Twilio
This is the archived full research. Read the story
The company whose code sends the texts, log-in codes and phone calls behind thousands of apps, now selling the phone line for AI agents.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↑
Revenue grew 8.6%, 7.3% and 13.7% over three years and 16% organic in Q3 2026; the guide slows to 11-12%, then 10%.
Business quality3/4 ↑
Developers' code and carrier registrations make it sticky, with net expansion at 114%, but rivals sell the same product and it rents its networks.
Financial position4/4 →
$2.9B of cash and securities against $994M of notes, and about $1.2B of free cash flow guided for 2026.
Execution record3/4 ↑
Eight straight beats and a 2026 guide raised from 8-9% to 15% organic, after years of losses and a 2023 restructuring.
Per share capture3/4 →
Diluted shares fell 12% since 2023, but stock pay near 10% of revenue takes about half of free cash flow.
Potential3/4 →
Trillions of US messages and minutes and 2.7 million customer service jobs AI agents could take, but no AI-agent revenue is filed.
Risk profile3/4 →
No customer near 10% and net cash, but 76% usage revenue customers can cut and rented carrier networks.
Valuation1/4 →
About 80.6 times GAAP operating profit after cash, 332% of a three-stage value near $64: priced for perfection, above even the bull case.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Filed figures carry revenue, margins and cash, but product revenue and the AI-agent line rest on management's word.
If it works 0.7× · if it fails you keep about 56%.
The Verdict
We rate Twilio Unattractive, with high conviction. It is a solid business getting better: sales grew 16% in the third quarter of 2026 before pass-through fees, customers spend more each year, and losses turned to profit. But once the shares it pays staff are counted as a cost, it keeps only about 7 cents of each sales dollar, and rivals offer the same. The price is about three times our estimate of its value and above even our sunny case, so it is priced for perfection. As a bet on AI agents it is priced for success: the price already assumes they arrive. Only a much lower price changes that.
The long caseIf AI agents take over routine customer calls, each one still needs a phone line, a voice connection and a trusted identity.
How we weighed it
The price against our value
Against it
Price at 332% of our value
The price is several times our base value and above our sunny case.
The business
In its favour
Solid
Sticky with developers, customers spending more each year, net cash and growing free cash flow.
Growth against what the price assumes
Cuts both ways
Growth sped up this year, but the guide slows it and carrier fees flatter it.
What could go wrong
Cuts both ways
Customers can cut usage at any time and it rents the networks it sells, but no customer is large.
Against competitors
Cuts both ways
Ranked near the top, but rivals offer the same product, some cheaper, and the cloud giants offer the parts.
How its group is behaving
Cuts both ways
Software that AI might help or replace trades on mood, and joining the index lifted it.
The latest news and report
Against it
The last report grew fast but guided slower, and the shares fell on it.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
Management says about 4 points of the 114% come from US carrier fees passed through (C16), so the underlying figure is nearer 110%.
On the adjusted margin the company reports, with stock pay added back, the value would be roughly double; the thesis counts stock pay as a cost.
No AI-agent revenue is filed, so neither the 1% nor the deal's size can be checked (C01).
The company
Twilio sells building blocks for talking to customers. A bank's app that texts you a log-in code, a delivery app that calls the driver, a shop that emails a receipt: often the message goes through Twilio, which has contracts with phone networks around the world and wraps them in simple code.
Its newest product connects a business's AI model to a live phone call, so an AI agent can answer customers. An outside research firm ranks Twilio among the top three sellers of this kind of service.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
How it makes money
About three quarters of the money is fees per text sent and per minute of calls; the rest is subscriptions for email and customer data. Most customers can cut their use any time, but none is large: the ten biggest are 9% of sales. Part of the fee is the phone carriers' own charge, passed on with no profit on it.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The release counts $53.1M of these fees in Q3 (C02); the full-year figure is management's estimate.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (Q3 2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Usage-based | 76% | Fees per message sent or received and per minute of calls, mostly Messaging and Voice, prepaid by card or billed monthly under contracts. |
| Subscription-based | 24% | Contracts for Email and Segment, recognised evenly over the term. |
Who runs it
Khozema Shipchandler, the former finance chief, has run Twilio since January 2024; Aidan Viggiano is finance chief. Insiders own under 1%. Bonuses pay on growth and on profit before share pay. An activist fund, Sachem Head, has a director on the board and sold 3.2 million shares this year.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Once a company's apps are written to call Twilio, moving means rewriting and retesting that code and moving its phone numbers, so customers tend to stay and grow. Existing customers spent $1.14 a year later for each dollar, about $1.10 without the carriers' fees.
