MKS
This is the archived full research. Read the story
The maker of the gauges, gas valves and power supplies inside other companies' chipmaking machines, and of the chemicals that plate copper onto circuit boards and chip packages.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↑
Growing fast, but the record restarted in 2025 after four flat years and it amplifies a cycle it does not control.
Business quality3/4 →
Copy-exact qualification is structural, but it will not price to scarcity and a named rival is attacking its largest stated position.
Financial position3/4 ↑
Leverage down a full turn to 3.0 times, no maintenance covenants, but $1.40B of convertible debt turned current against $611M of cash.
Execution record3/4 ↑
Six straight beats and a refinancing delivered ahead of plan, against an acquisition it had to impair and a past material weakness.
Per share capture2/4 ↓
The anchor rules out a 3 where a convertible sits near its conversion price. This one is 33% above it, hedged to $237.42.
Potential2/4 ↑
The upside is somebody else's capital spending plus orders not yet shipped - expected rather than committed, with no volume or term disclosed.
Risk profile3/4 →
Customer concentration is genuinely low, but 81% of revenue is international and export controls on chip equipment are a standing dependency.
Valuation4/4 ↑
About 19.8 times operating profit, 57% of a three-stage value near $335 at an 8% return: cheap, past the 20% margin.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Filings, both releases, the call and three competitors' own reports - but the central price claim rests on my own $5.0B revenue estimate.
The Verdict
We rate MKS Attractive. It makes the gauges, gas valves and power supplies inside other companies' chipmaking machines; the products are good but profit swings with the chip cycle, so the business is mixed. AI chip spending lifted sales, and profit jumped far faster because costs stayed flat: third-quarter costs rose only 2% on 13% more sales. The price is a little over half our value, with our gloomy case below it, though it counts on most of the jump lasting. Whether low costs survive a quarter when sales stop rising is the risk; on the evidence so far the cushion is enough.
The long caseAI chip demand is driving chipmakers to buy more factory equipment, which carries MKS parts; its profits must hold up when that spending stops rising.
How we weighed it
The price against our value
In its favour
Price at 57% of our value
The price is a little over half our value on the analysts' path, though the bear case sits below it.
The business
Cuts both ways
Mixed
Good parts inside chipmaking machines, but profit swings with the cycle and past purchases weigh on the books.
Growth against what the price assumes
In its favour
Profit rose far faster than sales because costs stayed flat, and the price asks little more growth than that.
What could go wrong
Against it
The cycle can turn, orders can be cancelled cheaply, most sales are abroad, and a downturn would test the cost base.
Against competitors
Cuts both ways
It is only a little dearer than its filed rivals, and the whole group is dear, so its level is the group's.
How its group is behaving
Cuts both ways
Chip equipment names move together on spending news; the cost discipline is its own fact.
The latest news and report
In its favour
The latest report showed costs barely moving while sales jumped and consumables growing; one strong quarter cannot prove the downturn.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
- Management describes it as durable - 'we expect operating expenses will grow at a much lower rate than revenue' - and guides Q3 to $280M of operating expenses on $1,350M of revenue, which would extend the pattern for at least one more quarter.
- Some of the flat cost base is deliberate under-investment being caught up later: the chief financial officer says Malaysia and Guangzhou start-up costs run 50 to 80 basis points a quarter through cost of revenues and are 'self-liquidating', so the cost line is carrying a drag that will lift.
- Mix is genuinely moving against gross margin - chemistry equipment has lower gross margin than chemistry - so the operating margin rose despite the mix, not because of it.
- On the guided Q3 run rate the multiple is far lower: revenue of $1,350M at 47.0% gross margin less $346M of GAAP operating expenses is about $289M of operating profit, or $1.15B annualised, which puts the enterprise at 18.6 times.
- On the vendor panel's 2027 adjusted earnings of $17.50 a share the shares are at 15.2 times, which is not a demanding price for a business growing this fast.
- The trailing figure is depressed by three quarters that pre-date the ramp, so 30 times is arithmetically true and describes a company that no longer exists at that run rate.
- Adding back the $248M a year of acquisition intangible amortisation takes trailing operating profit to $929M and the multiple to 23 times - and that amortisation is a non-cash charge against a purchase already paid for.
- 2026-11-04editedre-struck at $205.18 and trailing operating profit of $869M
- The company does not quantify the refund in any filed document, so the 100 basis points cannot be checked against the statements - it is management's own characterisation of its own margin.
- It is also the unflattering direction, which is a point in its favour: a company inflating a margin story would not volunteer this.
- 2026-11-04editedthe Q3 release does not restate the discrete item; read on the call
The company
A chipmaking machine etches and coats a wafer inside a sealed chamber, and it only works if the pressure, the gas flow and the plasma are exactly right. MKS makes the gauges, valves and power supplies that control them, sold to the companies that build the machines.
