Pagaya Technologies
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The company whose software picks which loans banks and fintech lenders can safely approve, then finds investors to buy them.
The scores
Growth3/4 →
Revenue grew 27% in 2024 and 26% in 2025, then 12% in Q3 2026 with volume up 29%; the 2026 guide implies about 13%.
Business quality3/4 →
A partner and investor network the rating agency supports, with flat core costs, but Upstart sells the same thing and partners owe no volume.
Financial position2/4 ↑
$1.1B of retained loan securities on $622M of equity and 8.875% notes; volume depends on securitization markets staying open.
Execution record3/4 ↑
Seven profitable quarters and the 2026 net income guide raised three times, after losses through 2024 and a cut of risky volume.
Per share capture2/4 ↑
Diluted shares rose from 38.3M in 2022 to 98.5M, and in-the-money notes add more, though stock pay is now small.
Potential3/4 →
Auto loans of $208B a quarter and 8.4 million personal loans against $3.6B of volume; large banks joining is observable.
Risk profile3/4 →
A few fintech partners bring most volume and founders control the vote; Israel staff risk is real but survivable.
Valuation4/4 →
About 1.96 times as-converted book and 62% of an excess-return value near $25.74, which needs a return below what it earns now.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Filed figures carry revenue, profit, write-downs and debt; partner shares, funding terms and loan performance rest mostly on management and one rating agency.
The Verdict
We rate Pagaya Attractive, with medium conviction. Its software approves loans that banks would decline, and investors buy them: loans arranged grew 29% and profit hit a record, with a fourth raise of the year's profit forecast. It is a mixed business, though: it keeps $1.1B of slices of those loans, and their write-downs caused years of losses, while a few fintech partners bring most of the loans. The price is about 62% of our value of about $26, so it looks cheap even if profit settles below today's. A credit downturn that brings the write-downs back is what would undo it.
The long caseIf banks keep handing their declined borrowers to an outside model funded by investors, Pagaya becomes the plumbing behind a large share of US consumer loans.
How we weighed it
The price against our value
In its favour
Price at 62% of our value
The price sits well under our base value, and the base asks for a return below today's.
The business
Cuts both ways
Mixed
A network of partners and investors the rating agency supports, but partners owe no volume and Upstart sells the same thing.
Growth against what the price assumes
In its favour
Volume grows fast and new banks are joining; the price assumes far less than the analysts' path.
What could go wrong
Against it
Write-downs on retained loans turned profit to loss in the last downturn, and funding depends on securitization markets.
Against competitors
Cuts both ways
Upstart offers the same model, and large banks could build their own or place loans with private funds directly.
How its group is behaving
Against it
Consumer lenders trade on the credit cycle, and personal loan delinquency is rising across the industry.
The latest news and report
Cuts both ways
Record profit and a third guide raise, against a thinner fee per loan and Klarna leaving.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
Profit turned to large losses in 2022 to 2024 as retained loans were written down (C04, C08); a credit downturn makes the bear case near $13.60 the closer reading.
On ordinary shares alone and filed equity the price is about 2.16 times book, a dearer reading.
The year began with a cut of higher-risk volume (C41), so part of the raise is a lower starting bar.
The company
Pagaya, founded in Israel in 2016, sells banks and fintech lenders a second look. When a lender would decline an applicant for a personal or car loan, it sends the application to Pagaya. Its models, trained on more than $3.6 trillion of applications, approve some, and the lender makes the loan under its own name.
A fund or a bond Pagaya arranges then buys the loan, so the lender gains a customer without holding the risk. Citizens and FNBO joined this year.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The pipeline is management's count and new partners start at a lower fee rate (C05).