For AI agents the price is small next to what they save: a minute of AI voice through Twilio lists at about 8 cents, against about 36 cents a minute for a customer-service worker's median wage.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
Management says about 4 points of the 114% come from US carrier fees passed through (C16), so the underlying figure is nearer 110%.
The release counts $53.1M of these fees in Q3 (C02); the full-year figure is management's estimate.
Large customers pay negotiated prices below list (C13), and the AI model's own cost sits outside Twilio's fee.
The threat
Several rivals sell the same thing: Infobip, Sinch and Vonage rank beside Twilio, and Bandwidth owns its own US phone network. Amazon and Microsoft sell the parts for businesses building their own AI call centres. Twilio rents most of its networks, so it competes on software and reach, not on owning the wires.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The rivals: ERIC, BAND, AMZN, MSFT, and 2 more that are private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Private | InfobipPriced against it: Private | Communications APIs and software | On sale | Private |
| SinchPriced against it: Listed abroad | Communications APIs and software | On sale | Listed abroad | |
| ERIC | Vonage, owned by EricssonPriced against it: Not checked | Communications APIs and software | On sale | Not checked |
| BAND | BandwidthPriced against it: Not checked | Communications APIs and software | On sale | Not checked |
| AMZN · MSFT | Amazon Connect and Microsoft's contact-centre toolsPriced against it: Not checked | AI agent infrastructure | On sale | Not checked |
How big it could get
How big this could get
Americans sent nearly 2.2 trillion texts and spent over 2.4 trillion minutes on calls in 2024, and about 2.7 million work as customer-service agents. Nobody counts how much of that traffic businesses send, so the size of Twilio's market cannot be pinned down; one research firm puts the field at about $28B a year worldwide.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 19% over the twelve months to Sep 2026, faster than the 14% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is 6.8%, up from −21% in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 42¢ of each sales dollar, down from 81¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
Each dollar put into the business earns 4.2% a year after tax, about where it was (1.1%) in the year to Dec 2025.
The business brought in $1.19B of cash from operations, 20% of sales, before capital spending, which the filer does not tag.
It holds $2.89B of cash against $994M of debt, $1.90B more cash than it owes.
The share count fell 7.1% in 4.8 years, and pay in shares costs 10% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-11-16. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Sep 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $2.84B | $3.83B | $4.15B | $4.46B | $5.07B | $5.83B |
| Sales growth | +61% | +35% | +8.6% | +7.3% | +14% | +19% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 49% | 47% | 49% | 51% | 49% | 49% |
| Operating margin | −32% | −32% | −21% | −1.2% | 3.1% | 6.8% |
| Net margin | −33% | −33% | −24% | −2.5% | 0.7% | 22% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 28% | 28% | 23% | 23% | 20% | 18% |
| Sales and marketing | 37% | 33% | 25% | 19% | 17% | 15% |
| General and admin | 17% | 14% | 11% | 10% | 8.1% | 7.6% |
| Pay in shares | 22% | 21% | 16% | 14% | 12% | 10% |
| Capital spending | 1.6% | - | - | - | - | - |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | −$58.2M | −$254M | $415M | $716M | $1.00B | $1.19B |
| Free cash flow | −$104M | - | - | - | - | - |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $5.36B | $4.16B | $4.01B | $2.38B | $2.47B | $2.89B |
| Debt | $986M | $987M | $989M | $991M | $992M | $994M |
| Net cash | $4.37B | $3.17B | $3.02B | $1.39B | $1.48B | $1.90B |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | - | - | - | - | 1.1% | 4.2% |
| Shares (diluted) | 174M | 183M | 183M | 166M | 160M | 162M |
What growth costs
Growth has got cheaper: from 2023 to 2025 sales rose 22% while spending on selling and offices fell and the staff count stayed flat, turning a loss into a profit. Research spending still rises, and share pay still takes about 10 cents a dollar.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The last report (29 Oct)
Quarter ended September 2026, filed figures.