It also sells lasers and optics for inspection tools, and the chemistry and machines that plate copper onto circuit boards and chip packages. No single rival competes with it across all of that.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
How it makes money
Machine builders buy MKS parts for every tool they ship, so semiconductor sales, $554M of the June quarter's $1.25B, rise and fall with spending on new chip factories, and orders can be cancelled with little penalty. On the plating side, each machine sold is meant to pull repeat sales of the chemistry it uses.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The down payments are real money and are the strongest commitment evidence in the file, even though no volume, term or counterparty is disclosed for any of it.
- Short lead times cut both ways: they mean little visibility, and they also mean MKS carries less cancellation risk than a supplier holding a long book into a downturn.
- Management's own framing is that this is the good order of events: equipment ships first and the chemistry follows, with 24 to 30 months between an install and volume chemistry, so a quarter where equipment outruns chemistry is what the front of that cycle looks like.
- The chief executive also says 'the majority of the chemistry growth right now ... is still with previously installed capacity', meaning the 21% is not yet being helped by the equipment now shipping.
- MKS does not disclose chemistry revenue in any filed document, so the 21% cannot be checked and neither can the margin difference the argument turns on.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (Q2 2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Vacuum Solutions Division | 40.6% | Pressure, flow, gas-delivery, power and plasma subsystems built into chipmaking tools, plus service on them. |
| Materials Solutions Division | 32.1% | Plating chemistry consumed by circuit-board and chip-package makers, and the plating machines that use it. |
| Photonics Solutions Division | 27.3% | Lasers, optics and motion control for lithography and inspection tools, and laser drilling systems for circuit boards. |
Who runs it
John Lee has run MKS since 2020, after joining in 2007. He bought Atotech, wrote much of it down a year later, and has spent the time since paying down the debt it left. Ramakumar Mayampurath has run finance since 2024. Insiders own well under 1% of the company and none has bought shares on the market in the past year. The bonus pays on adjusted operating profit and on cutting debt; the share awards on adjusted earnings and on beating similar companies' shares.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- Vanguard filed on 27 March 2026 that it no longer beneficially owned any MKS shares, so the 5% list is already partly out of date.
- No insider has bought on the open market in the twelve months to September 2026 (C30).
- Every sale is coded S and every acquisition A, so what is absent is buying rather than what is present being unusual - routine scheduled selling by executives of an appreciated stock looks exactly like this.
- The chief executive still held 134,776 shares after the sale and the chief operating officer 19,201, so neither is exiting.
- The filings in the pack do not say whether any sale ran under a pre-arranged trading plan, which is the fact that would settle whether the timing carries information; that requires reading the Form 4 footnotes.
- Nothing pays on revenue growth, return on capital or per-share results, and the profit metrics are struck before the acquisition amortisation that separates reported from adjusted earnings (C35).
- In 2024 the committee set plan-of-record performance to pay 25% of target for a muted year and restored 100% in 2025, so the payout curve moves with the cycle.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
The chipmaker, not the machine builder, picks the part. Once a production recipe is approved around a particular gauge or generator, the factory's rule of copying exactly forbids swapping it without re-approving the process. So MKS wins at the start of a machine design and keeps the slot for its life.
Outsiders back this up: 1,201 chipmaker survey responses put it in the top ten large suppliers for service. And no customer is more than 10% of sales.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- MKS is on the list and did not win its own category, which is the qualification rather than the endorsement: the WFE Subsystems award went to Edwards, a vacuum-pump maker MKS's own competition section does not even name.
- The published list is a top-ten membership rather than a rank, so nothing here says where MKS sits within it, and the survey measures customer service and support rather than technical position or share.
- TechInsights is also the source MKS itself cites for its claim to be number one or two in 19 product categories, so it is not an origin independent of the company's own marketing use of it.
The threat
Advanced Energy's own annual report says it is chasing more share in one kind of etching, the application where MKS claims to lead. In plating chemistry, Qnity, spun out of DuPont in November 2025, sells the same product to the same buyers, and Element Solutions names MKS as its most significant competitor.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- Advanced Energy has been saying a version of this for several years and MKS's semiconductor revenue grew 13.2% in 2025 against Advanced Energy's semiconductor equipment revenue growth of 6.0%, so the attack has not shown up in the relative numbers yet.
- MKS's leadership claim is its own and unaudited; no third party publishes application-level share in radio-frequency power delivery, so neither side of this can be checked from outside.
- An independent customer survey of 1,201 responses put MKS in the 2026 top ten for customer service among large chipmaking equipment suppliers and did not list Advanced Energy at all.
