Sezzle
This is the archived full research. Read the story
A lender for young shoppers: it splits a checkout purchase into four payments and sells a monthly membership that lets members spend more and in more places.
The scores
Growth4/4 ↑
Revenue up 42.6% and volume up 34.9% in the third quarter against online shopping's 8.4%, with revenue outgrowing volume.
Business quality2/4 →
Very profitable today, but nothing stops shoppers or merchants switching to far larger rivals selling the same product and membership, and industry margins were thin.
Financial position3/4 →
Small borrowings on one credit line with room unused and no bonds, but funding and origination rest on one bank and a covenant that rose.
Execution record3/4 ↑
The earnings guide rose from $4.35 to $5.50 in 2026 and the provision fell, but the 2025 On-Demand detour cost subscribers.
Per share capture4/4 →
Buybacks outrun small stock pay, so shares outstanding fall and earnings per share track profit.
Potential2/4 →
A large online market of which Sezzle has about 0.3%, but its new lines are tiny and its larger rivals chase the same young shoppers.
Risk profile2/4 →
Mostly subprime borrowers untested in a recession at this size, one originating bank, unnamed platform concentration and a largely pledged founder stake.
Valuation1/4 →
About 218% of an excess-return value near $74 and above the bull case near $104: priced for perfection.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Figures are filed and the threat and market sourced outside the company, but platform concentration is unnamed and the analyst panel thin.
If it works 0.6× · if it fails you keep about 57%.
The Verdict
We rate Sezzle Unattractive, with high conviction. It lends small sums at the checkout to young shoppers and sells them a membership; revenue is growing fast, profit is high and losses have fallen, so the business is solid. The price asks far more: it sits above even our hopeful case and needs Sezzle to keep earning about two-thirds of its equity every year for decades, with no moat against much larger rivals, one partner bank and loans to mostly subprime shoppers. As a bet on its cash and payment lines and its own bank it is priced for success: shareholders keep a little over half if they fail.
The long caseYoung shoppers are moving from credit cards to short instalments and memberships; Sezzle sells its members cash, payments and, one day, a bank account.
How we weighed it
The price against our value
Against it
Price at 218% of our value
The price sits above our bull case, let alone our base, with no margin of safety.
The business
Cuts both ways
Solid
Growth, profit and credit are strong today, but nothing stops shoppers or merchants switching and the regulator's data show thin margins across the industry.
Growth against what the price assumes
Against it
Growth is strong, yet the price assumes the very high return on equity holds for decades rather than fading as a business without a moat usually does.
What could go wrong
Against it
Loans go mostly to subprime shoppers and have not met a recession at this size; one bank lends, a few platforms carry much of the volume, and the founder's stake is largely pledged.
Against competitors
Against it
Klarna and Affirm are many times larger, offer the same product and a paid membership, and neither names Sezzle as a rival.
How its group is behaving
Cuts both ways
Pay-later lenders move together on credit and rate news, and the shares have fallen by more than half twice in sixteen months.
The latest news and report
In its favour
The last report beat its guide, raised it a fourth time and lowered the provision; the bank charter application adds a long, uncertain path.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
Management says the first quarter is the seasonal low and the provision climbs into the holiday quarter; in 2025 the provision rose to 3.1% of volume when the underwriting net was widened (C22).
A three-stage cash-flow reading of the same analysts' path gives a higher base near $124, still below the price; the equity method is lower because book is small against earnings.
Management's 2027 figure of $7.20 a share implies 22 times next year's earnings, a multiple that reads less stretched than the equity method.
The company
At an online or in-store checkout, Sezzle lets a shopper split a purchase into four payments over six weeks, usually without interest. Members pay a monthly fee to use it at more shops and for larger amounts. Its shoppers are mostly in their twenties and thirties and use credit cards less; a Utah bank, WebBank, makes most of the loans and Sezzle holds them.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
How it makes money
Shoppers pay most of the bill. In the quarter to September, membership and other shopper fees were 38% of revenue and fees on loans another 37%; merchants paid the remaining quarter. Sezzle holds the loans itself, funded by its own equity and a credit line, so every bad loan comes out of its own profit.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Management says the first quarter is the seasonal low and the provision climbs into the holiday quarter; in 2025 the provision rose to 3.1% of volume when the underwriting net was widened (C22).
