Morgan Stanley
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The Wall Street firm that also looks after the savings of millions of American families, through its advisers, its E*TRADE accounts and the share plans of big companies.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↑
Revenue rose 14% in 2025 and 18% so far in 2026, but it follows markets: it fell 10% in 2022 and profit 40% by 2023.
Business quality3/4 ↑
A wealth funnel that grew client assets by a seventh in nine months and third in global M&A fees; advisers still drift to independents.
Financial position3/4 →
Capital about 310 basis points above its requirement and large liquid assets, but leverage ratio fell to 4.8% and dealers lean on funding markets.
Execution record4/4 ↑
Hit its 20% return goal for five quarters, cut costs from 71 to 66 cents a dollar, and integrated E*TRADE into the funnel it promised.
Per share capture3/4 →
The share count fell 1.6% in a year and buybacks exceed share pay, but they run near four times tangible book.
Potential3/4 →
About 8% of household savings the Fed counts, growing with markets and the funnel; more needs flows to hold without IPOs.
Risk profile3/4 →
One dependency dominates: markets and the regulators who set capital. Diversified clients, no binary event inside the horizon.
Valuation3/4 →
About 3.4 times tangible book, 101% of an excess-return value near $184 at an 8% return: fair, inside the 20% margin.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Everything central is filed and the household and fee pools are counted outside, but the funnel's durability rests on management's word.
The Verdict
We rate Morgan Stanley Neutral. It is a solid business that now earns as much from looking after families' savings as from Wall Street, and its clients brought in more new money this year than ever. The price is about 101% of our value of about $184 a share, so it is fair: buyers already pay for this year's high returns to last. What decided it is that a boom in share trading and new listings did much of the work in 2026, and profit fell sharply when the last boom ended. Whether the flows of new money hold without them decides the view.
The long caseAmerican savers keep getting richer in shares, and Morgan Stanley's funnel keeps catching them; the flows must hold when IPOs slow.
How we weighed it
The price against our value
Cuts both ways
Price at 101% of our value
The price sits almost exactly at our value, with no margin of safety either way.
The business
In its favour
Solid
A large wealth arm whose funnel keeps bringing in new clients, beside a leading trading and banking business.
Growth against what the price assumes
Cuts both ways
Returns well above the firm's goal this year; the price assumes they last through a slower market.
What could go wrong
Against it
Markets and listings slow, advisers leave for independent firms, and buybacks run near four times tangible book.
Against competitors
Cuts both ways
A little dearer than its closest rivals on earnings, a premium its steadier wealth half explains in part.
How its group is behaving
Cuts both ways
Its group moves with markets and deals; the sell-off since September hit the trading banks alike.
The latest news and report
Cuts both ways
A record quarter for wealth, but revenue fell from the quarter before and some listings were pulled.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
Tangible common equity is management's non-GAAP measure; the filed return on equity is about five points lower, and the third quarter's ROTCE fell to 22.6%.
The value leans on the return on equity staying near 19% for a decade; at the bear case's 15.1% it is $111, and 2023's return on equity was about 9%.
The same call says September's market volumes dried up and some IPOs were pulled; a flow that rides the listing calendar is the least steady part of the funnel, and nothing filed splits it out.
The company
Two kinds of client come to Morgan Stanley. Companies and big investors hire its Wall Street arm to advise on mergers, sell their shares and bonds, trade for them and lend to hedge funds against their holdings.
Families come to its wealth arm, through its financial advisers, through E*TRADE's online accounts, or through their employer's share plan, which Morgan Stanley runs for many big companies. It holds $8.4 trillion of their savings. The alternative is another bank, an independent adviser or doing it yourself.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Cerulli's data show the big brokerage firms losing advisers and assets to independents over a decade (C16); a funnel that brings clients in does not prove it keeps their advisers.