- Both were already competing before the spin-off - Qnity's business was DuPont's electronics arm and Element Solutions has named MKS for years - so the change is focus and disclosure rather than a new entrant.
- MKS's own claim is that it is the only supplier integrating laser drilling systems, plating chemistry and plating equipment, which neither of these two does, so the overlap is on the chemistry alone rather than on the offer.
How big it could get
How big this could get
Chipmakers are forecast to spend $133B on equipment for the largest wafers in 2026, up 18%, and $151B in 2027. MKS says its parts can go into tools making up over 85% of that, but puts what it can actually sell into semiconductors at $8B. Its own semiconductor sales run at about $2.22B a year.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Both figures are labelled the company's own: the lender presentation footnotes the serviceable market as 'Internal Company estimates', and no outside body publishes a subsystem segmentation of fab equipment spending that could check it.
- The 85% is a coverage claim about applications touched, not a revenue claim: MKS's actual semiconductor revenue is about 1.7% of the fab equipment spend SEMI measures, so the two numbers describe very different things and only one of them is money.
- The serviceable market is stated as of 2024 while MKS's semiconductor revenue has since risen sharply, so its share of its own stated market has gone from about 19% to about 28% in two years - which means either the estimate is stale or the share gain is larger than the company claims elsewhere.
Where the growth is coming from, business by business
Where the growth is coming from
| Business | Share of revenue | Growth: last quarter | Last half-year | Last year | Share in 3 years at its half-year rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Product | 88% | +30.2% | +23.5% | +17.1% | 91% |
| Service | 12% | +15.2% | +10.7% | +10.1% | 9% |
| Whole company | 100% | +28.3% | +21.8% | +16.3% | 100% |
On the filed split through 2026-06-30, if each business keeps its last half-year's growth, the company grows about 22% next year and 22% in year 3, against 16.2% over the last twelve months. A scenario, not a forecast: no business holds its rate.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 25% over the twelve months to Sep 2026, faster than the 9.6% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is 18%, up from −43% in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 29¢ of each sales dollar, up from 23¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
Each dollar put into the business earns 11% a year after tax, down from 17% in the year to Dec 2021.
It turned 12% of sales into free cash, $552M over the last twelve months.
It owes $3.27B more than the cash it holds, about 4.5 years of the cash its operations bring in.
The share count rose 30% in 4.8 years, and pay in shares costs 1.2% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-11-10. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Sep 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $2.95B | $3.55B | $3.62B | $3.59B | $3.93B | $4.77B |
| Sales growth | +27% | +20% | +2.1% | −1.0% | +9.6% | +25% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 47% | 44% | 45% | 48% | 47% | 47% |
| Operating margin | 24% | 17% | −43% | 14% | 13% | 18% |
| Net margin | 19% | 9.4% | −51% | 5.3% | 7.5% | 13% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 6.8% | 6.8% | 8.0% | 7.6% | 7.6% | 6.6% |
| Selling, general and admin | 13% | 14% | 19% | 19% | 18% | 16% |
| Pay in shares | 1.3% | 1.3% | 1.5% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 1.2% |
| Capital spending | 2.9% | 4.6% | 2.4% | 3.3% | 3.8% | 3.7% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $640M | $529M | $319M | $528M | $645M | $730M |
| Free cash flow | $553M | $365M | $232M | $410M | $497M | $552M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | - | - | $507M | $420M | $418M | $511M |
| Debt | $834M | $5.21B | $5.05B | $4.54B | $4.20B | $3.78B |
| Net cash | - | - | −$4.54B | −$4.12B | −$3.78B | −$3.27B |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | 17% | 7.1% | - | 6.9% | 7.4% | 11% |
| Shares (diluted) | 55.7M | 59.9M | 66.8M | 67.6M | 67.7M | 72.5M |
What growth costs
Today's MKS gets more profitable as it grows: research and selling costs rise more slowly than sales, so each new dollar of sales costs less to win. Over five years those costs rose as a share of sales, but that was the chemistry business it bought, not waste. A flat year turns the effect around.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The step up in selling and admin from 2022 to 2023 is the first full year of Atotech inside the perimeter (C49), not cost drift, so the five-year comparison crosses two different companies.
- In 2023, with revenue flat, research and development rose to 8.0 cents a sales dollar, so the leverage runs both ways (C33).
- It is management describing its own cyclicality unprompted and unflatteringly, which is a point for its reliability rather than against it.
- The 2023 record supports it: MKS semiconductor revenue fell 28% sequentially that year, which is worse than the wafer fab equipment market fell.
The last report (4 Nov)
Quarter ended September 2026, filed figures.
The third quarter of 2026 beat the company's forecast on every line. Sales rose 43% to $1.41B, packaging grew 9% when a flat quarter was guided, and the operating margin reached 27.8%.