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (Q3 2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Subscriptions and other consumer fees | 37.6% | Monthly membership fees for Sezzle Premium and Sezzle Anywhere and other fees shoppers pay outside the loan itself. |
| Consumer fees earned on loans | 37.3% | Fees shoppers pay on their instalment loans, such as for late payment or rescheduling, booked as lending income. |
| Merchant and partner fees | 18.3% | Fees from merchants and partners outside the loan, such as referral and network income. |
| Merchant fees earned on loans | 6.9% | The discount merchants pay on each purchase Sezzle finances, booked as lending income over the loan. |
Who runs it
Charlie Youakim co-founded Sezzle and runs it as chairman and chief executive; Paul Paradis, the other co-founder, is president, and Lee Brading became finance chief in February 2026. Youakim owns about 39% of the shares, but has pledged most of them as security for personal loans, which a lender could sell in a sharp fall. Executive bonuses ride on adjusted profit; nothing pays on loan losses or per-share results.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Pledged shares can be sold by a lender if the price falls far enough, so the large stake is also a source of forced selling.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Nothing stops a shopper or a merchant leaving. Shoppers can download Klarna or Affirm in minutes; members can cancel monthly; merchants offer several buttons at once. When Sezzle moved its marketing elsewhere in 2025, members fell from 529,000 to 484,000.
The regulator's data show a product sold by six lenders to mostly subprime shoppers, with margins of about one percent of the amount lent in 2021. Klarna already sells a card with four paid membership tiers.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Management framed the subscriber fall as a deliberate test of On-Demand; an analyst on the call tied the higher 3.1% loss rate to the same shift, which is the reading used here.
The figure is four years old and predates Sezzle's subscription model, which now earns 11.5% of volume as revenue (C18).
The threat
Klarna and Affirm sell the same checkout choice and are about thirty and thirteen times larger by volume; neither names Sezzle as a rival. Block's Afterpay and PayPal sell pay-in-four to far larger customer bases. Shopify controls its own checkout and offers Affirm's instalments there; Sezzle is suing it for access.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The rivals: KLAR, AFRM, XYZ, PYPL, SHOP, SYF, COF, and 1 more that is private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KLAR | Klarna Group plcPriced against it: Yes | Sezzle's pay-later loans and subscriptions in the United States and Canada | On sale | Yes |
| AFRM | Affirm Holdings, Inc.Priced against it: Yes | Sezzle's pay-later loans and subscriptions in the United States and Canada | On sale | Yes |
| XYZ | Block, Inc. (Afterpay and Cash App)Priced against it: Shown, not counted | Sezzle's pay-later loans and subscriptions in the United States and Canada | On sale | Shown, not counted |
| PYPL | PayPal Holdings, Inc. (Pay Later)Priced against it: Shown, not counted | Sezzle's pay-later loans and subscriptions in the United States and Canada | On sale | Shown, not counted |
| SHOP | Shopify Inc. (control of its own checkout)Priced against it: Not checked | Sezzle's pay-later loans and subscriptions in the United States and Canada | On sale | Not checked |
| SYF · COF | Card issuers' instalment plans (Synchrony, Capital One and others)Priced against it: Not checked | Sezzle's pay-later loans and subscriptions in the United States and Canada | On sale | Not checked |
| Zip Co LimitedPriced against it: Listed abroad | Sezzle's pay-later loans and subscriptions in the United States and Canada | On sale | Listed abroad | |
| KLAR · AFRM | Klarna and Affirm cash and card productsPriced against it: Yes | Sezzle's new lines: SezzleCash, Sezzle Send and its own bank | On sale | Yes |
How big it could get
How big this could get
Americans spent about $1.30 trillion online in the year to June 2026, 8.4% more than a year before. Sezzle's $3.9B of purchases in 2025 was about 0.3% of that, and in 2022 it was about 5% of the six largest pay-later lenders' volume. Nobody measures how much of online shopping could move to instalments, so this is the pool, not a target.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 39% over the twelve months to Sep 2026, slower than the 66% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is 42%, up from 14% in the year to Dec 2023.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from +9.4% to +95% over the last 5 years.