How it makes money
Nearly nine tenths of sales are fees on each loan, paid by the lender and by the investors who buy it. About a tenth is fees for running those investment funds. A small part is interest on the slices of loans Pagaya must keep, less any write-downs. Of every fee dollar, the share Pagaya keeps after paying to fund the loans fell this year as interest rates rose.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (FY2025) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Network AI fees | 87% | Fees for creating and delivering the loans in network volume, and for executing securitizations and forward flows. |
| Contract fees | 10% | Administration, management and performance fees from the funds and trusts that hold the loans. |
| Interest and investment income | 3% | Interest on the retained slices and cash, less losses on fund stakes. |
Who runs it
Gal Krubiner, a co-founder who structured loan-backed bonds at UBS, has run Pagaya since 2016; the other two co-founders are his deputies. Together they control about 61% of the votes. Half of their bonus rides on profit under accounting rules, the rest on loans arranged and sales. Krubiner bought shares with his own money in June; other insiders mostly sold as awards vested.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
More lenders send more applications, which teach the models; better loans draw more investors at lower cost, which lets lenders approve more. KBRA, a rating agency that checks the bonds, affirmed 165 classes of notes backed by Pagaya's loans and upgraded 19, an outside sign the loans pay as promised.
More than 180 investors bought its bonds last quarter, and costs stayed flat while sales grew.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The threat
Upstart sells banks the same kind of AI lending model. Large banks could build their own, and fintech lenders can sell loans straight to private funds. The few fintech partners that bring most loans could move them elsewhere.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The rivals: UPST, SOFI, ALLY, and 1 more that is private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| UPST | UpstartPriced against it: Not checked | AI lending network | On sale | Not checked |
| In-house | Banks' own underwriting and private credit buyersPriced against it: In-house | AI lending network | On sale | In-house |
| SOFI · ALLY | Large self-funded lenders such as SoFi and AllyPriced against it: Not checked | AI lending network | On sale | Not checked |
How big it could get
How big this could get
Americans take out about 8.4 million personal loans a quarter, a record, says TransUnion, a credit bureau, and $208B of new car loans a quarter, says the New York Fed. Pagaya arranged $3.6B of loans in its latest quarter, a small share of both, so most of that market is still open to it.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Who has signed
Neuberger Berman, an asset manager, agreed to buy $700M of its car loans, and two more deals add over $1B of committed funding for personal loans. That money is promised in advance rather than raised one bond sale at a time.
The evidence under this - 1 claim
The deals' terms are not filed, and a forward flow buyer can still decline loans outside its criteria (C12).
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 15% over the twelve months to Sep 2026, slower than the 26% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is 26%, up from −3.0% in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 17¢ of each sales dollar, down from 52¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
Each dollar put into the business earns 56% a year after tax, up from 41% in the year to Dec 2025.
It turned 16% of sales into free cash, $234M over the last twelve months.
It holds $247M of cash against $151M of debt, $96.4M more cash than it owes.
The share count rose 505% in 4.8 years, and pay in shares costs 2.3% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-11-17. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Sep 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $475M | $749M | $812M | $1.03B | $1.30B | $1.43B |
| Sales growth | +379% | +58% | +8.4% | +27% | +26% | +15% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 51% | 40% | 37% | 42% | 42% | 44% |
| Operating margin | −1.2% | −34% | −3.0% | 6.5% | 20% | 26% |
| Net margin | −19% | −40% | −16% | −39% | 6.3% | 11% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 14% | 20% | 9.2% | 7.4% | 5.8% | 4.9% |
| Sales and marketing | 10% | 14% | 6.1% | 4.9% | 4.1% | 2.8% |
| General and admin | 28% | 39% | 25% | 23% | 12% | 9.8% |
| Pay in shares | 14% | 32% | 8.8% | 6.0% | 4.2% | 2.3% |
| Capital spending | 1.4% | 3.0% | 2.5% | 1.7% | 1.1% | 0.9% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $49.8M | −$40.0M | −$21.7M | $47.8M | $239M | $247M |
| Free cash flow | $43.2M | −$62.4M | −$41.8M | $30.0M | $225M | $234M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $191M | $310M | $186M | $210M | $235M | $247M |
| Debt | $0 | $61.8M | $37.7M | $321M | $149M | $151M |
| Net cash | $191M | $248M | $149M | −$111M | $86.5M | $96.4M |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | - | - | - | - | 41% | 56% |
| Shares (diluted) | 16.3M | 38.3M | 60.0M | 70.9M | 83.1M | 98.5M |
What growth costs
Growth now costs less per dollar of sales. Running costs have stayed flat for seven quarters while loans grew, each employee brings in about $2.5M of sales against $0.9M in 2022, and shares paid to staff fell to about 4 cents of each sales dollar.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The last report (29 Oct)
Quarter ended September 2026, filed figures.