Operating costs rose only $6M from the second quarter while sales rose $165M, so about 44 cents of each added dollar became profit. MKS guided $1.49B for the next quarter and announced a $500M buyback. On the call it said consumable chemicals grew 26%, almost all from older machines, and that new machines will add to it over the next two years.
What it did to the thesisIt supported the cost-discipline half of the case: costs barely moved while sales jumped. The call showed the consumables the machines pull in growing, which helps the second half, though slower than the machines themselves. One peak-cycle quarter cannot show the margin survives a downturn.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $4.18 against $3.63 expected.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
- Management describes it as durable - 'we expect operating expenses will grow at a much lower rate than revenue' - and guides Q3 to $280M of operating expenses on $1,350M of revenue, which would extend the pattern for at least one more quarter.
- Some of the flat cost base is deliberate under-investment being caught up later: the chief financial officer says Malaysia and Guangzhou start-up costs run 50 to 80 basis points a quarter through cost of revenues and are 'self-liquidating', so the cost line is carrying a drag that will lift.
- Mix is genuinely moving against gross margin - chemistry equipment has lower gross margin than chemistry - so the operating margin rose despite the mix, not because of it.
- MKS has beaten its own guidance on revenue and adjusted earnings in each of the last six quarters, so the guide has been a floor rather than a forecast - which argues the Q3 numbers are conservative and also that they carry little information.
- The guidance is explicitly struck 'up through but not including the date of this release' on tariffs, so a tariff change after 5 August 2026 is outside it.
- 2026-11-04editedtested against the print: Q3 revenue $1,413M
- The flat guide is a seasonal pattern management named in advance rather than a demand break, and the same call says chemistry equipment demand is 'easily the strongest it has ever been' with visibility through 2027.
- Electronics & Packaging is still guided up over 30% year on year in Q3, so the sequential flatness is a comparison against an unusually strong Q2 rather than a decline.
- 2026-11-04editedtested against the print: packaging grew 9%, not 1%
Chemistry's 26% is well under the 43% growth of Electronics & Packaging as a whole and the tools' own growth, so the faster-growing half is still the lower-margin equipment; the call says very little of the chemistry growth is from the new equipment yet.
Management also said that 'at some point things flatten and then things come down', that capacity added in this cycle is easier to build on the electronics side, and that a missing part from any supplier could constrain shipments.
What management did with the money
It has been paying down debt, prepaying $1.27B of term loan in February and $100M in each of May and August. But it also owes $1.4B of bonds that can be swapped for shares: above $237.42 a share, about 13 cents of every further dollar of gain goes to their holders.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- It is management's own measure on management's own definition. Adjusted earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation is not a filed figure, and the credit agreement version the January 2026 lender presentation used was $63M higher again than the reported one - $1,016M against $953M for the same twelve months.
- Most of the fall from 4.0 times to 3.0 times is the denominator rising with the cycle, not the numerator falling: net debt went from about $3.9B to $3.4B while trailing adjusted earnings went from roughly $0.9B to $1.1B. A cycle that turns puts the ratio back up without a dollar of debt being added.
- The 3.0 times counts the convertible notes as debt at their $1,400M principal. At 30 June 2026 the market valued them at $4,133M, because they are mostly an equity claim now - so the leverage figure is right on the indenture and understates what holders are actually owed.
- 2026-11-04editedthe Q3 release gives no leverage ratio; read on the call
- 2026-11-04editedQ3: notes convertible again during Q4
- The company may redeem the notes for cash from 5 June 2027 if the share price holds 130% of the conversion price, which caps how long the leak runs - though redeeming still requires finding $1,400M of cash and the excess is still owed.
- The conversion rate adjusts on certain events and the cap adjusts under the capped-call terms, so both prices can move; the 10-Q says the $237.42 is 'subject to adjustments'.
- It cuts the other way below $237.42: between $154.29 and the cap the capped calls absorb the dilution entirely, so within that band shareholders lose nothing.
- 2026-11-04editedthe price is now below the cap
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Cheap. The price is about 57% of what we think the business is worth, at an 8% yearly return.
The shares are 54.2% below their June high and 22.7% below where we first priced them, even as sales set a record.
Q3, reported 4 November, answered the cost test: costs rose 2% on 13% more sales. The call on 5 November should show whether chemistry is growing too, and what the Ophir sale means.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- 2026-11-04editedre-struck at the 3 November close
- MKS has beaten its own guidance on revenue and adjusted earnings in each of the last six quarters, so the guide has been a floor rather than a forecast - which argues the Q3 numbers are conservative and also that they carry little information.
- The guidance is explicitly struck 'up through but not including the date of this release' on tariffs, so a tariff change after 5 August 2026 is outside it.