Each dollar put into the business earns 59% a year after tax, up from 22% in the year to Dec 2023.
It turned 51% of sales into free cash, $298M over the last twelve months.
It owes $32.0M more than the cash it holds, about 0.1 years of the cash its operations bring in.
The share count rose 538% in 3.8 years, and pay in shares costs 1.3% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-11-17. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Sep 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $115M | $126M | $159M | $271M | $450M | $582M |
| Sales growth | +95% | +9.4% | +27% | +70% | +66% | +39% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Operating margin | −60% | −23% | 14% | 30% | 39% | 42% |
| Net margin | −65% | −30% | 4.5% | 29% | 30% | 31% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| General and admin | - | - | - | 4.2% | 3.7% | 3.5% |
| Pay in shares | 12% | 8.2% | 4.4% | 1.9% | 1.4% | 1.3% |
| Capital spending | 0.6% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.2% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | −$72.1M | $8.51M | −$25.7M | $131M | $210M | $299M |
| Free cash flow | −$72.8M | $8.46M | −$25.8M | $131M | $209M | $298M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $77.0M | $68.3M | $67.6M | $73.2M | $64.1M | $70.1M |
| Debt | $78.0M | $64.0M | $94.6M | $104M | $140M | $102M |
| Net cash | −$977K | $4.25M | −$27.0M | −$30.8M | −$75.9M | −$32.0M |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | - | - | 22% | 53% | 58% | 59% |
| Shares (diluted) | - | 5.44M | 5.68M | 35.9M | 35.7M | 34.8M |
What growth costs
Growing has made Sezzle much more profitable. Operating profit rose from about 14 cents of each sales dollar in 2023 to about 42 cents over the last year, and stock pay shrank. Marketing is the cost moving the other way: it doubled this year against revenue up 41%, and management says each dollar pays back within six months.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The six-month payback is management's own measure and is not disclosed in a form that can be checked.
The last report (4 Nov)
Quarter ended September 2026, filed figures.
In the quarter to September, revenue rose 42.6% to $166.5M on purchases up 34.9% to $1.4B, and profit rose to $47.8M, $1.38 a share. Members rose 68% to 955,000. The cost of bad loans fell to 2.7% of purchases from 3.1% a year earlier.
Management raised its 2026 guide for a fourth time, to $5.45 to $5.50 of adjusted earnings a share, gave a first $7.20 for 2027, and applied for its own national bank charter. Marketing spending was up 81% on the year.
What it did to the thesisA strong report: growth, profit and credit all beat the plan. It does not answer whether returns this high can last without a moat, which is what the price assumes, so the view stays Unattractive.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures. The company has restated its own history, so a quarter either side of the restatement may describe a different business; n/c marks one that does not compare.
Earnings per share $1.37 against $1.28 expected; $1.38 as filed, the gap being what the company adds back.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
Management says the first quarter is the seasonal low and the provision climbs into the holiday quarter; in 2025 the provision rose to 3.1% of volume when the underwriting net was widened (C22).
The guide is on an adjusted basis that adds back strategic project costs and stock pay; GAAP nine-month earnings were $139.9M (C03).
The six-month payback is management's own measure and is not disclosed in a form that can be checked.
What management did with the money
Profit has gone into the loan book first and then into buybacks: $28.0M in the first nine months of 2026, under a $100M programme. Stock pay is small, so the share count has fallen. The next call on capital is the bank, which would need equity put into it.
Insiders in 2026Q3: 3 purchases and 32 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Priced for perfection. The price is about 218% of what we think the business is worth, at an 8% yearly return.
The shares have doubled and halved twice in sixteen months and closed at $161.92 after the latest beat. The next test is the holiday quarter, reported around 24 February 2027: does the cost of bad loans stay near 2.7% of purchases, do members pass one million, and does the $7.20 guide for 2027 hold?
