SK hynix
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SK hynix makes the memory chips computers think and store with, and leads in HBM, the stacked memory packed beside AI processors.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↑
Revenue rose 47% in 2025 and 328% on the year in Q3 2026, all organic, but mostly price, and 2023's loss shows it reverses.
Business quality3/4 ↑
One of three DRAM makers at scale with over half of HBM, but Samsung ships HBM4 and 2023's loss shows scale cannot hold price.
Financial position4/4 ↑
Won 98.7 trillion of net cash at 30 September after Won 27.5 trillion of 2025 capital spending and a Won 100 trillion return plan.
Execution record3/4 ↑
First to volume in HBM3E and HBM4 with yields ahead of plan, but Q3 2026 EPS missed by a third on investment losses.
Per share capture3/4 ↑
About Won 100 trillion returned in 2026, but July's offering added 2.5% of shares and half the buyback goes to staff pay.
Potential3/4 ↑
Memory revenue roughly tripled in a year and fourteen agreements cover over half of 2027 and 2028, but their prices are unfiled.
Risk profile3/4 →
One customer is 23.9% of revenue, Chinese fabs need US licences and 2023 lost Won 9.1 trillion; net cash cushions all three.
Valuation3/4 ↑
About 20.7 times normal-year operating profit, about 102% of a three-stage value near $125 once peak memory prices are half unwound: neither cheap nor dear.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Statements are audited or filed and market shares measured by TrendForce and IDC, but the agreements' terms rest on management.
The Verdict
We rate SK hynix Neutral. It leads in HBM, the memory AI chips need most, and fourteen customers have signed five-year agreements for over half of 2027 and 2028, so the business is solid. But analysts forecast on today's shortage prices, memory sells at a market price, and in 2023 the same business lost money. Valued on a normal year, with half the fall to a normal margin coming from lower prices, the price sits about at our value: fair, not cheap.
The long caseAI accelerators need HBM that only three firms can make, and new fabs take years; SK hynix leads it and needs the shortage to outlast past memory booms.
How we weighed it
The price against our value
Cuts both ways
Price at 102% of our value
The price is about at our normal-year value, with the bear case far below.
The business
In its favour
Solid
The leader in high-bandwidth memory with long agreements signed.
Growth against what the price assumes
Cuts both ways
Profit is a shortage peak, and the value assumes it falls back.
What could go wrong
Against it
The shortage ends, the agreements' prices are private, a bigger rival ships the newest memory and China grows.
Against competitors
Cuts both ways
There is no usable filed cohort; its own history mixes currencies.
How its group is behaving
Against it
Memory names move together on the shortage; its profit is the group's cycle.
The latest news and report
In its favour
The latest report showed the shortage still widening margins and the newest memory shipping.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
- No agreement is filed, no counterparty named and no floor price, volume or deposit amount disclosed (S01, S02).
- The prospectus says quantities and prices are typically agreed at the time of purchase (C27).
TrendForce's June 2026 bulletin projected SK hynix's 2026 HBM share falling as Samsung gains on HBM4; that bulletin is paid and was not read, so only its headline is known.
In 2023 operating profit was a loss of Won 7,730 billion, so a cycle's average sits far below today's pace (C26).
Annualising a record quarter assumes it repeats; in 2023 the same business lost money (C26), so the past-year multiple is the steadier reading.
Management says HBM and the agreements keep profit far above past peaks (C07, C06).
An average of a handful of forecasts that has moved with each print; the company's own guidance covers at most the next year, and the analysts' operating profit is usually the adjusted figure, before stock pay.
Read on the full analysts' path, as before 10 November, it is worth about $314; counting all of the margin drop as price, about $81. Half is a stated judgement, since part of any memory downturn is volume. At a 9% required return the base is about $107, and the bear case of $61.33 is the downturn test.
- 2026-11-10editeda business at a cycle peak that sells at a market price it does not set has its analysts' sales path cut by the price fall half its margin drop implies, the owner's rule of 10 November
- 2026-11-10editedre-valued on the owner's rules of 10 November: the return on new capital glides to its terminal level over years six to ten
The company
SK hynix makes two kinds of memory chip. DRAM is the fast working memory every processor needs; HBM is DRAM chips stacked into a tower right beside an AI processor, to feed it data fast. NAND flash keeps data with the power off, much of it sold as data-centre drives through Solidigm, its US arm.