- 2026-11-04editedtested against the print: Q3 revenue $1,413M
- The flat guide is a seasonal pattern management named in advance rather than a demand break, and the same call says chemistry equipment demand is 'easily the strongest it has ever been' with visibility through 2027.
- Electronics & Packaging is still guided up over 30% year on year in Q3, so the sequential flatness is a comparison against an unusually strong Q2 rather than a decline.
- 2026-11-04editedtested against the print: packaging grew 9%, not 1%
How we value it
- Method
- Cash the business will produce, in three stages
- Required return
- 8%
- Long-run growth
- 4%
- Moat
- An average moat
| Bear | Base | Bull | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | 11.3%, 6.4% | 22.5%, 12.8% | 28.1%, 16% |
| Normal operating margin | 20.9% | 26.2% | 28.8% |
| Return on new capital after year ten | 8% | 12% | 15% |
| Value a share | $151 | $335 | $463 |
- Price
- $192
- Priced on
- 6 Nov
- Price as a share of the base value
- 57%
- Starting growth the price pays for
- -0.7%
- Yearly return the price offers on the base case
- 10.3%
- Risk check: valued at 10%, the rate for a cyclical or indebted business
- $205
Where each figure comes from
| Figure | Source | Where exactly |
|---|---|---|
| Sales, the last twelve months | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Operating margin today | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Tax rate | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Sales per dollar of new capital | Filed report | Annual report (10-K) for the period to 31 Dec 2025, filed 24 Feb 2026: the year's sales over its operating capital. |
| Shares | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the diluted share count. |
| Cash and investments | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Debt | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus for the years to 31 Dec 2026 and 31 Dec 2027, as it stood when the value was struck on 10 Nov 2026: the average of 2 to 10 analysts' revenue estimates, 22.5%, 12.8%. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Normal operating margin | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus operating margin for the year to 31 Dec 2027, as it stood when the value was struck on 10 Nov 2026, the average of 10 analysts' estimates, less stock pay: 26.2% in the base case. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Return on new capital after year ten | Our method's rule | Set by our reading of the moat: the 8% rate with none, 12% with an average one, 15% with a strong one; the bear case earns the rate. |
| The bear and bull cases | Our method's rule | Our method's spread: the bear case takes half the growth and a fifth off the margin, the bull a quarter more growth and a tenth more margin. |
| Price | Market price | FMP's closing price on 6 Nov 2026. |
What each case rests on
Bear caseGrowth runs at half the analysts' path, 11% and 6%, the margin settles a fifth lower at 20.9%, and new capital earns only the 8% rate: the downturn test.
Base caseRevenue grows 22% and 13% over three years, the analysts' path (C56), then fades toward 4%, closing 30% of the gap each year; the margin moves to 26.2%, the analysts' year-three figure after stock pay.
Bull caseGrowth runs a quarter above the analysts' path, 28% and 16%, the margin reaches 28.8%, and new capital earns 15%.
What moves the base value
| Lower | Higher | |
|---|---|---|
| Growth in years 1 to 3, a quarter lower or higher | $293 | $381 |
| The normal margin, 15% lower or higher | $278 | $392 |
| Capital per dollar of growth, a quarter more or less | $326 | $340 |
| Return on new capital after year ten, at the rate or one step up | $259 | $365 |
| The rate, a point higher or lower | $257 | $464 |
| Long-run growth a point lower | $295 | - |
Value a share as growth and margin change
| Normal margin ↓ · growth → | 50% | 75% | 100% | 125% | 150% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 21% | $197 | $226 | $259 | $295 | $334 |
| 23.6% | $226 | $259 | $297 | $338 | $383 |
| 26.2% | $255 | $293 | $335 | $381 | $432 |
| 28.8% | $284 | $326 | $373 | $425 | $482 |
| 31.4% | $313 | $360 | $411 | $468 | $531 |
Growth is shown as a share of the base case's. Green: the price is at or under 80% of that value. Red: at or over 120%.
How we read the multiple
Buyers pay about $17.0B for the whole company, debt included: 20 times the $869M of operating profit it earned in the last twelve months. To cost an ordinary 15 times, MKS must:
- Earn about $1.13B of operating profit a year, and keep earning it.
- Its best quarter ever, taken over a full year, comes to $1.30B.
- So the price now asks that today's peak pace holds, not that it climbs further.
Against its own history. Far dearer than its own normal, and the gap comes from a spending boom rather than a better business, so it closes if the cycle turns.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- On the guided Q3 run rate the multiple is far lower: revenue of $1,350M at 47.0% gross margin less $346M of GAAP operating expenses is about $289M of operating profit, or $1.15B annualised, which puts the enterprise at 18.6 times.
- On the vendor panel's 2027 adjusted earnings of $17.50 a share the shares are at 15.2 times, which is not a demanding price for a business growing this fast.