Two slower clocks run behind it: the bank charter application, filed on 22 October with no timetable, and the Shopify lawsuit, in discovery through 2027.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
Management says the first quarter is the seasonal low and the provision climbs into the holiday quarter; in 2025 the provision rose to 3.1% of volume when the underwriting net was widened (C22).
The guide is on an adjusted basis that adds back strategic project costs and stock pay; GAAP nine-month earnings were $139.9M (C03).
How we value it
- Method
- The owners' book plus the returns it earns above the rate
- Required return
- 8%
- Long-run growth
- 4%
- Moat
- No moat
| Bear | Base | Bull | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Book growth, years 1 to 3 | 15%, 11.8% | 30%, 23.7% | 37.5%, 29.6% |
| Normal return on equity | 55.1% | 68.8% | 75.7% |
| Return on new capital after year ten | 8% | 8% | 11% |
| Value a share | $47.18 | $74.11 | $104 |
- Price
- $162
- Priced on
- 16 Nov
- Price as a share of the base value
- 218%
- Yearly return the price offers on the base case
- 4.8%
- Risk check: valued at 10%, the rate for a cyclical or indebted business
- $65.53
Where each figure comes from
| Figure | Source | Where exactly |
|---|---|---|
| The owners' book | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Shares | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the diluted share count. |
| Book growth, years 1 to 3 | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus for the years to 31 Dec 2026, 31 Dec 2027 and 31 Dec 2028: the average of 3 to 5 analysts' revenue estimates; the owners' book grows on that path, held to 30% a year. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Normal return on equity | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus for the year to 31 Dec 2026 and 31 Dec 2028, the average of 3 to 5 analysts' estimates: the return on equity of their last forecast year. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Return on new capital after year ten | Our method's rule | Set by our reading of the moat: the 8% rate with none, 12% with an average one, 15% with a strong one; the bear case earns the rate. |
| The bear and bull cases | Our method's rule | Our method's spread: the bear case takes half the growth and a fifth off the margin, the bull a quarter more growth and a tenth more margin. |
| Price | Market price | FMP's closing price on 16 Nov 2026. |
What each case rests on
Bear caseEquity grows at half the base path, 15% and 12%, the return on equity settles a fifth lower at 55%, and new equity earns only the 8% rate: a consumer-credit downturn or a lost platform.
Base caseEquity grows 30% and 24%, the analysts' revenue path (C26) held to 30% a year, then fades toward 4%; the return on equity moves to about 69%, the analysts' 2028 earnings over the equity they build; no moat, so new equity after year ten earns the 8% rate.
Bull caseEquity grows a quarter faster, 37.5% and 30%, the return on equity reaches about 76%, and new equity earns 11%, one step above no moat, as if the subscriptions became a lasting edge (C05, C13).
What moves the base value
| Lower | Higher | |
|---|---|---|
| Growth in years 1 to 3, a quarter lower or higher | $64.34 | $85.37 |
| The normal return on equity, 15% lower or higher | $64.69 | $83.53 |
| Return on new capital after year ten, at the rate or one step up | $74.11 | $83.13 |
| The rate, a point higher or lower | $67.45 | $83.37 |
| Long-run growth a point lower | $73.04 | - |
Value a share as growth and margin change
| Normal return on equity ↓ · growth → | 50% | 75% | 100% | 125% | 150% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 55.1% | $47.18 | $53.85 | $61.55 | $70.41 | $80.57 |
| 61.9% | $51.54 | $59.10 | $67.83 | $77.89 | $89.44 |
| 68.8% | $55.89 | $64.34 | $74.11 | $85.37 | $98.30 |
| 75.7% | $60.25 | $69.59 | $80.39 | $92.85 | $107 |
| 82.6% | $64.60 | $74.83 | $86.67 | $100 | $116 |
Growth is shown as a share of the base case's. Green: the price is at or under 80% of that value. Red: at or over 120%.
How we read the multiple
On next year's guided profit the shares cost about 22.5 times earnings. The question is how long the returns last.
Valued on what shareholders own and what it earns above an 8% yearly return:
- Shareholders own about $8 a share of equity, and the business earns about two-thirds of it a year.
- If that return holds to 2028 and new money then earns only 8%, as without a moat, the shares are worth about $74.