In the third quarter of 2026 loans arranged rose 29% to $3.6B and profit was a record $49.7M, against $22.5M a year earlier. Pagaya raised its 2026 profit forecast for the third time, to $162M to $182M.
The weak line was the fee it keeps on each loan, 4.1% against 5.0%, as rates raised its funding cost. It raised borrower rates in the autumn to win that back. Write-downs on loans it keeps were $43.4M, and Klarna, a partner, has left.
What it did to the thesisIt showed the core case working, with rising profit on flat costs and more committed funding, but the fee kept on each loan fell and write-downs on retained loans continued, so the credit risk the view turns on stays open.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $1.07 against $0.47 expected; $0.52 as filed, the gap being what the company adds back.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
Management also says activation held after the increase, but only three weeks of data back it (C05).
The year began with a cut of higher-risk volume (C41), so part of the raise is a lower starting bar.
Management's own 10-K claims 100% partner retention since inception (C18); Klarna's exit is the first stated exception.
What management did with the money
Pagaya replaced costlier debt with $500M of notes due 2030 and has bought some back below face value. It also borrowed through notes that turn into shares near today's price. The share count has more than doubled since 2022.
Insiders in 2026Q3: 11 purchases and 20 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Cheap. The price is about 62% of what we think the business is worth, at an 8% yearly return.
The shares fell 31.5% in a year, all of it because buyers pay less for each dollar of sales. They fell again after the third-quarter report, on the lower fee kept per loan, even as profit set a record.
The next check is the fourth-quarter report in February 2027, with a forecast for 2027. It will show whether higher borrower rates lift the fee Pagaya keeps.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The year began with a cut of higher-risk volume (C41), so part of the raise is a lower starting bar.
Management also says activation held after the increase, but only three weeks of data back it (C05).
How we value it
- Method
- The owners' book plus the returns it earns above the rate
- Required return
- 8%
- Long-run growth
- 4%
- Moat
- An average moat
| Bear | Base | Bull | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Book growth, years 1 to 3 | 7.5%, 7.6% | 15%, 15.3% | 18.8%, 19.1% |
| Normal return on equity | 14.4% | 18% | 19.8% |
| Return on new capital after year ten | 8% | 12% | 15% |
| Value a share | $13.60 | $25.74 | $36.71 |
- Price
- $16.02
- Priced on
- 16 Nov
- Price as a share of the base value
- 62%
- Yearly return the price offers on the base case
- 10.4%
- Risk check: valued at 10%, the rate for a cyclical or indebted business
- $17.14
Where each figure comes from
| Figure | Source | Where exactly |
|---|---|---|
| The owners' book | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 2 Nov 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Shares | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 2 Nov 2026; the diluted share count. |
| Book growth, years 1 to 3 | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus for the years to 31 Dec 2026, 31 Dec 2027 and 31 Dec 2028: the average of 5 to 8 analysts' revenue estimates; the owners' book grows on that path, held to 30% a year. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Normal return on equity | Our judgement | Our reading of the evidence; each case below names it. |
| Return on new capital after year ten | Our method's rule | Set by our reading of the moat: the 8% rate with none, 12% with an average one, 15% with a strong one; the bear case earns the rate. |
| The bear and bull cases | Our method's rule | Our method's spread: the bear case takes half the growth and a fifth off the margin, the bull a quarter more growth and a tenth more margin. |
| Price | Market price | FMP's closing price on 16 Nov 2026. |
What each case rests on
Bear caseEquity grows at half the analysts' path, 7.5% and 7.7%, the return on it settles at 14.4%, a fifth under the base, and new equity earns only the 8% rate: the test of a credit downturn that brings back the write-downs of 2024.
Base caseEquity grows 15% and 15.3%, the analysts' revenue path (C31), then fades toward 4%; the return on equity eases from 20.7% today to 18%, between 2025's 17.0% and today's, below the analysts' 2028 figure (C47).
Bull caseEquity grows a quarter faster, 19% a year, the return on equity holds near 19.8%, and new equity earns 15%, as if large banks join and cheaper committed funding lifts the fee kept per loan.