- The trailing figure is depressed by three quarters that pre-date the ramp, so 30 times is arithmetically true and describes a company that no longer exists at that run rate.
- Adding back the $248M a year of acquisition intangible amortisation takes trailing operating profit to $929M and the multiple to 23 times - and that amortisation is a non-cash charge against a purchase already paid for.
- 2026-11-04editedre-struck at $205.18 and trailing operating profit of $869M
- Each peer matches one third of MKS and none matches the whole, so this compares a three-division company against three single-line ones - which is what MKS's own filing says would happen.
- The subject figure is struck on trailing operating profit that pre-dates the ramp, and the peers' are not obviously affected the same way, so part of the gap is timing rather than price.
- Multiples are vendor figures; the pack could only check the operating-margin line against the filings for Advanced Energy and Element Solutions, and both agreed within one percentage point.
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on company value for each $1 of operating profit, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | company value for each $1 of operating profit |
|---|---|---|
| Q | Qnity Electronics | 26.5× |
| ESI | Element Solutions | 27.2× |
| MKSI | MKS | 30.0× |
| AEIS | Advanced Energy Industries | 41.3× |
The middle of the other 3 is 27.2. MKS Inc. is 2nd dearest of 4.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
Only a little dearer than its filed rivals, and every one of them is dear, so the high price belongs to the whole group rather than this company.
Also checked and set aside: IPG Photonics (a substitute, not the same product); Lumentum Holdings (a substitute, not the same product).
Where we disagree with the market
An artificial-intelligence compounder: most analysts rate it Buy and expect adjusted earnings a share to more than double between 2025 and 2027.
The profit jump looks mostly like fixed costs meeting a spending peak; Q3 and the Q4 guide fit a lasting change too, and the price counts on the peak lasting.
The market is reading the headline margin. The call explained it, yet twelve analysts asked 28 questions there and not one asked what happens to costs if sales stop rising.
We would be wrong if gross margin holds near 47% into 2027 while costs stay flat. Q3 and the Q4 guide of 47.5% with costs near $288M point that way; 2027 is the test.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The company does not quantify the refund in any filed document, so the 100 basis points cannot be checked against the statements - it is management's own characterisation of its own margin.
- It is also the unflattering direction, which is a point in its favour: a company inflating a margin story would not volunteer this.
- 2026-11-04editedthe Q3 release does not restate the discrete item; read on the call
- Management describes it as durable - 'we expect operating expenses will grow at a much lower rate than revenue' - and guides Q3 to $280M of operating expenses on $1,350M of revenue, which would extend the pattern for at least one more quarter.
- Some of the flat cost base is deliberate under-investment being caught up later: the chief financial officer says Malaysia and Guangzhou start-up costs run 50 to 80 basis points a quarter through cost of revenues and are 'self-liquidating', so the cost line is carrying a drag that will lift.
- Mix is genuinely moving against gross margin - chemistry equipment has lower gross margin than chemistry - so the operating margin rose despite the mix, not because of it.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- The cycle turns. The chief executive says MKS outgrows chip spending early in an upswing and that it reverses in the downturn. Revenue fell 8.4% in 2019.
- Orders that can vanish. Semiconductor orders can be cancelled or rescheduled with little penalty, and MKS guides only one quarter ahead.
- Acquisitions on the books. Past purchases make up 51% of its assets, and a 2023 write-down pushed the operating margin to minus 42.9%.
- Selling abroad. 81% of revenue comes from outside America, concentrated in China, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Japan, with the export-control and tariff risk that carries.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- It is management describing its own cyclicality unprompted and unflatteringly, which is a point for its reliability rather than against it.
- The 2023 record supports it: MKS semiconductor revenue fell 28% sequentially that year, which is worse than the wafer fab equipment market fell.
- The down payments are real money and are the strongest commitment evidence in the file, even though no volume, term or counterparty is disclosed for any of it.
- Short lead times cut both ways: they mean little visibility, and they also mean MKS carries less cancellation risk than a supplier holding a long book into a downturn.
What we still do not know
- Whether operating costs stay flat once sales stop rising. Nobody on the call asked.
- Whether chemistry sales will follow the plating machines. Chemistry grew about 21%, against 43.2% for that whole business.
- Whether a customer will approve a second supplier in the etching work MKS leads, where Advanced Energy is chasing share.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Management's own framing is that this is the good order of events: equipment ships first and the chemistry follows, with 24 to 30 months between an install and volume chemistry, so a quarter where equipment outruns chemistry is what the front of that cycle looks like.
- The chief executive also says 'the majority of the chemistry growth right now ... is still with previously installed capacity', meaning the 21% is not yet being helped by the equipment now shipping.