DRAM is about three-quarters of sales. The buyers are AI chip makers, cloud companies and phone and PC makers; without SK hynix they would buy from Samsung, Micron or, for ordinary chips, China's CXMT.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
TrendForce says Samsung moved into HBM4 mass production early enough to grow bits fastest of the three in 2Q26 (C15).
How it makes money
SK hynix sells memory by the bit, so sales are the bits shipped times the price per bit. Prices swing far more than volumes: in the third quarter DRAM shipments rose about a tenth while DRAM prices rose by over a quarter. Almost all of a price rise falls to profit, because the factories cost the same either way.
HBM is sold on yearly volume and price deals agreed in advance; ordinary chips mostly sell at the going price.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
TrendForce says SK hynix's price gains lagged its rivals' in 2Q26 because HBM, sold on agreed terms, is a larger share of its bits (C16).
Management says HBM and the agreements keep profit far above past peaks (C07, C06).
TrendForce expects ordinary DRAM contract prices to rise 10% to 15% in the fourth quarter, slower than earlier in 2026 (C19).
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY 2025) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| DRAM, including HBM | 77.1% | Working memory sold as chips, server and mobile modules and HBM stacks for AI accelerators. |
| NAND flash | 21.3% | Flash sold mostly inside data center and PC SSDs, much of it through Solidigm. |
| Other | 1.6% | Foundry work for other chip designers through two subsidiaries, and other products. |
Who runs it
Kwak Noh-jung has been chief executive since 2022, after running manufacturing and technology, and took HBM3E and HBM4 to volume. SK square, controlled by the SK Group, owns about a fifth of the shares. Staff share 10% of operating profit, so pay rises and falls with it. As a foreign company, its officers file no US insider trading reports.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Memory is hard to make at scale: three companies make almost 90% of the world's DRAM, and each spends tens of trillions of won a year on factories. SK hynix leads the hardest part, HBM, with over half of the market, after being first to stack chips this way and developing the bonding method it uses.
That keeps new rivals out but does not hold prices up. Most of today's margin is the shortage, which is why customers signed long agreements to be sure of supply.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- Scale did not protect 2023, when SK hynix lost money (C26).
- Samsung's early HBM4 shipments grew its bits fastest in 2Q26 (C15).
TrendForce's June 2026 bulletin projected SK hynix's 2026 HBM share falling as Samsung gains on HBM4; that bulletin is paid and was not read, so only its headline is known.
TrendForce says Samsung moved into HBM4 mass production early enough to grow bits fastest of the three in 2Q26 (C15).
Management says HBM and the agreements keep profit far above past peaks (C07, C06).
- No agreement is filed, no counterparty named and no floor price, volume or deposit amount disclosed (S01, S02).
- The prospectus says quantities and prices are typically agreed at the time of purchase (C27).
The threat
Samsung, the biggest DRAM maker, is shipping its own HBM4 and grew its shipments faster in mid-2026. Micron sells the same three products to the same buyers. And China's CXMT has grown to about a tenth of world DRAM sales in ordinary chips.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The rivals: MU, SNDK, and 2 more that are private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Samsung Electronics HBM4Priced against it: Listed abroad | DRAM, including HBM | On sale | Listed abroad | |
| MU | Micron HBM and server DRAMPriced against it: Same product | DRAM, including HBM | On sale | Same product |
| CXMT (ChangXin Memory Technologies) DDR5 and LPDDR5Priced against it: Listed abroad | DRAM, including HBM | On sale | Listed abroad | |
| MU · SNDK | Samsung, Kioxia, Micron and Sandisk data center SSDsPriced against it: Same product | NAND, including Solidigm | On sale | Same product |
How big it could get
How big this could get
World DRAM sales reached $154.7B in a single quarter of 2026, and the top five flash makers sold $68.9B. Gartner, quoted by the company, expects the memory market to nearly triple in 2026, with HBM growing from $33B in 2025 toward $86B in 2027, and TrendForce sees contract prices still rising this quarter.
Those are sales at today's prices. Nobody publishes how much memory the world will need once prices fall back, so the market beyond 2027 is unmeasured.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Gartner's own history in the half-year report shows DRAM revenue fell 36.5% in 2023 after a 15.4% fall in 2022 (S13).
Who has signed
Fourteen customers, including large cloud companies, have signed long-term agreements, usually for five years, covering over half of 2027 and 2028 output, management says. HBM volumes and prices for 2027 are agreed. The terms are not filed, and prices inside the agreements still move with the market within a range.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- No agreement is filed, no counterparty named and no floor price, volume or deposit amount disclosed (S01, S02).