- Even with faster growth, about $104: $161.92 needs the high return to last for decades.
Against its own history. Profitable for only three years, it has no normal price for its profit to compare with; in the past year the shares ranged from $50 to $196.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
A three-stage cash-flow reading of the same analysts' path gives a higher base near $124, still below the price; the equity method is lower because book is small against earnings.
Management's 2027 figure of $7.20 a share implies 22 times next year's earnings, a multiple that reads less stretched than the equity method.
Three to five analysts is a thin panel, and the 2027 figure equals management's own first guide (C12).
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on price for each $1 of net worth, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | price for each $1 of net worth |
|---|---|---|
| KLAR | Klarna Group | 2.1× |
| AFRM | Affirm Holdings | 3.7× |
| SEZL | Sezzle | 19.7× |
| XYZ | Block not in the median | 2.2× |
| PYPL | PayPal Holdings not in the median | 2.6× |
The middle of the other 2 is 2.9. Block, Inc., PayPal Holdings, Inc. compete with it in one product line inside a much bigger company, so their price says little about this business and they are not counted in the middle. Sezzle Inc. is dearest of 3.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
Against Affirm and Klarna, the two rivals that do the same thing, buyers pay several times more for each dollar Sezzle's shareholders own.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Zip Co Limited.
The bet: what it pays if it works
The bet is on Sezzle's new lines: cash advances, payments between people and, if approved, its own bank. They made almost nothing yet, so the lending and membership business is counted separately, at the multiple this thesis would call fair.
If the new lines grow to a tenth of volume, the shares are still worth less than today. If they never earn, shareholders keep a little over half.
| Sezzle's new lines: SezzleCash, Sezzle Send and its own bank revenue in two to three years | Billions of dollars of yearly volume needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $10.00M | about 0 at 100% kept | 0.6× |
| $40.00M (the big win) | about 0 at 100% kept | 0.6× |
| $120.00M | about 1 at 100% kept | 0.8× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $834.41M of Sezzle's new lines: SezzleCash, Sezzle Send and its own bank revenue (about 7 billions of dollars of yearly volume); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $2.58B of Sezzle's new lines: SezzleCash, Sezzle Send and its own bank revenue (about 22 billions of dollars of yearly volume), at the same multiple.
Each row is Sezzle's new lines: SezzleCash, Sezzle Send and its own bank alone, plus the rest of the company (Sezzle's pay-later loans and subscriptions in the United States and Canada) counted at about $3.10B.
The steps it has to take
- Done SezzleCash and Sezzle Send launched
- Done WebBank funds SezzleCash and Send up to $30M
- Done National bank charter applied for
- Not started Charter approved due 2027-12
- Not started New lines disclosed as a figure of their own due 2027-12
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 4 claims
No volume or revenue for either product is disclosed, so the early reads cannot be checked; frequency now counts cash advances and payments, which flatters the comparison with a year ago.
Three to five analysts is a thin panel, and the 2027 figure equals management's own first guide (C12).
A three-stage cash-flow reading of the same analysts' path gives a higher base near $124, still below the price; the equity method is lower because book is small against earnings.
Where we disagree with the market
A fast-growing, very profitable lender at a reasonable multiple of next year's profit, beating and raising every quarter.
The growth is real, but a lender with no moat cannot be assumed to earn two-thirds of its equity a year for decades.
The market reads next year's profit and the run of beats; four of seven analysts say buy, and the latest target is $220.
The evidence against us is the business itself. If members keep growing while marketing falls as a share of revenue, and bad loans stay low through a downturn, the high return lasts longer than we allow.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 7 claims
The guide is on an adjusted basis that adds back strategic project costs and stock pay; GAAP nine-month earnings were $139.9M (C03).
A three-stage cash-flow reading of the same analysts' path gives a higher base near $124, still below the price; the equity method is lower because book is small against earnings.
Management's 2027 figure of $7.20 a share implies 22 times next year's earnings, a multiple that reads less stretched than the equity method.
The six-month payback is management's own measure and is not disclosed in a form that can be checked.
Management says the first quarter is the seasonal low and the provision climbs into the holiday quarter; in 2025 the provision rose to 3.1% of volume when the underwriting net was widened (C22).