- MKS does not disclose chemistry revenue in any filed document, so the 21% cannot be checked and neither can the margin difference the argument turns on.
- Advanced Energy has been saying a version of this for several years and MKS's semiconductor revenue grew 13.2% in 2025 against Advanced Energy's semiconductor equipment revenue growth of 6.0%, so the attack has not shown up in the relative numbers yet.
- MKS's leadership claim is its own and unaudited; no third party publishes application-level share in radio-frequency power delivery, so neither side of this can be checked from outside.
- An independent customer survey of 1,201 responses put MKS in the 2026 top ten for customer service among large chipmaking equipment suppliers and did not list Advanced Energy at all.
What would change our view
- Attractive→NeutralThe price rises within 20% of fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price rises to about $268, 80% of what we think the business is worth, so it is no longer cheap enough.about ≈$253.45 today, -5% above the last close
- Attractive→UnattractiveThe price runs 20% above fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price rises to about $402, 20% above what we think the business is worth.about ≈$362.21 today, 36% above the last close
- Attractive→UnattractiveThe cycle or the sole-source position turns
It needs any of:
- ○The industry body SEMI cuts its 2027 chip-equipment spending forecast below the 2026 figure.watched as it happens
- ○A customer approves a second supplier for a part MKS calls its own.watched as it happens
We would also be wrong if
- Operating costs rise as fast as revenue for two quarters running.
What is coming
- 5 November 2026 Q3 2026 earnings call and 10-Q: Whether chemistry revenue grew alongside the equipment, whether Q3 gross margin held without discrete items, leverage, and the terms of the Ophir Optics sale.
Every dated event ahead
- 5 November 2026 Q3 2026 earnings call and 10-Q: Whether chemistry revenue grew alongside the equipment, whether Q3 gross margin held without discrete items, leverage, and the terms of the Ophir Optics sale.
- February 2027 Q4 2026 results and the FY2026 10-K: A full year of cost per sales dollar against 2025 with the new plants' start-up costs inside it, and how much more term loan was repaid.
- March 2027 2027 proxy statement: How 2026 bonuses and performance shares paid out, and whether the profit and net-debt targets were set above 2025's actuals.
- 5 June 2027 MKS may first call the convertible notes: From this date a sustained price 30% above conversion lets MKS force settlement, which would fix the dilution the capped calls no longer cover.
Since we wrote this
- 9 NovThesis reviewAttractive: priced at 55% of a value near $349Re-valued in three stages at an 8% return, the method now drawn on every thesis: the price sits past the 20% margin of safety.
- 5 NovEarningsThe call showed chemistry growing; the view waits for Q4Chemistry consumables grew faster than before but mostly from old equipment; the profit pace the price needs is guided, not yet earned.
- 4 NovEarningsRecord quarter with costs up only 2%; Neutral holds pending the callSales beat the top of guidance and the margin hit 27.8%, which answers the cost test. The chemistry evidence is read on the call, so the view waits.
- 19 OctNewsMKS sells its Ophir infrared optics business for $650M cash, closing in 2027. View heldMKS agrees to sell its Ophir Optics business to TTM for $650M cash.
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 9 SepThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionWritten a month after a record quarter whose margin jump came from costs holding flat rather than a better business, with the shares 40.7% below their June high.
Also checked 2 times with nothing new to act on.
Sources 20
Sources - 20
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-24the three-division product descriptions, the named competitors division by division and the statement that no single competitor spans all product lines, the copy-exact passages, customer concentration, end-market and international revenue splits, research and development spend, patents, backlog language and the risk factorsbacksC01C08C09C14C29C32C36C41C42C44C48C49
- S02primarycompany filing2026-08-06the debt note in full - convertible terms, capped-call cap, the 2034 notes, the February 2026 refinancing and prepayments - the balance sheet, the earnings-per-share note with the diluted bridge, and the fair-value table showing the convertible marked at $4,133M against $1,400M carriedbacksC10C12C17C35C43C44C48C50
- S03primarycompany filing2026-08-05the end-market revenue split, the GAAP and non-GAAP reconciliations including the capped-call share adjustment, the cash flow statement, Q3 2026 guidance and the conversion-condition disclosurebacksC02C03C05C15C16C19C24C38C39C40
- S04primarycompany filing2026-02-17FY2025 revenue by market, the 13.4% full-year operating margin that confirms the filed $528M operating income against the vendor's $565M, and the Q1 2026 guidance the year was subsequently beaten againstbacksC26C27
- S05primarytranscript2026-08-06management's answers on the tariff refund inside the gross margin, the refusal to price to scarcity, leverage at 3.0 times, chemistry growth of 21%, lead times and down payments, the start-up cost drag, and the Q3 end-market guidance. Twelve analysts asked 28 questions, and the questions are a separate origin from the answers: none of them asked what happens to the cost base if volume stops rising
In Q2, 47.6% is what we had, what we reported. That includes about 100 basis points of discrete items. mostly coming from the refund of tariffs and duties.