In the third quarter of 2026 sales rose 20% to $1.56B, or 16% without carrier fees and purchases. Existing customers spent $1.14 for each dollar a year before, up from $1.09. Profit under accounting rules was $148.6M, about 10% of sales.
The forecast for the fourth quarter is 11% to 12% growth without fees, slower than the third, and the shares fell 15.2% the next day.
What it did to the thesisIt showed the business improving, with customers spending more and profit rising, but the slower forecast removes the speed the price was paying for.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $1.65 against $1.47 expected; $1.00 as filed, the gap being what the company adds back.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Management says about 4 points of the 114% come from US carrier fees passed through (C16), so the underlying figure is nearer 110%.
- Organic growth guided at 11% to 12% for Q4 is below the 16% of Q3 (C02), so the guide itself is a slowdown.
- The CFO told analysts the first half's beats of 5% or more should not be read as normal; 2% to 4% is the usual size (C06).
What management did with the money
It bought back about $3.3B of shares since 2024, cutting the count about 12%, though lately buybacks only match the new shares it pays staff. It bought Stytch, a small company that checks the identity of AI agents, for about $104M.
Insiders in 2026Q3: 11 purchases and 34 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The diluted count rose from 159.8M in 2025 to 161.7M in Q3 2026 as the buyback slowed to $127.2M a quarter against stock pay of $153.9M (C07).
The purchase price is about 2% of a year's revenue (C03), so the 10-K treats it as immaterial; nothing on revenue is disclosed.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Priced for perfection. The price is about 332% of what we think the business is worth, at an 8% yearly return.
The shares rose 64.5% in a year, mostly because buyers paid more for each dollar of sales. They joined the S&P 500 in October 2026, then fell 15.2% after the third-quarter report forecast slower growth.
The next check is the fourth-quarter report in February 2027, with a forecast for 2027 and an Investor Day in April where AI-agent sales may be shown for the first time.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- Organic growth guided at 11% to 12% for Q4 is below the 16% of Q3 (C02), so the guide itself is a slowdown.
- The CFO told analysts the first half's beats of 5% or more should not be read as normal; 2% to 4% is the usual size (C06).
How we value it
- Method
- Cash the business will produce, in three stages
- Required return
- 8%
- Long-run growth
- 4%
- Moat
- An average moat
| Bear | Base | Bull | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | 6.5%, 5.4%, 3% | 12.9%, 10.8%, 6% | 16.1%, 13.5%, 7.5% |
| Normal operating margin | 6.9% | 8.6% | 9.4% |
| Return on new capital after year ten | 8% | 12% | 15% |
| Value a share | $41.90 | $63.63 | $77.37 |
- Price
- $211
- Priced on
- 13 Nov
- Price as a share of the base value
- 332%
- Yearly return the price offers on the base case
- 5%
Where each figure comes from
| Figure | Source | Where exactly |
|---|---|---|
| Sales, the last twelve months | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 30 Oct 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Operating margin today | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 30 Oct 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Tax rate | Our method's rule | The normal rate where no rate is filed to read: 25% for a US company, 21% elsewhere. |
| Sales per dollar of new capital | Filed report | Annual report (10-K) for the period to 31 Dec 2025, filed 24 Feb 2026: the year's sales over its operating capital, held to between 0.5 and 6. |
| Shares | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 30 Oct 2026; the diluted share count. |
| Cash and investments | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 30 Oct 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Debt | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 30 Oct 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus for the years to 31 Dec 2026, 31 Dec 2027, 31 Dec 2028 and 31 Dec 2029: the average of 11 to 23 analysts' revenue estimates, 12.9%, 10.8%, 6%. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Normal operating margin | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus operating margin for the year to 31 Dec 2028, the average of 23 analysts' estimates, 18.6%, less stock pay of 10.1% of sales. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Return on new capital after year ten | Our method's rule | Set by our reading of the moat: the 8% rate with none, 12% with an average one, 15% with a strong one; the bear case earns the rate. |
| The bear and bull cases | Our method's rule | Our method's spread: the bear case takes half the growth and a fifth off the margin, the bull a quarter more growth and a tenth more margin. |
| Price | Market price | FMP's closing price on 13 Nov 2026. |
| Other investments | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 30 Oct 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
What each case rests on
Bear caseGrowth runs at half the analysts' path, 6.5%, 5.4% and 3.0%, the margin after stock pay settles at 6.9%, a fifth under the base, and new capital earns only the 8% rate: the test if AI agents add little.