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Subprime shoppers, untested. Most pay-later borrowers are subprime or deep subprime, and Sezzle's loans have not met a recession at this size.
- One bank. WebBank makes most of its loans; the charter that would replace it has no timetable.
- A few platforms. A significant part of volume runs through a few large e-commerce platforms, unnamed, any of which could favour a rival.
- A pledged stake. The founder's 39% stake is mostly pledged for personal loans, a source of forced selling in a fall.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
Management says the first quarter is the seasonal low and the provision climbs into the holiday quarter; in 2025 the provision rose to 3.1% of volume when the underwriting net was widened (C22).
The filing does not name the platforms or their share of volume, so the concentration cannot be sized from outside.
Pledged shares can be sold by a lender if the price falls far enough, so the large stake is also a source of forced selling.
What we still do not know
- Which platforms carry Sezzle's volume, and how much each brings.
- Whether members stay when marketing slows, and what the charter costs in capital.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The filing does not name the platforms or their share of volume, so the concentration cannot be sized from outside.
Management framed the subscriber fall as a deliberate test of On-Demand; an analyst on the call tied the higher 3.1% loss rate to the same shift, which is the reading used here.
What would change our view
- Unattractive→NeutralThe price falls to within 20% of fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price falls to about $88.93, within 20% of what we think the business is worth.about $89.17 today, 45% below the last close
- Unattractive→AttractiveThe price falls 20% under fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price falls to about $59.29, 80% of what we think the business is worth.about $59.08 today, 64% below the last close
- Reopens the researchThe high return proves durable
It needs:
- ○Through 2027 members keep growing while marketing falls as a share of revenue, and bad loans stay at or below 2.7% of purchases.checked at the next results, due in Feb 2027
We would also be wrong if
- The cost of bad loans stays at or below 2.7% of purchases through a rise in unemployment.
- The bank charter is approved and funding gets cheaper without new shares.
What is coming
- 24 February 2027 Fourth-quarter 2026 results and the 2027 outlook: Whether the holiday-quarter provision stays near 2.7% of volume, subscribers pass one million, and the 2027 guide of $7.20 a share holds.
Every dated event ahead
- 24 February 2027 Fourth-quarter 2026 results and the 2027 outlook: Whether the holiday-quarter provision stays near 2.7% of volume, subscribers pass one million, and the 2027 guide of $7.20 a share holds.
- December 2027 Decision on the national bank charter: Whether Sezzle can stop relying on WebBank and what capital the bank needs.
- December 2027 Shopify antitrust suit leaves discovery: Whether Sezzle wins access to Shopify's checkout or the suit fades.
Since we wrote this
- 17 NovThesis writtenUnattractive, high convictionWritten two weeks after a third quarter that beat and raised the guide again, with the shares back near $162.
Sources 18
Sources - 18
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-26Business and products, the originating bank (WebBank), competition naming Affirm, Afterpay, Klarna, PayPal and Zip, platform concentration, the Shopify suit, one segment, staff and the consumer profile.backsC01C08C09C37
- S02primarycompany filing2026-11-05Quarter and nine-month income statement, revenue by source, provision and allowance, notes receivable, the credit line, equity, cash, buybacks, share counts, the tax rate, the Shopify suit's status and the bank charter risk factors.backsC02C03C04C06C07C10C11C13C14C15C16C27
- S03primarycompany filing2026-11-04Total transaction volume, active consumers and subscribers, the raised 2026 outlook and the first 2027 figure, the bank charter application.backsC02C05C11C12
- S04primarytranscript2026-11-04Provision as a share of volume, the Visa arrangement, marketing payback, early reads on SezzleCash and Sezzle Send, Canada, the suit's timetable and the outlook.