backsC04C07C18C20C28C29C33C34 - S06primarycompany filing2026-01-21the company's own serviceable market estimate of $25B split three ways, the claim to 19 number one or two product positions, the pro-forma capitalisation and leverage table behind the February 2026 refinancingbacksC14
- S07primarycompany filing2026-02-13Advanced Energy Industries Form 10-K for the year ended 31 December 2025 Advanced Energy Industriesa competitor's own statement that it is targeting share growth in dielectric etch, its competitor table naming MKS Instruments, its description of the design-win and qualification barrier from the attacker's side, and its revenue by market including the $587.3M data centre business MKS does not addressbacksC20
- S08primarycompany filing2026-02-20Qnity Electronics Form 10-K for the year ended 31 December 2025 Qnity Electronicsconfirmation from the candidate's own filing that its Advanced Circuit & Packaging line sells the competing electroless and electrolytic plating chemistry for advanced packaging and IC substrates, and the 1 November 2025 separation date that dates the perimeterbacksC21
- S09primarycompany filing2026-02-18Element Solutions Form 10-K for the year ended 31 December 2025 Element Solutionsthe reciprocal naming - MKS Instruments first among 'our most significant competitors' - which confirms the chemistry rivalry from both sidesbacksC21
- S10primaryindustry data2026-04-01the measured size and growth rate of the market MKS's largest division sells into, from a trade body rather than from a participant - the base of the prize and the rate behind the driver
Worldwide 300mm fab equipment spending is expected to increase 18% to $133 billion in 2026 and 14% to $151 billion in 2027 ... continue to increase 3% to $155 billion in 2028 ... another 11% to $172 billion in 2029 ... Strong growth reflects surging AI chip demand for data centers and edge devices, as well as the growing commitment to semiconductor self-sufficiency across key regions.
backsC13 - S11primaryindustry data2026-05-14an independent customer-rated scorer: MKS in the Customer Service Excellence top ten for large chipmaking equipment suppliers from 1,201 survey responses, with Edwards rather than MKS winning the Wafer Fab Equipment Subsystems award and Advanced Energy absent. Read twice under differently worded requests and reproduced both times
2026 Global Semiconductor Supplier Awards ... 1,201 survey responses ... Customer Service Excellence - Top 10 Suppliers ... Advantest, Tokyo Electron, Edwards, Kokusai Electric, Lam Research, Hitachi High-Tech, Applied Materials, EBARA, MKS Instruments ... Wafer Fab Equipment Subsystems ... Edwards
backsC22 - S12secondaryvendor data2026-09-09Research pack, frozen at content/MKSI/research-pack.jsoncontent/MKSI/research-pack.jsonprice, returns and the 252-day range; the analyst split and estimates; the filer's own XBRL annual and quarterly series; the segment split from the filing's XBRL instance; FINRA short interest across six settlements; Form 4 insider transactions by code; the measured session reaction to each news item; and the competitors:filed cohort multiplesbacksC23C24C26C27C30C31C32C37C38
- S13primarycompany filing2026-03-31beneficial ownership as of 3 March 2026, the executive officers' backgrounds and tenure, the 2025 Management Incentive Plan metrics, goals and payout, the performance-based RSU metrics and the rTSR schedule, the 2025 CEO grant valuesbacksC45C46C47
- S14primarycompany filing2023-03-14the Atotech consideration per share and the $5.7B total net purchase price and how it was funded; the 2020 to 2022 income statements, cash flows and diluted share countsbacksC44C48C49
- S15primarycompany release2026-11-04Q3 revenue by market, margins, non-GAAP operating expenses, Q4 guidance, liquidity
Record revenue of $1,413 million, above the high end of guidance
backsC10C15C16C17C25C51C52C53 - S16primarycompany release2026-11-04repurchase authorisation and dividend
share repurchase program of up to $500 million
backsC53 - S17secondaryvendor data2026-11-04close of $205.18 on 3 November 2026backsC11C23C25
- S18primarytranscript2026-11-05Third quarter 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held 2026-11-05data/cache/transcripts/MKSI-2026Q3.jsonchemistry growth and the lag from equipment to consumables, capacity, gross margin outlook, wafer equipment outlook, buyback and the investor day
in Q3, chemistry revenue organically grew about 26% year-over-year.
backsC54C55 - S19primarycompany filing2026-11-09trailing revenue, operating profit, stock pay, tax, debt, cash and the diluted share countbacksC57
- S20secondaryvendor data2026-11-09the analysts' average revenue and operating profit for the next three fiscal years, and the closebacksC56C57