How it makes money
In 2025 the Wall Street arm earned $33.1B of the firm's $70.6B of revenue and the wealth arm $31.8B. The Wall Street half is paid deal by deal and trade by trade. The wealth half is steadier: most clients pay a yearly fee on the money in their account, and the firm earns interest on the cash they keep there. Fund management for institutions adds the rest.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (9M 2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Wealth: asset management fees | 25% | A yearly fee on assets in advised accounts. |
| Equities: trading and financing | 27% | Trading shares and derivatives for clients and lending to hedge funds. |
| Fixed income trading | 12% | Trading bonds, currencies and commodities for clients. |
| Investment banking | 11% | Merger advice and selling companies' shares and bonds. |
| Wealth: net interest | 11% | Interest on loans to clients, less what it pays on their deposits. |
| Wealth: commissions and other | 6% | Commissions on trades and other wealth revenue. |
| Investment Management | 7% | Fees on funds managed for institutions and through advisers. |
Who runs it
Ted Pick has run Morgan Stanley since January 2024 and chaired it since 2025, after running its Wall Street arm. Sharon Yeshaya is finance chief. Directors and officers own under 0.2% of the company, and insiders sold shares this year without buying any.
Most of Pick's $45M of pay for 2025 is in shares that pay out in full only if the return on net worth after goodwill averages 20% from 2026 to 2028.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Executives are paid largely in stock, so sales after vesting are routine; the sales are small against the 2,701,847 shares the group owns.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Size brings the next client. A company that hires Morgan Stanley for its share plan sends its employees to Morgan Stanley's accounts; when those shares vest or a company lists, the money is already inside, and advisers turn it into accounts that pay a yearly fee.
The funnel is working: client assets grew from $7.4 trillion to $8.4 trillion in nine months. Against it, independent advisers have been taking a growing share of advisers and savings from the big brokerage firms for a decade.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Cerulli's data show the big brokerage firms losing advisers and assets to independents over a decade (C16); a funnel that brings clients in does not prove it keeps their advisers.
The threat
Each rival takes one piece. Independent advisers win the advisers who want to own their business. Schwab sells online accounts, advice and banking to the same three kinds of client. Goldman Sachs competes for the same companies, investors and wealthy families, and JPMorgan matches both halves with a bigger bank behind it.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The rivals: LPLA, SCHW, GS, JPM, BLK.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LPLA | LPL Financial and the independent registered advisersPriced against it: Not checked | Wealth Management | On sale | Not checked |
| SCHW | Schwab and FidelityPriced against it: Yes | Wealth Management | On sale | Yes |
| GS · JPM | Goldman Sachs and JPMorganPriced against it: Yes | Institutional Securities | On sale | Yes |
| BLK | BlackRock and the index-fund managersPriced against it: Not checked | Investment Management | On sale | Not checked |
How big it could get
How big this could get
The Federal Reserve counts $106.5 trillion of American households' savings in bank deposits, money funds, shares and bonds, of which $86.2 trillion is shares and bonds. Morgan Stanley's wealth arm holds about 7.9% of the whole, and somewhat less in fact, since some of its clients are businesses or live abroad. The pool grows with markets: household wealth rose $12.8 trillion in one quarter.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Client assets include businesses, institutions and stock-plan holdings and some clients abroad, so the share of household wealth alone is lower than 7.9%; the two figures are a quarter apart.
Who has signed
Nobody signs up for years: a family can move its account at any time. The nearest thing is a large company retirement plan that moved to Morgan Stanley in the third quarter, which management says brought nearly half of that quarter's new fee-paying money.
The evidence under this - 1 claim
Where the growth is coming from, business by business
Where the growth is coming from
| Business | Share of revenue | Growth: last quarter | Last half-year | Last year | Share in 3 years at its half-year rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Institutional Securities | 49% | +17.7% | +21.0% | +19.9% | 56% |
| Wealth Management | 44% | +10.1% | +11.6% | +11.0% | 40% |
| Investment Management | 7% | -11.6% | +0.1% | +6.7% | 5% |
| Whole company | 100% | +11.7% | +14.8% | +14.7% | 100% |
On the filed split through 2026-09-30, if each business keeps its last half-year's growth, the company grows about 15% next year and 16% in year 3, against 16.2% over the last twelve months. A scenario, not a forecast: no business holds its rate.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 16% over the twelve months to Sep 2026, about the same pace as the 14% in the year to Dec 2025.