What moves the base value
| Lower | Higher | |
|---|---|---|
| Growth in years 1 to 3, a quarter lower or higher | $23.79 | $27.91 |
| The normal return on equity, 15% lower or higher | $23.87 | $27.62 |
| Return on new capital after year ten, at the rate or one step up | $17.14 | $32.19 |
| The rate, a point higher or lower | $20.60 | $34.24 |
| Long-run growth a point lower | $23.52 | - |
Value a share as growth and margin change
| Normal return on equity ↓ · growth → | 50% | 75% | 100% | 125% | 150% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 14.4% | $20.05 | $21.56 | $23.24 | $25.12 | $27.21 |
| 16.2% | $21.04 | $22.67 | $24.49 | $26.52 | $28.76 |
| 18% | $22.04 | $23.79 | $25.74 | $27.91 | $30.32 |
| 19.8% | $23.04 | $24.91 | $26.99 | $29.31 | $31.88 |
| 21.6% | $24.03 | $26.02 | $28.24 | $30.70 | $33.43 |
Growth is shown as a share of the base case's. Green: the price is at or under 80% of that value. Red: at or over 120%.
How we read the multiple
The shares are worth about $1.6B, about twice what Pagaya owns minus what it owes, counting the notes that turn into shares. That is about 9 times its profit over the last four quarters.
Analysts expect sales to grow about 15% a year to 2028. On that path, with profit easing to 18 cents a year on each dollar it owns, we value the shares at about $26, $14 in our gloomy case and $37 in our sunny one.
Against its own history. Buyers now pay less for each dollar of sales than a year ago, while sales per share grew.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
On ordinary shares alone and filed equity the price is about 2.16 times book, a dearer reading.
Profit turned to large losses in 2022 to 2024 as retained loans were written down (C04, C08); a credit downturn makes the bear case near $13.60 the closer reading.
The 2026 net income average sits below the company's raised guide of $162M to $182M (C07), so part of the panel has not updated.
2025 included an income tax benefit of $19.7M, which flatters that year's return.
Priced against its rivals
Its rivals have not yet been checked against their own filings, so there is no group to price it against; the price is judged against its own history instead.
Where we disagree with the market
A securitization machine whose profit vanishes when credit turns, so it deserves a low price however much it earns now.
The models have earned an outside rating agency's upgrades, and the price holds even if profit falls well below today's.
A fifth of the shares that can trade are bet against it, while every analyst is positive. We agree credit is the risk: write-downs on retained loans caused the past losses.
Where we could be wrong: if borrowers fall behind across the US, write-downs could return at 2024's scale, and our gloomy case sits below today's price.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Profit turned to large losses in 2022 to 2024 as retained loans were written down (C04, C08); a credit downturn makes the bear case near $13.60 the closer reading.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Loans it must keep. It holds $1.1B of loan slices, and in a downturn their write-downs can erase profit, as in 2024.
- A few big partners. A handful of fintech lenders bring most loans, and their agreements can end; Klarna has just left.
- Rates squeeze the fee. Higher interest rates raise what investors demand, cutting the fee Pagaya keeps on each loan.
- Founders control the vote. Three founders hold about three fifths of the votes, so other shareholders cannot change the board.
- Staff in Israel. Much of its staff lives in Israel, and war or reserve duty can disrupt the work.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
What we still do not know
- How the loans approved since 2024 will perform if unemployment rises; the latest rating agency reviews cited by management are not public.
- Which partners bring most of the loans, and how long each has agreed to stay.
- Whether higher borrower rates restore the fee kept per loan without losing loans.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
KBRA's 2026 surveillance sits behind a subscription, so the count could not be checked outside the company (C16).
Management also says activation held after the increase, but only three weeks of data back it (C05).
What would change our view
- Attractive→NeutralThe price closes the gap
It needs:
- ○The share price rises to 80% of what we think the business is worth.about $20.68 today, 29% above the last close
- Attractive→UnattractiveThe price runs 20% above fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price rises to 20% above what we think the business is worth.about $30.98 today, 93% above the last close
- Attractive→NeutralCredit or funding breaks the return
It needs any of:
- ○Write-downs on loans it keeps exceed $80M in a quarter.checked at the next results, due by 8 Feb
- ○Loans arranged, leaving out Klarna, fall from a year earlier for two quarters running.checked at the next results, due by 8 Feb
We would also be wrong if
- Investors stop buying its bonds at rated terms, so loans arranged shrink.