- The prospectus says quantities and prices are typically agreed at the time of purchase (C27).
TrendForce expects ordinary DRAM contract prices to rise 10% to 15% in the fourth quarter, slower than earlier in 2026 (C19).
The results
What growth costs
Growth made SK hynix far more profitable, because research and overheads barely moved while prices soared, so they shrank to a sliver of sales. What does grow with profit is the factory bill and staff profit sharing. The lever works in reverse: in 2023, when prices fell, the company lost money.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The last report (27 Oct)
Quarter ended September 2026, filed figures.
In the third quarter of 2026 sales rose 32% from the quarter before to Won 104.6 trillion and operating profit 38% to Won 83.3 trillion, 80 cents of each sales dollar. Prices did most of the work: DRAM prices rose by over a quarter, shipments by about a tenth, and HBM4 began shipping.
Net profit fell to Won 39.8 trillion, because a weaker won and a markdown of investments it holds cost Won 32.6 trillion. That is why earnings per share missed forecasts by a third while sales beat.
What it did to the thesisIt showed the shortage still widening margins and HBM4 shipping, which supports the view. It did not show the profit lasting: the agreements' prices stayed private, and net profit fell on currency and investment losses outside the business.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $4.01 against $5.96 expected.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The figures are preliminary and unaudited; the 6-K says they may change (C03 itself, S02).
The 6-K does not split the Won 22.9 trillion by asset, so how much is the Kioxia stake rather than other holdings rests on management's word, and a further loss could recur.
TrendForce says SK hynix's price gains lagged its rivals' in 2Q26 because HBM, sold on agreed terms, is a larger share of its bits (C16).
No outside party measures HBM yield; the claim cannot be checked.
What management did with the money
SK hynix plans about Won 100 trillion of returns for 2026 in dividends and buybacks, with part of the buyback paying staff in shares. In July it sold 2.5% more shares as US-listed ADSs at $149 each.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
About Won 10 trillion of the new buyback goes to executive and staff pay, not cancellation (S05).
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Fair. The price is about what we think the business is worth once today's peak memory prices partly fall back, at an 8% yearly return.
The shares are 38% below their high and under the $149 they were sold at in July. It is the third fall in four months, the latest after a record quarter, on worries about how long the boom lasts and about US export licences for its China factories.
The next test is fourth-quarter results on 28 January 2027, which will show whether profit keeps rising and shipments grow as guided.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
SK hynix has filed no disclosure on it; the claim rests on one analyst note reported second hand.
TrendForce expects ordinary DRAM contract prices to rise 10% to 15% in the fourth quarter, slower than earlier in 2026 (C19).
How we value it
- Method
- Cash the business will produce, in three stages
- Required return
- 8%
- Long-run growth
- 4%
- Moat
- An average moat
| Bear | Base | Bull | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | 1%, -11.5%, -11% | 25.9%, 0.5%, 1.8% | 38.7%, 6.7%, 8.2% |
| Normal operating margin | 16.7% | 20.9% | 23% |
| Return on new capital after year ten | 8% | 12% | 15% |
| Value a share | $61.33 | $125 | $180 |
- Price
- $127
- Priced on
- 6 Nov
- Price as a share of the base value
- 102%
- Starting growth the price pays for
- 9.9%
- Yearly return the price offers on the base case
- 7.9%
- Risk check: valued at 10%, the rate for a cyclical or indebted business
- $94.54
Where each figure comes from
| Figure | Source | Where exactly |
|---|---|---|
| Sales, the last twelve months | Filed report | Read by hand from the filed statements; the period it was read from was not recorded. |
| Operating margin today | Filed report | Read by hand from the filed statements; the period it was read from was not recorded. |
| Tax rate | Filed report | Read by hand from the filed statements; the period it was read from was not recorded. |
| Sales per dollar of new capital | Filed report | Read by hand from the filed statements; the period it was read from was not recorded. |
| Shares | Filed report | Read by hand from the filed statements; the period it was read from was not recorded. |
| Cash and investments | Filed report | Read by hand from the filed statements; the period it was read from was not recorded. |
| Debt | Filed report | Read by hand from the filed statements; the period it was read from was not recorded. |
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus for the years to 31 Dec 2026, 31 Dec 2027 and 31 Dec 2028, as it stood when the value was struck on 10 Nov 2026: the average of 12 to 27 analysts' revenue estimates, cut by the price fall a peak margin implies: 25.9%, 0.5%, 1.8%. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Normal operating margin | Our judgement | Our reading of the evidence; each case below names it. |
| Return on new capital after year ten | Our method's rule | Set by our reading of the moat: the 8% rate with none, 12% with an average one, 15% with a strong one; the bear case earns the rate. |
| The bear and bull cases | Our judgement | Our reading of the evidence; each case below names it. |
| Price | Market price | FMP's closing price on 6 Nov 2026. |
What each case rests on
Bear caseGrowth runs at half the analysts' path, less the same price fall, 1%, minus 12% and minus 11%, the margin settles a fifth lower at 16.7%, and new capital earns only the 8% rate: the downturn test.