Base caseRevenue grows 12.9%, 10.8% and 6.0%, the analysts' path (C44), then fades toward 4%; the margin moves to 8.6%, the analysts' 18.6% for 2028 less stock pay of 10.05% (C09); new capital earns 12% for an average moat.
Bull caseGrowth runs a quarter above the analysts' path, 16.1%, 13.5% and 7.5%, the margin reaches 9.4%, and new capital earns 15%, as if AI agents add a second leg of growth.
What moves the base value
| Lower | Higher | |
|---|---|---|
| Growth in years 1 to 3, a quarter lower or higher | $59.81 | $67.73 |
| The normal margin, 15% lower or higher | $56.22 | $71.04 |
| Capital per dollar of growth, a quarter more or less | $62.70 | $64.19 |
| Return on new capital after year ten, at the rate or one step up | $54.06 | $67.46 |
| The rate, a point higher or lower | $53.66 | $80.19 |
| Long-run growth a point lower | $58.86 | - |
Value a share as growth and margin change
| Normal margin ↓ · growth → | 50% | 75% | 100% | 125% | 150% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6.9% | $48.03 | $50.79 | $53.74 | $56.92 | $60.32 |
| 7.7% | $52.15 | $55.30 | $58.69 | $62.32 | $66.22 |
| 8.6% | $56.26 | $59.81 | $63.63 | $67.73 | $72.12 |
| 9.5% | $60.37 | $64.32 | $68.57 | $73.13 | $78.02 |
| 10.3% | $64.48 | $68.83 | $73.51 | $78.54 | $83.93 |
Growth is shown as a share of the base case's. Green: the price is at or under 80% of that value. Red: at or over 120%.
How we read the multiple
Net of its cash, the business costs buyers about $32B. It earned about $398M of operating profit over the last four quarters under accounting rules, so the price is about 81 times that profit.
Analysts expect sales to grow about 11% a year to 2028. Even on that path, with share pay counted as a cost, we value the shares at about $64, and about $77 in our sunny case.
Against its own history. Buyers now pay more for each dollar of sales than they did a year ago, while sales per share grew far less than the price.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
On non-GAAP operating income of about $1.2B guided for 2026 (C05) the multiple is near 27, because stock pay is added back.
On the adjusted margin the company reports, with stock pay added back, the value would be roughly double; the thesis counts stock pay as a cost.
Management's own 2027 floor of at least 10% organic growth (C06) sits close to the analysts' 11.7%, leaving little room for a miss.
Priced against its rivals
Its rivals have not yet been checked against their own filings, so there is no group to price it against; the price is judged against its own history instead.
The bet: what it pays if it works
The bet is on Twilio's AI-agent products: the connection that puts an AI model on a live phone call, and checking the identity of AI agents. Today they are a sliver of its voice calls and report no sales.
Even if they grow several times over, the shares would still be worth less than today. Most of today's price already assumes the AI products succeed, so this bet is priced for success.
| AI agent infrastructure revenue in two to three years | Minutes of AI-agent voice a year needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $250.00M | about 3.0B at 100% kept | 0.6× |
| $500.00M (the big win) | about 6.0B at 100% kept | 0.7× |
| $1.00B | about 11.9B at 100% kept | 0.8× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $5.63B of AI agent infrastructure revenue (about 67.0B minutes of AI-agent voice a year); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $17.09B of AI agent infrastructure revenue (about 203.4B minutes of AI-agent voice a year), at the same multiple.