It keeps 26% of sales as profit, up from 17% in the year to Dec 2023.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from −10% to +23% over the last 5 years, with sales falling in 1 of them.
Shareholders' money earned 18% a year.
The share count fell 14% in 4.8 years, and pay in shares costs 2.7% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-11-17. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Sep 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $59.8B | $53.7B | $54.1B | $61.8B | $70.6B | $80.2B |
| Sales growth | +23% | −10% | +0.9% | +14% | +14% | +16% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Net margin | 25% | 21% | 17% | 22% | 24% | 26% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Pay in shares | 3.5% | 3.5% | 3.2% | 2.6% | 2.7% | 2.7% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $34.0B | −$6.40B | −$33.5B | $1.36B | −$17.9B | −$58.3B |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $128B | $128B | $89.2B | $105B | $112B | $139B |
| Debt | $227B | $234B | $261B | $284B | $342B | $378B |
| Net cash | −$99.6B | −$106B | −$171B | −$179B | −$230B | −$239B |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Shares (diluted) | 1.81B | 1.71B | 1.65B | 1.61B | 1.59B | 1.57B |
What growth costs
For Morgan Stanley the main cost is pay, which rises with revenue. Even so, costs took 66 cents of each revenue dollar in the first nine months of 2026, against 69 cents a year earlier, and the wealth arm's margin has risen every year since 2023. Growth is widening the margin, not narrowing it.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The last report (14 Oct)
Quarter ended September 2026, filed figures.
In the third quarter of 2026 revenue was $20.3B, 12% more than a year earlier but 5% less than the second quarter. Share trading rose 41%, while bond trading fell 7% and banking fees barely grew. The wealth arm had a record quarter, keeping 30.4 cents of each revenue dollar as profit, and clients brought in $232B of new money.
Two warnings came with it: just over half that new money came from shares of newly listed companies, and loan losses rose on commercial property.
What it did to the thesisIt confirmed that the wealth arm keeps gaining clients and margin, the core of the case, but showed revenue falling from the quarter before and much of the new money coming from listings that will not repeat every quarter. It left open whether returns hold in a quieter year.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $3.03 against $2.93 expected; $3.03 as filed, with no adjustments.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
The same call says September's market volumes dried up and some IPOs were pulled; a flow that rides the listing calendar is the least steady part of the funnel, and nothing filed splits it out.
Tangible common equity is management's non-GAAP measure; the filed return on equity is about five points lower, and the third quarter's ROTCE fell to 22.6%.
What management did with the money
Morgan Stanley pays out most of what it earns. In the third quarter it bought back $1.5B of shares and paid a $1.15 dividend; the share count fell 1.6% in a year, even after paying staff partly in shares.
Insiders in 2026Q3: 0 purchases and 8 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Fair. The price is about 101% of what we think the business is worth, at an 8% yearly return.
The shares fell from a high of $232 to about $186 by 16 November, 13% in three months, although revenue kept growing. The third quarter brought less revenue than the second, and management said some new listings were pulled in September.
The fourth-quarter results on 14 January 2027 show whether new money and returns hold as listings slow, and new stress-test rules decide how much capital the firm must keep.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The same answer says the build-out may plateau and that there will be moments when it feels like overbuilding; the firm's deal and IPO revenue leans on a cycle it does not control.
An average of a few forecasts that moves with each print; it assumes markets and deal activity stay near 2026's level.