Base caseRevenue follows the analysts' path (C46), 60%, 28% and 29%, less the price fall half the margin drop from 74.5% to 20.9% implies: sales 49% of the path by year three, so 26%, 0% and 2%; then it fades toward 4%, closing 30% of the gap each year; the margin settles at its five-year average of 20.9%, not today's cycle peak.
Bull caseGrowth runs a quarter above the analysts' path, less the price fall, 39%, 7% and 8%, the margin reaches 23.0%, and new capital earns 15%.
What moves the base value
| Lower | Higher | |
|---|---|---|
| Growth in years 1 to 3, a quarter lower or higher | $118 | $131 |
| The normal margin, 15% lower or higher | $112 | $138 |
| Capital per dollar of growth, a quarter more or less | $123 | $126 |
| Return on new capital after year ten, at the rate or one step up | $108 | $131 |
| The rate, a point higher or lower | $107 | $154 |
| Long-run growth a point lower | $116 | - |
Value a share as growth and margin change
| Normal margin ↓ · growth → | 50% | 75% | 100% | 125% | 150% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 16.7% | $96.76 | $102 | $107 | $112 | $118 |
| 18.8% | $104 | $110 | $116 | $122 | $128 |
| 20.9% | $112 | $118 | $125 | $131 | $138 |
| 23% | $120 | $127 | $133 | $140 | $148 |
| 25.1% | $127 | $135 | $142 | $150 | $158 |
Growth is shown as a share of the base case's. Green: the price is at or under 80% of that value. Red: at or over 120%.
How we read the multiple
Buyers pay about $801B for the whole company after its net cash. Memory profits swing hard: the past year's operating profit was about $147B, but in 2023 it lost money.
To earn 6 cents after tax for each dollar paid, a common rule of thumb for what a share should earn, SK hynix must:
- Earn about Won 83.9 trillion of operating profit a year, indefinitely.
- That is 42% of the past year's operating profit.
- It is about one quarter's profit at the third quarter's pace, but 1.8 times 2025's.
Against its own history. The history on file predates the US listing and divides dollar prices by won profits, so it says nothing about this company's own normal.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The Won 20 trillion buyback under way and the Won 20.7 trillion of investment assets, chiefly the Kioxia bond, are left out, which overstates the value slightly.
In 2023 operating profit was a loss of Won 7,730 billion, so a cycle's average sits far below today's pace (C26).
Annualising a record quarter assumes it repeats; in 2023 the same business lost money (C26), so the past-year multiple is the steadier reading.
The figures are preliminary and unaudited; the 6-K says they may change (C03 itself, S02).
Priced against its rivals
Only Micron Technology sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., KIOXIA Holdings Corporation, ChangXin Memory Technologies.
Where we disagree with the market
A memory boom at its peak: profits this high always draw new supply, so pay little for each dollar of today's profit.
HBM and the long agreements make this boom longer and safer than past ones, and the price needs far less than today's profit.
The market has cut the shares three times in four months while each quarter's profit rose, pricing the length of the cycle rather than the quarter. We agree the cycle matters, but HBM takes far more factory space per bit, only three firms make it, and over half of the next two years is signed.
Against us: the agreements' prices are not public and still move with the market, Samsung is catching up in HBM4, and in 2023 the same factories lost money.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 7 claims
- No agreement is filed, no counterparty named and no floor price, volume or deposit amount disclosed (S01, S02).
- The prospectus says quantities and prices are typically agreed at the time of purchase (C27).
Management says HBM and the agreements keep profit far above past peaks (C07, C06).
- Every earlier memory shortage ended in a glut; SK hynix lost Won 9,138 billion in 2023 after prices fell from the third quarter of 2022 (C26).
- CXMT raised its share of DRAM revenue from 7.6% to 9.5% in one quarter and plans about 30% more capacity by 2027 (C17).
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- The shortage ends Profits this high draw new factories; when supply caught up in 2023, the company lost money.