Each row is AI agent infrastructure alone, plus the rest of the company (Communications APIs: messaging, voice, email, verification and Segment) counted at about $16.10B.
The steps it has to take
- Done First eight-figure voice AI contract signed
- Done Stytch bought for agent identity
- In progress Agent identity reaches general availability due 2027-12
- Not started AI-agent revenue disclosed due 2027-04
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 5 claims
No AI-agent revenue is filed, so neither the 1% nor the deal's size can be checked (C01).
The purchase price is about 2% of a year's revenue (C03), so the 10-K treats it as immaterial; nothing on revenue is disclosed.
On the adjusted margin the company reports, with stock pay added back, the value would be roughly double; the thesis counts stock pay as a cost.
Management's own 2027 floor of at least 10% organic growth (C06) sits close to the analysts' 11.7%, leaving little room for a miss.
Where we disagree with the market
An AI winner whose turnaround is done and whose growth will speed up as AI agents need phone lines.
A real business getting better, but the price pays for AI-agent sales nobody has reported, on profit share pay mostly uses up.
Most analysts rate it a buy, more than in March. They read the profit Twilio reports before share pay; we count share pay as a cost.
Where we could be wrong: if Twilio reports AI-agent sales near $500M a year while growth stays above 15%, the business would be worth far more than we think.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
On non-GAAP operating income of about $1.2B guided for 2026 (C05) the multiple is near 27, because stock pay is added back.
On the adjusted margin the company reports, with stock pay added back, the value would be roughly double; the thesis counts stock pay as a cost.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Customers can walk. About three quarters of sales are fees most customers can cut any time, with no long contract.
- Same product, cheaper. Rivals sell the same service, some at lower list prices, and one owns its network.
- Rented networks. Twilio relies on phone carriers it does not own; two of them ran into trouble this year.
- Fees that flatter growth. Carrier charges passed through add sales but no profit.
- Insiders selling. No insider bought shares this year; the activist on the board sold heavily.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The release counts $53.1M of these fees in Q3 (C02); the full-year figure is management's estimate.
What we still do not know
- How much AI agents earn Twilio. It reports no sales by product.
- How much customers grow their spending without the carriers' fees, quarter by quarter.
- Why Twilio stopped reporting its customer count in 2026.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
No AI-agent revenue is filed, so neither the 1% nor the deal's size can be checked (C01).
Management says about 4 points of the 114% come from US carrier fees passed through (C16), so the underlying figure is nearer 110%.
What would change our view
- Unattractive→NeutralThe price falls back within 20% of fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price falls to about $76.36, 20% above what we think the business is worth.about ≈$67.35 today, 68% below the last close
- Unattractive→AttractiveThe price falls 20% under fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price falls to about $50.90, 80% of what we think the business is worth.about ≈$40.36 today, 81% below the last close
- Unattractive→NeutralAI agents become a second business with filed revenue
It needs all of:
- ○Twilio reports AI-agent sales of $500M a year or more.checked at the next results, due by 11 Feb
- ○Sales grow 15% or more for a full year without fees or purchases.checked at the next results, due by 11 Feb
We would also be wrong if
- Sales growth without fees or purchases falls below 8% for two quarters running.
- Existing customers fall below $1.05 a year later for each dollar, without carrier fees.
What is coming
- 11 February 2027 Q4 2026 results and the 2027 guide: Whether organic growth holds at 11% to 12% and the 2027 guide keeps at least 10% organic, and net expansion before carrier fees.
Every dated event ahead
- 11 February 2027 Q4 2026 results and the 2027 guide: Whether organic growth holds at 11% to 12% and the 2027 guide keeps at least 10% organic, and net expansion before carrier fees.
- 14 April 2027 Investor Day: Whether Twilio discloses AI-agent revenue and new medium-term targets.
- 30 April 2027 2027 proxy statement: Whether pay keeps riding on adjusted profit, and the Sachem Head director's holding.
Since we wrote this
- 16 NovThesis writtenUnattractive, high convictionThe business is improving fast, but with stock pay counted as a cost it is worth about a third of the price, below even the bull case.
