General Matter at Paducah, GLE's laser plant and its $28.5M
If the plan holds, the facility will begin producing LEU in 2031.
backsC18 - S14primarycompany release2026-08-06a definitive LEU and HALEU contract with prepayments; no volume or price
Under the contract, X-energy will provide prepayments to Centrus to support its domestic commercial enrichment capacity program.
backsC30 - S15secondaryvendor data2026-10-04Research pack (FMP market data and FINRA short interest), as of 4 October 2026price, returns and the price decomposition, company value and multiples, the analyst series, short interest, insider rows and the Q3 consensusbacksC24C25C26C28
- S16primarycompany release2026-09-09a definitive multi-year HALEU contract with prepayments, and the unobligated claim; no volume or price
Centrus' AC100 centrifuge design is the only deployment-ready U.S.-origin technology available for unobligated enrichment today.
backsC30C31 - S17primarycompany release2026-09-17a definitive multi-year HALEU contract with prepayments, deliveries before the end of the decade; no volume or price
The new contract includes prepayments from Antares to support the expanded HALEU capacity.
backsC30 - S18primarycompany filing2026-04-24the executive officers and their start dates, beneficial ownership at 27 March 2026, the Class B holders, the 2025 corporate goals and payout, the long-term award's net income test and the CEO's employment agreementbacksC41C42C43
- S19primarycompany filing2026-11-04contingent backlog $5.4B ($5.1B definitive), total backlog $7.0B, revenue $55.5M, gross loss $10.6M; no plant cost or capacity
approximately $5.4 billion in contingent LEU and HALEU sales commitments, $5.1 billion of which are under definitive agreements
backsC06 - S20primarycompany filing2026-11-05backsC46
- S21primarytranscript2026-11-05Third quarter 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 2026-11-05data/cache/transcripts/LEU-2026Q3.jsonthe investor day date, capital-spend ramp, guidance kept, commercial HALEU, backlog mix and the supplier acquisition
We have maintained our capital spend guidance.
backsC47 - S22primarycompany filing2026-11-09trailing revenue, operating profit, stock pay, tax, debt, cash and the diluted share countbacksC49
- S23secondaryvendor data2026-11-09the analysts' average revenue and operating profit for the next three fiscal years, and the closebacksC48C49
- S24primarycompany release2026-11-12definitive multi-year HALEU contracts with Oklo, with prepayments, deliveries from 2029; no volume or price; $5.4B of customer contracts and commitments from the new capacity
The agreements formalize the June 2026 letter of intent between Oklo and Centrus and include enough HALEU to support up to five Aurora powerhouses for multiple years, with fuel deliveries from Centrus' American Centrifuge Plant in Pike County, Ohio, scheduled to begin in 2029.
backsC30