How we value it
- Method
- The owners' book plus the returns it earns above the rate
- Required return
- 8%
- Long-run growth
- 4%
- Moat
- An average moat
| Bear | Base | Bull | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Book growth, years 1 to 3 | 3.5%, 2.8%, 3% | 7%, 5.6%, 6.1% | 8.8%, 7%, 7.6% |
| Normal return on equity | 15.1% | 18.9% | 20.8% |
| Return on new capital after year ten | 8% | 12% | 15% |
| Value a share | $111 | $184 | $243 |
- Price
- $186
- Priced on
- 16 Nov
- Price as a share of the base value
- 101%
- Yearly return the price offers on the base case
- 8%
Where each figure comes from
| Figure | Source | Where exactly |
|---|---|---|
| The owners' book | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Shares | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the diluted share count. |
| Book growth, years 1 to 3 | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus for the years to 31 Dec 2026, 31 Dec 2027, 31 Dec 2028 and 31 Dec 2029: the average of 10 to 14 analysts' revenue estimates, 7%, 5.6%, 6.1%; the owners' book grows on that path, held to 30% a year. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Normal return on equity | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus for the year to 31 Dec 2028, the average of 14 analysts' estimates: the return on equity of their last forecast year. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Return on new capital after year ten | Our method's rule | Set by our reading of the moat: the 8% rate with none, 12% with an average one, 15% with a strong one; the bear case earns the rate. |
| The bear and bull cases | Our method's rule | Our method's spread: the bear case takes half the growth and a fifth off the margin, the bull a quarter more growth and a tenth more margin. |
| Price | Market price | FMP's closing price on 16 Nov 2026. |
What each case rests on
Bear caseEquity grows at half that path, about 4%, 3% and 3%, the return on equity settles a fifth lower at 15.1%, and new equity earns only the 8% rate: the downturn test.
Base caseEquity grows 7%, 6% and 6%, the analysts' revenue path (C45), then fades toward 4%; the return on equity moves to 18.9%, the analysts' 2028 figure.
Bull caseEquity grows a quarter faster, about 9%, 7% and 8%, the return on equity reaches 20.8%, and new equity earns 15%.
What moves the base value
| Lower | Higher | |
|---|---|---|
| Growth in years 1 to 3, a quarter lower or higher | $178 | $191 |
| The normal return on equity, 15% lower or higher | $172 | $197 |
| Return on new capital after year ten, at the rate or one step up | $132 | $224 |
| The rate, a point higher or lower | $152 | $237 |
| Long-run growth a point lower | $171 | - |
Value a share as growth and margin change
| Normal return on equity ↓ · growth → | 50% | 75% | 100% | 125% | 150% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 15.1% | $156 | $162 | $167 | $173 | $180 |
| 17% | $164 | $170 | $176 | $182 | $189 |
| 18.9% | $171 | $178 | $184 | $191 | $199 |
| 20.8% | $179 | $186 | $193 | $200 | $208 |
| 22.7% | $187 | $194 | $201 | $209 | $218 |
Growth is shown as a share of the base case's. Green: the price is at or under 80% of that value. Red: at or over 120%.
How we read the multiple
For a bank the useful measure is the price against its net worth after goodwill.
- Morgan Stanley's net worth after goodwill was $53.96 a share in September 2026, and buyers pay about 3.4 times that.
- Assume shareholders want 9% to 10% a year and the firm grows 4% a year for ever.
- Then 3.4 times pays for a return of about 21% to 25% a year, for good.
- Morgan Stanley earned 21.6% in 2025 and 25.4% so far in 2026, against its own 20% goal.
Against its own history. Buyers pay far more for each dollar of Morgan Stanley's net worth than in its own past, but the usual price for its earnings: they trust the earnings more.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The cost of equity is assumed: at 8%, the rate the fair value uses, the same multiple needs only about 18%. The reading is a range, not a figure.
Tangible common equity is management's non-GAAP measure; the filed return on equity is about five points lower, and the third quarter's ROTCE fell to 22.6%.
The value leans on the return on equity staying near 19% for a decade; at the bear case's 15.1% it is $111, and 2023's return on equity was about 9%.