Sources 17
Sources - 17
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-24Item 1 products, the Super Network and the competition classes, Active Customer Accounts, top-ten account share, the Stytch purchase, the Syniverse stake and its transactions, buybacks, notes, headcount, statementsbacksC01C03C08C09C10C14C19C25C33C37C40C46
- S02primarycompany filing2026-10-30usage-based share of revenue, remaining performance obligations, revenue by region, balance sheet, purchase commitments, the prepaid impairment, the tax valuation-allowance release, Syniverse transactions, the share count at 16 October 2026backsC02C08C09C11C13C33C35C36C37C47C48
- S03primarycompany filing2026-10-29revenue, organic growth, net expansion, GAAP and non-GAAP margins, stock pay, free cash flow, the buyback, headcount, and the Q4 and full-year 2026 guidebacksC02C04C05C07C10C12C17C34C46
- S04primarytranscript2026-10-29Q3 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP)data/cache/transcripts/TWLO-2026Q3.jsonmessaging and voice growth, carrier fees, voice AI penetration, the first eight-figure voice AI deal, the identity private beta, the preliminary 2027 outlook and the April 2027 Investor Day
Our go-to-market team landed notable wins, including our first 8-figure conversations deal with a health insurance provider.
backsC06C15C16C18C19 - S05primarycompany filing2026-02-122025 revenue and organic growth, GAAP and non-GAAP operating income, free cash flow, net expansion, and the first 2026 guidebacksC03C04C12C34
- S06primarycompany filing2026-04-28executive officers and their records, beneficial ownership, the Sachem Head cooperation agreement, bonus and performance-share metricsbacksC38C39C49
- S07primarycompany release2026-11-16list prices for US calls and for Conversation Relay, the voice AI connector
Media Streams $0.0044 / min SIPREC $0.0044 / min Conversation Relay $0.07 / min
backsC31 - S08primaryindustry data2025-09-01US text messages and voice minutes in 2024
In total, Americans exchanged nearly 2.2T SMS and MMS text messages last year, more than any other year besides 2020
backsC29 - S09primarygovernment data2026-11-16US Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Outlook Handbook: Customer Service Representatives US Bureau of Labor Statisticsjobs in 2025, the median wage, and the 2025-2035 projection
The median hourly wage for customer service representatives was $21.53 in May 2025.
backsC30 - S10secondaryindustry data2024-03-18TelecomTV on Juniper Research's CPaaS leaderboard Juniper ResearchJuniper's ranking of CPaaS vendors and its size of the market in 2024
As the chart above shows, Sinch and Twilio also ranked in the top three, followed by Ericsson subsidiary Vonage
backsC28 - S11primarycompany filing2026-02-19a rival's description of the same CPaaS product, sold on owning its own network
We believe we are the only Communications Platform as a Service (“CPaaS”) provider that also owns and operates a cloud communications network with our global reach
backsC26 - S12primarycompany filing2026-02-26a contact-centre vendor naming Twilio, Amazon and Microsoft as build-your-own rivals
Amazon.com, Inc., or Amazon, Twilio Inc., or Twilio, and Microsoft, have introduced solutions aimed at companies who wish to build their own contact centers and/or contact center components with developers
backsC27 - S13secondarynews2026-10-01the index change: Twilio into the S&P 500, effective before the open on 6 October 2026backsC22
- S14secondaryvendor data2026-11-16TWLO research pack (FMP market tier, FINRA short interest, headcount), frozen 2026-11-16content/TWLO/research-pack.jsonthe 13 November close of $211.21, daily bars, returns and their split, analyst ratings and their history, price-target drift, earnings beats, insider filings, short interest, headcountbacksC21C23C24C41C42C43C46
- S15secondaryvendor data2026-11-16the analysts' average revenue for 2026 to 2030 and operating margin for 2028, with the count of analystsbacksC44
- S16primarycompany filing2026-11-16every open-market sale, its Rule 10b5-1 flag, and the Sachem Head sales through director Andrew StafmanbacksC24
- S17tertiarynews2026-10-30the stated objection on the day of the 15.2% fall (headline only; the article refused the fetch)read, but no claim rests on it