- Agreements without public terms Prices inside the agreements move with the market, and the prospectus says buyers can cut orders.
- Samsung in HBM4 The biggest DRAM maker is shipping HBM4 and could take share in the next AI chips.
- China CXMT is growing in ordinary DRAM, and US licences for tools bound for SK hynix's own China factories are reported held up.
- One big customer Its largest customer was nearly a quarter of 2025 sales.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
Management says HBM and the agreements keep profit far above past peaks (C07, C06).
- No agreement is filed, no counterparty named and no floor price, volume or deposit amount disclosed (S01, S02).
- The prospectus says quantities and prices are typically agreed at the time of purchase (C27).
SK hynix has filed no disclosure on it; the claim rests on one analyst note reported second hand.
What we still do not know
- The price ranges in the long-term agreements, and what margin they earn when market prices fall.
- Whether SK hynix keeps over half of HBM once Samsung's HBM4 ships at volume.
- How much of the third quarter's investment loss was the Kioxia stake, and whether more follows.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- No agreement is filed, no counterparty named and no floor price, volume or deposit amount disclosed (S01, S02).
- The prospectus says quantities and prices are typically agreed at the time of purchase (C27).
TrendForce's June 2026 bulletin projected SK hynix's 2026 HBM share falling as Samsung gains on HBM4; that bulletin is paid and was not read, so only its headline is known.
The 6-K does not split the Won 22.9 trillion by asset, so how much is the Kioxia stake rather than other holdings rests on management's word, and a further loss could recur.
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveThe price falls 20% below fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price falls to about $99.74, 20% below what we think the business is worth.about ≈$98.43 today, 21% below the last close
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe price runs 20% above fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price rises to about $150, 20% above what we think the business is worth.about ≈$150.72 today, 22% above the last close
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe cycle turns on SK hynix's own numbers
It needs any of:
- ○Operating margin falls below 60% while DRAM contract prices fall.checked at the next results, due by 28 Jan
- ○A customer cuts, defers or walks away from a volume in a long-term agreement.watched as it happens
We would also be wrong if
- An outside count puts SK hynix below 40% of HBM sales in a 2027 quarter.
- US export licences block new tools for its China factories for a year.
What is coming
- 29 November 2026 Further disclosure on Solidigm's US NAND fab: Whether SK hynix commits up to Won 60 trillion to new NAND supply in the US.
Every dated event ahead
- 29 November 2026 Further disclosure on Solidigm's US NAND fab: Whether SK hynix commits up to Won 60 trillion to new NAND supply in the US.
- 28 January 2027 Fourth-quarter and full-year 2026 results: Whether DRAM shipments rose by the guided mid 20s percent, whether the margin held near 80%, and the year-end special dividend.
- 31 March 2027 First Yongin fab clean room opens: When the next large block of supply starts, the one the 2027 spending rise pays for.
- 30 April 2027 First annual report on Form 20-F: The first filed English annual report: customer concentration, the Kioxia bond's value, and any filed agreement terms.
Since we wrote this
- 10 NovThesis reviewMoved to Neutral: priced at 100% of a value near $127Re-valued with the analysts' sales path cut by the price fall half its margin drop implies, since memory sells at a market price.
- 9 NovThesis reviewStill Attractive: priced at 41% of a value near $314Re-valued in three stages at an 8% return, the method now drawn on every thesis: the price sits past the 20% margin of safety.
- 6 NovThesis writtenAttractive, medium convictionWritten on 6 November after the ADS fell 25% in six sessions following a record third quarter.
Sources 20
Sources - 20
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-07-10business, products, fabs, named competitors, customer concentration, revenue by product and region, risk factors, the Intel NAND conditions, the Kioxia stake, profit sharing, management, pay and ownership, audited statements, the share count and ADS ratiobacksC01C02C09C10C12C14C19C20C21C23C25C26C27C28C29C30C31C32C34C44C45
- S02primarycompany filing2026-10-28third-quarter and year-to-date revenue, operating profit, profit before tax and net profit, with the second quarter and the prior year beside thembacksC03C35C36
- S03primarycompany release2026-10-27cash, borrowings and net cash at 30 September; the long-term agreements; the 2027 investment plan; the shareholder return plan
The LTA volume secured to date corresponds to more than 50% of total production capacity for 2027 and 2028.