The provision for credit losses was 2.7% of TTV, down from 3.1% a year ago. ... SezzleCash looks like it's going to be another great product for us, but it's still not putting up significant numbers just because it's starting from scratch. ... our antitrust case remains in discovery, which we expect to continue through 2027.
backsC01C05C06C10C12C14C35C36 - S05primarycompany filing2026-11-09Yearly total transaction volume 2022 to 2025, revenue as a share of volume, the return on equity and the outlook history.backsC12C18
- S06primarycompany filing2026-10-09Beneficial ownership and pledged shares, executive officers, the bonus plan's measure and the equity awards.backsC30C32C33
- S07secondaryvendor data2026-11-17SEZL research pack (market tier), fetched 2026-11-17: close of 2026-11-16, market value, multiples, 52-week range, analyst split, cohortClose of $161.92 on 2026-11-16, market value about $5.47B, trailing P/E 29.9, price to book 19.7 against Klarna 2.1 and Affirm 3.7, the 52-week range $49.50 to $195.71, the analyst split and its dated series.backsC25C28C34C38
- S08primarycompany filing2026-08-12WebBank originates and keeps SezzleCash and Sezzle Send loans up to a $30M threshold; the minimum tangible net worth covenant rises from $12M to $100M.backsC08
- S09primarycompany filing2026-11-17Yearly revenue, operating income, net income, stock pay and operating cash flow 2021 to 2025 and the trailing twelve months.backsC17
- S10primaryregulator2025-01-13CFPB, Consumer Use of Buy Now, Pay Later and Other Unsecured Debt (January 2025) Consumer Financial Protection BureauThe six lenders studied (Affirm, Afterpay, Klarna, PayPal, Sezzle and Zip), 2022 loan counts and volume, the share of credit-card spending, originations and default rates by credit score.
the data represent approximately 277 million BNPL loans with a gross merchandise value of roughly $34 billion at the six BNPL lenders combined. To place this number in context, it represents approximately one percent of total spending on credit cards in the same year. ... borrowers with deep subprime credit scores accounted for 45% of BNPL originations, while those with subprime credit scores were responsible for another 16% of originations.
backsC21C22 - S11primaryregulator2022-09-15CFPB press release, CFPB Study Details the Rapid Growth of Buy Now, Pay Later Lending (September 2022) Consumer Financial Protection BureauIndustry margins as a share of originations, 2020 and 2021.
The five firms surveyed in the report originated 180 million loans totaling over $24 billion in 2021, a near tenfold increase from 2019. ... Lenders' profit margins are shrinking: Margins in 2021 were 1.01% of the total amount of loan originated, down from 1.27% in 2020.
backsC23 - S12primarycompany filing2026-02-26Klarna's membership tiers and card, $128B of 2025 volume with 21% in the United States, and its own list of rivals, which does not name Sezzle.backsC19
- S13primarycompany filing2026-08-27Affirm's $50.2B of fiscal 2026 volume, its rivals, Shopify as a significant commercial partner; it does not name Sezzle.backsC20
- S14primarygovernment data2026-11-17FRED series ECOMSA, U.S. Census Bureau e-commerce retail sales (quarterly, seasonally adjusted) U.S. Census Bureau / Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED)Trailing-four-quarter U.S. e-commerce sales to June 2026 and the year before.
2024-07-01,295249 | 2024-10-01,300329 | 2025-01-01,297701 | 2025-04-01,303284 | 2025-07-01,310817 | 2025-10-01,317999 | 2026-01-01,327861 | 2026-04-01,340244
backsC24 - S15secondaryvendor data2026-11-17The analysts' average revenue and earnings per share for 2026, 2027 and 2028, and how many analysts each rests on.backsC26C27C28
- S16primarygovernment data2026-11-17Short interest at the latest settlement.
4,412,440 shares short, settled 2026-10-30, -0.4% vs prior settlement, 10.1 days to cover; 23.6% of an 18.7M-share float
backsC29 - S17primarytranscript2025-11-05The objection of autumn 2025: a wider credit net, a higher provision and slower subscriber growth after On-Demand was set aside.
the 3.1% credit losses was maybe a little bit higher by deemphasizing on demand, will that naturally drop a little bit more? ... third quarter provision for credit losses as a percentage of GMV increased 70 basis points year-over-year to 3.1%
backsC39 - S18primarycompany filing2026-11-1794 open-market sales of 202,299 shares, 89.4% of them flagged as under Rule 10b5-1 plans, and 2 purchases of 379 shares.backsC31