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on price for each $1 of net worth excluding goodwill, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | price for each $1 of net worth excluding goodwill |
|---|---|---|
| GS | The Goldman Sachs Group | 2.2× |
| JPM | JPMorgan Chase & Co. | 2.9× |
| MS | Morgan Stanley | 3.1× |
| SCHW | The Charles Schwab | 5.0× |
The middle of the other 3 is 2.9. Morgan Stanley is 2nd dearest of 4.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
It costs a little more than its closest rivals on net worth, a small gap that fits a firm earning more on that net worth than most of them.
Also checked and set aside: Interactive Brokers Group (a substitute, not the same product).
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Fidelity Investments, Vanguard.
Where we disagree with the market
This year's returns are the new normal, because the wealth arm keeps growing whatever markets do.
The wealth arm is real and growing, but this year's returns also rest on a boom the price assumes will last.
Investors have sold the shares since the summer on fears that the boom in listings and trading is ending. We think the wealth arm really is steadier than in past cycles, but the price already pays for that.
We would be too cautious if new money stays strong and returns stay near 20% through a year when listings and share trading slow.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 6 claims
The cost of equity is assumed: at 8%, the rate the fair value uses, the same multiple needs only about 18%. The reading is a range, not a figure.
The same call says September's market volumes dried up and some IPOs were pulled; a flow that rides the listing calendar is the least steady part of the funnel, and nothing filed splits it out.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Markets turn. Profit fell 40% from 2021 to 2023 when the last boom ended, and share trading, up 44% this year, swings hardest.
- New money was listings. Just over half the third quarter's new money came from newly listed shares, which will not arrive every quarter.
- Capital rules tighten. New stress tests add a second market shock for big trading banks, which could raise what Morgan Stanley must hold.
- Deposits cost more. The rate the wealth arm pays on clients' cash has risen this year, squeezing the interest it earns.
- Insiders sell, none buy. Insiders sold shares in the past year, none under a pre-set plan, and bought none.
- One holder owns a quarter. MUFG, a Japanese bank, owns about 24% and returns shares to stay under its agreed cap.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
The same call says September's market volumes dried up and some IPOs were pulled; a flow that rides the listing calendar is the least steady part of the funnel, and nothing filed splits it out.
Executives are paid largely in stock, so sales after vesting are routine; the sales are small against the 2,701,847 shares the group owns.
What we still do not know
- How much new money the wealth arm gathers in a quarter with few new listings.
- How many advisers Morgan Stanley loses to independent firms; it publishes no count.
- How much the coming stress-test rules change the capital the firm must hold.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The same call says September's market volumes dried up and some IPOs were pulled; a flow that rides the listing calendar is the least steady part of the funnel, and nothing filed splits it out.
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveThe price falls 20% under fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price falls to about 80% of what we think the business is worth.about $147.36 today, 21% below the last close
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe price runs 20% above fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price rises to about 20% above what we think the business is worth.about $223.78 today, 21% above the last close
- Neutral→AttractiveThe returns survive a weaker year
It needs all of:
- ○Morgan Stanley earns 20% or more on net worth after goodwill for a full year in which share trading revenue falls.checked at the next results, due by 14 Jan
- ○Clients bring in over $300B of new money in four quarters, none with more than a quarter of it from new listings.checked at the next results, due by 14 Jan
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe returns or the capital give way
It needs any of:
- ○The return on net worth after goodwill falls below 15% in a quarter, from 22.6% in the third quarter of 2026.checked at the next results, due by 14 Jan
- ○The capital ratio falls below 13%, from 14.9%, against an 11.8% requirement.checked at the next results, due by 14 Jan
We would also be wrong if
- The wealth arm's pre-tax margin falls below 27% for two quarters running.
- Clients bring in less than $200B of new money over a full year.
What is coming
- December 2026 Basel III endgame and surcharge rules finalised: How much capital the firm must hold, and so how much it can return or lend.
Every dated event ahead
- December 2026 Basel III endgame and surcharge rules finalised: How much capital the firm must hold, and so how much it can return or lend.
- 14 January 2027 Q4 2026 results: Whether net new assets and returns hold as IPOs and trading slow, and the full-year return on tangible equity.