- A partner bringing a large share of loans leaves without a replacement.
What is coming
- 31 December 2026 Exchange window on the 2029 notes: How many of the about 11M shares behind the in-the-money notes are issued.
Every dated event ahead
- 31 December 2026 Exchange window on the 2029 notes: How many of the about 11M shares behind the in-the-money notes are issued.
- 8 February 2027 Q4 2026 results and the 2027 outlook: Whether the fee kept per dollar of loans turns up as the higher borrower rates reach new loans, and what profit 2027 is guided to.
- 31 July 2027 2027 proxy statement: Whether pay keeps riding on GAAP net income, and the founders' holdings.
Since we wrote this
- 17 NovThesis writtenAttractive, medium convictionThe price is about 62% of our value, which needs a lower return than Pagaya earns today; retained credit and funding are the risks.
Sources 14
Sources - 14
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-03-02Item 1 products and competition, partner concentration, investor concentration, risk retention, Israel risk, 2030 notes, revenue by fee type, headcount and statementsbacksC01C03C04C08C10C12C15C18C21C22C23C24C38C39C40C43C44C45C46
- S02primarycompany filing2026-11-02the balance sheet, the debt and exchangeable notes, the share count on the cover, stock pay and the investments in loans and securitiesbacksC02C03C04C08C09C21C22C23C45
- S03primarycompany filing2026-10-29network volume, revenue, fee revenue less production costs, adjusted EBITDA, core operating expenses, funding deals, new partners and the raised 2026 outlookbacksC02C04C05C06C07C09C10C11C14C15C17C19C42
- S04primarytranscript2026-10-29Q3 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP)data/cache/transcripts/PGY-2026Q3.jsonKlarna's exit, the borrower rate increases, the funding mix, the cost of secured borrowing, the pipeline and the size of the market as management puts it
Excluding Klarna, Q3 volumes were $3.3 billion.
backsC05C06C11C13C14C17C20C36 - S05primarycompany filing2026-02-09the cut of higher-risk volume in late 2025 and the first 2026 outlookbacksC07C41
- S06primarycompany filing2026-07-06officers and their records, beneficial ownership and options, the 2026 bonus frameworkbacksC24C25C26
- S07primarycompany filing2026-02-10a rival's description of the same product: AI underwriting sold to lending partners for a fee
We charge our lending partners platform fees in exchange for usage of our AI lending marketplace
backsC37 - S09primaryindustry data2025-09-17a rating agency's affirmations and upgrades across Pagaya personal loan trusts and the platforms that sold the loans
KBRA affirms ratings on 165 classes of notes and upgrades ratings on 19 classes of notes
backsC16 - S10primaryindustry data2026-11-05US unsecured personal loan originations, balances and serious delinquency
originations climbing 22.7% YoY to a record 8.41 million loans and outstanding balances rising 9.0% to $293.4 billion
backsC34 - S11primarygovernment data2026-11-10Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Household Debt and Credit Report, Q3 2026 release Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorknew auto loans in the quarter
there were $208 billion in new auto loans appearing on credit reports during the third quarter
backsC35 - S12primarygovernment data2026-11-10Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Household Debt and Credit Report, Q3 2026 release (balances) Federal Reserve Bank of New Yorkauto loan balances
auto loan balances increased by $21 billion to $1.73 trillion
backsC35 - S13secondaryvendor data2026-11-17PGY research pack (FMP market tier, FINRA short interest, headcount), frozen 2026-11-17content/PGY/research-pack.jsonthe 16 November close of $16.02, daily closes, returns and their split, analyst ratings and their history, insider filings, short interest, headcountbacksC27C28C29C30C40C41C42
- S14secondaryvendor data2026-11-17the analysts' average revenue and net income for 2026 to 2028, with the count of analystsbacksC31
- S15primarycompany filing2026-11-17every open-market purchase and sale, and its Rule 10b5-1 flagbacksC27