backsC03C06C07C08C10C11 - S04primarytranscript2026-10-27Third-quarter 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 2026-10-27, interpreted from Koreandata/cache/transcripts/SKHY-2026Q3.jsonshipments and prices by product, non-operating items, the long-term agreements, the fourth-quarter plan, HBM4 progress and yield, demand and supply outlook, capital spending, shareholder returns; eight analyst questions
Demand remains so strong that customers' volume requirement is more than double that of what we can supply today
backsC04C05C06C07C08C09C24 - S05primarycompany filing2026-10-28about Won 100 trillion of 2026 returns, the Kioxia special dividend, the Won 20 trillion buyback and its splitbacksC11
- S06primarycompany filing2026-10-28Won 20,000 a share, Won 14,103 billion in total, counted on the shares entitled at the resolution datebacksC11C13
- S07primaryindustry data2026-09-07DRAM industry revenue and each supplier's revenue and share for 2Q26, measured outside the company; Samsung's early HBM4 shipments; SK hynix's HBM-heavy mix
Samsung posted the strongest QoQ bit shipment growth among the three major suppliers in 2Q26, supported by its early move into HBM4 mass production and shipments. ... SK hynix ranked second. Since HBM accounted for the highest proportion of its total bit shipments among the top three suppliers, growth in ASP was relatively limited. Its 2Q26 revenue increased 37.9% QoQ to $38.59 billion, while market share edged down to 24.9%.
backsC15 - S08secondaryindustry data2026-09-24CXMT's DRAM revenue share by TrendForce's count, and CXMT's capacity plan as reported by Commercial Times
CXMT's monthly DRAM capacity is expected to rise from around 320,000 wafers currently to 420,000 wafers by 2027 ... According to TrendForce , CXMT's global DRAM revenue share rose to 9.5% in 2Q26 from 7.6% in 1Q26, placing it fourth behind Samsung at 39.4%, SK hynix at 24.9%, and Micron at 23.3%.
backsC16 - S09primaryindustry data2026-08-18top-five NAND revenue in 2Q26 and the SK hynix Group's NAND revenue, including Solidigm
the combined revenue of the top five publicly listed NAND Flash brands rose 77% QoQ to US$68.87 billion ... SK hynix Group, including SK hynix and Solidigm, ranked second. Continued ramp-up of its 321-layer process, strong orders for Solidigm's high-capacity QLC enterprise SSDs, and rising ASPs lifted NAND Flash revenue 89.5% QoQ to more than $14.27 billion.
backsC17 - S10primaryindustry data2026-09-30the 4Q26 contract price forecast for DRAM and NAND, and that long-term agreements make some suppliers' rises lag the market
Conventional DRAM contract prices are projected to grow 10-15% QoQ in 4Q26, while NAND Flash contract prices are expected to increase 15-20% ... On the pricing front, increases for some suppliers are expected to lag the market average due to pricing mechanisms stipulated in long-term agreements (LTAs).
backsC18 - S11primarycompany filing2025-10-03a rival's own list of competitors, naming SK hynix first among the Korean makersbacksC22
- S12secondaryvendor data2026-11-06Research pack frozen beside this thesis, 2026-11-06content/SKHY/research-pack.jsonclose of $123.90 on 2026-11-05 and the closes since listing, the analyst panel and its history, consensus estimates, the earnings surprise history, short interestbacksC34C35C36C38
- S13primarycompany filing2026-08-18the largest shareholder's stake at 30 June, employees and pay, second-quarter price and shipment trends, Gartner's market history, the Kioxia notebacksC29C30
- S14primarycompany filing2026-10-23that Solidigm ended its review of a pre-IPO raise and an IPObacksC33
- S15primarycompany filing2026-10-29that a reported Won 60 trillion US NAND fab is under review and nothing is decidedbacksC33
- S16primarycompany filing2026-08-17a NAND rival naming SK Hynix among the vertically integrated flash suppliers it competes withbacksC22
- S17tertiarynews2026-11-05the objection stated on the day of the November fall, and a Wedbush note on held-up US export licences for equipment bound for the China NAND fab
The agency has continued to hold up export licenses for chipmaking equipment shipments to SK Hynix's NAND flash plants inside China.
backsC37 - S18tertiarynews2026-11-04the objection stated in coverage of the October fall
However, it appears the sustainability of those earnings is being closely scrutinized.
read, but no claim rests on it - S19primarycompany filing2026-11-09trailing revenue, operating profit, stock pay, tax, debt, cash and the diluted share countbacksC47
- S20secondaryvendor data2026-11-09the analysts' average revenue and operating profit for the next three fiscal years, and the closebacksC46C47