Since we wrote this
- 17 NovThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionWritten a month after a record wealth quarter, with the shares a fifth below the summer high as listings and trading cooled.
Sources 17
Sources - 17
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-19The business and segment descriptions, the competition section, the 2025 segment revenues, the return and margin history, the wealth and workplace metrics, the equity trading split and the executive officers.backsC01C04C07C09C34C35C36C41C47C49
- S02primarycompany filing2026-10-14Third-quarter revenues by segment and line, earnings, returns, capital ratios, buybacks, the dividend and the period-end share count.backsC03C05C19C21C38C39C47C48
- S03primarycompany filing2026-11-05Nine-month segment results, the balance sheet, tangible equity, client assets, net new assets and fee-based flows, capital requirements and buffers, and the regional split.backsC02C03C04C08C09C19C20C22C24C36C38C41C42
- S04primarytranscript2026-10-14Morgan Stanley third-quarter 2026 earnings call transcriptThe IPO share of net new assets, the six-year flow record, the capital buffer, the chief executive's view of the AI build-out and the cycle, and thirteen analysts' questions.
IPO related flows once again contributed to just over half of the overall NNA.
backsC05C06C08C11C40C43 - S05primarycompany filing2026-01-15The full-year 2025 segment results as first reported, which the 10-K repeats.backsC01
- S06primarycompany filing2026-04-02Beneficial ownership of directors and officers, MUFG's stake, the chief executive's 2025 pay, and the performance stock unit terms.backsC10C29C32C33
- S07primarycompany filing2026-11-17Every open-market transaction by an insider in the year, with the Rule 10b5-1 checkbox read from each filing, and MUFG's share returns.backsC29C31
- S08primaryvendor data2026-11-17Research pack for MS, frozen at content/MS/research-pack.jsonThe price and its history, the analyst split and its dated series, price-target drift, FINRA short interest, the earnings history and the filed-competitor cohort.backsC03C23C24C26C27
- S09primaryindustry data2025-01-06The global investment banking fee pool.
Investment banking fees reached US$117.4 billion during full year 2024, posting a 14% increase compared to full year 2023
backsC13 - S10secondarynews2026-01-02LSEG's 2025 M&A fee ranking by bank.
It was paid US$4.6 billion in M&A fees, followed by JPMorgan at US$3.1 billion and Morgan Stanley at US$3 billion, Citi at US$2 billion and Evercore at US$1.7 billion
backsC12 - S11primarygovernment data2026-09-11Federal Reserve, Financial Accounts of the United States (Z.1), second quarter 2026, recent developments Federal ReserveUS households' financial assets by type and the quarter's change in net worth.
Financial assets include deposits and money market funds ($20.3 trillion), directly and indirectly held equity shares ($74.0 trillion) and debt securities ($12.2 trillion)
backsC14 - S12secondarynews2026-07-23InvestmentNews: Going RIA is a one-way street Cerulli AssociatesCerulli's decade of advisor and asset share moving from the big brokerage firms to independent advisers.
Data from Cerulli Associates shows that from 2014 to 2024, wirehouse, independent broker-dealer, and insurance broker-dealer channels collectively lost roughly 12 percentage points of advisor headcount share
backsC16 - S13primarycompany filing2026-02-25Schwab's own description of Investor Services, used for the competitor gate and the threat.backsC17
- S14primarycompany filing2026-02-25Goldman's own description of its segments, used for the competitor gate and the threat.backsC18
- S15primarycompany filing2026-11-17Revenue, net income, shareholders' equity, share-based pay and the diluted share count by year.backsC35C37C46
- S16secondaryvendor data2026-11-17The analysts' average revenue and earnings per share for the next fiscal years, and the close.backsC45C46
- S17primaryregulator2026-09-30Federal Reserve Board press release: stress test transparency and stress capital buffer averaging final rules Federal ReserveThe content and timing of the final stress-test rules.
These banks will now be tested against two global market shock components each year, and the Board will use the shock that produces the largest losses for each firm to calculate the firm's stress test results.
backsC44