Intuitive Machines
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A satellite builder bought this year, with NASA Moon landers and a lunar data network attached, that has never made an operating profit.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↑
Pro forma revenue rose 8.9% over nine months and 35.8% in the quarter, with backlog up to $1.87B; the older business shrank.
Business quality2/4 →
A flight-proven satellite factory earning about 9%, beside lunar landers NASA buys from eight vendors and that tipped twice.
Financial position2/4 →
Cash of $463.8M roughly covers the notes and claims ahead, but nine months' free cash flow was minus $112.3M, funded by new shares.
Execution record2/4 ↑
Two tipped landings, loss contracts, a narrowed 2026 range, a purchase-accounting weakness, and a quarter flattered by one-time gains.
Per share capture1/4 ↓
Class A shares rose about half in a year through deal shares and sales to fund losses; founders control the votes.
Potential3/4 ↑
NASA set CLPS 2 at $10B and gave it the sole lunar relay award, but eight vendors share each order.
Risk profile2/4 ↓
A Justice Department demand, a material weakness, a customer bankruptcy and lunar missions that can fail on one landing.
Valuation2/4 ↑
About 2.9 times this year's sales asks for profit beyond analysts' forecasts, though below the listed space peers.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Filed figures, NASA's own releases and an inspector general audit, though the lunar plans and one-time items rest on management's words.
If it works 0.6× · if it fails you keep about 35%.
The Verdict
We rate Intuitive Machines Unattractive. The business is weak: it has never earned an operating profit, its Moon landers lose money on fixed-price contracts, and the satellite factory it bought earns only about 9 cents on each dollar of sales. The price is full: the company is valued at about 3.8 times the last year's sales, roughly three times what the factory alone is worth, so most of it pays for lunar work that has not yet made money. As a bet on the Moon it is priced for success. Profit plus an upright IM-3 landing, or a much lower price, would make it Neutral.
The long caseNASA's Moon Base turns lunar deliveries and relay data into a steady government purchase, and the satellite factory pays the bills until it does.
How we weighed it
The price against our value
Against it
No fair value is drawn because the company has never earned an operating profit; the price asks for more profit than analysts forecast, and the factory alone explains about a third of it.
The business
Cuts both ways
Weak
A flight-proven satellite factory with repeat government orders, beside a lunar business that has not shown it can land cleanly or earn money.
Growth against what the price assumes
In its favour
Backlog grew several times over in nine months and pro forma revenue is rising, with most of next year already contracted.
What could go wrong
Against it
A Justice Department demand, a material weakness, a customer bankruptcy, fixed-price loss contracts and steady share sales.
Against competitors
Against it
NASA buys landers from eight vendors including SpaceX and Blue Origin, and a rival claims the only fully successful landings.
How its group is behaving
Cuts both ways
NASA is spending more with companies for its Moon Base, but listed space stocks swing together and are priced richly.
The latest news and report
In its favour
The latest quarter set records for revenue and cash flow and NASA chose the company for its next lander contract.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
The quarter carried $9.574M of deal costs, $10.304M of legal expense and a $9.5M bad-debt reserve; without them it was still a loss.
The pack's bridged figure is $3,393M because it adds the founders' units at book; counted at market as here, Class C shares are priced like Class A.
Analysts still expect a loss per share in 2028, so the price asks for more profit than they forecast.
The third quarter alone ran at $860M a year with one-time gains in it.
The company counts both missions as completed and NASA kept awarding it missions.
Selection awards no mission: each task order is competed among the eight.
Firm remaining performance obligations were $1.00B, and nearly all government contracts can be cancelled for convenience.
The company
Intuitive Machines is a Houston space company. Its Lanteris factory in California builds satellite platforms, from small buses for missile-tracking satellites to large communications satellites; more than 95 of its large platforms are still flying.
It also flies Nova-C landers that carry NASA's instruments to the Moon, on rockets it buys from SpaceX, and holds NASA's contract for a lunar relay service worth up to $4.82B, with its satellites not yet launched.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The $150M per order is the chief executive's figure; filed contract values range from $68.6M to $160.1M.
The ceiling is a maximum; NSN revenue fell $8.9M over nine months on schedule delays and a worse cost estimate.
Commercial geostationary orders are lumpy and the EchoStar bankruptcy shows the buyers can fail.
The chief executive also said the launch picture after the Falcon 9 is not yet written.
How it makes money
In the first nine months of 2026 about four fifths of revenue, $523.4M, came from building satellites and spacecraft at Lanteris. The lunar, network and engineering business owned before brought about $138.8M, roughly $185M a year.
Buyers are few: three customers were 76% of the quarter's revenue, spread across commercial, civil and military space.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
It includes KinetX and Goonhilly, bought since, so the older business shrank by more.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (nine months to September 2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Satellites and space systems (product revenue) | 79% | Satellites built by Lanteris for commercial, national security and civil buyers, recognised as work progresses. |
| Lunar missions, network and engineering services | 20% | CLPS lander missions, Near Space Network work, ground station and navigation services and NASA engineering contracts. |
| Grants | 1% | Government grant funding for development work. |
Who runs it
The founders run it: the chairman controls 33.5% of the votes, the chief executive 11.6% and the technology chief 8.2%. The chief executive was paid $5.07M for 2025, mostly in shares, on a plan that rewards orders, revenue and margins.
No insider bought shares in the open market in the year, while insiders sold 17.7M, including Advent, the seller of Lanteris, which sold half its stake in July.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The deal bonus rewards buying Lanteris rather than any result from it.
Advent is a private equity seller exiting a stake it was paid in, not an operator; the founders' sales were mostly under plans.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Buyers do come back. The Space Development Agency chose Lanteris for missile-tracking buses twice, NASA picked the company for its sole lunar relay contract and again for its next ten-year lander contract, and it holds six lander task orders.
But the edge earns little. The factory makes about 9% before head-office costs, the lander contracts lose money, and the first landing tipped over. NASA's inspector general found most lander orders late and over price.
The evidence under this - 8 claims
Commercial geostationary orders are lumpy and the EchoStar bankruptcy shows the buyers can fail.
Selection awards no mission: each task order is competed among the eight.
The ceiling is a maximum; NSN revenue fell $8.9M over nine months on schedule delays and a worse cost estimate.
NASA's release gives no date for the first CLPS 2 order, how many missions or how much of the ceiling it will use.
The third quarter alone ran at $860M a year with one-time gains in it.
IM-3's accrued losses fell $10.5M over the same nine months.
The company counts both missions as completed and NASA kept awarding it missions.
The report predates 2026, when the chief executive says half of CLPS 1's 22 task orders were let.
The threat
Firefly says it is the only company to have fully completed NASA Moon missions, and seven others share the next lander contract, including SpaceX and Blue Origin, which already holds NASA orders for heavier cargo. In satellites, Rocket Lab, York, Northrop Grumman, Airbus and Thales Alenia bid for the same work.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
It is a rival's own claim; Intuitive Machines' landers reached the surface twice but finished on their sides or short of plan.
Selection awards no mission: each task order is competed among the eight.
The rivals: FLY, SPCX, RKLB, NOC, VOYG, and 1 more that is private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FLY | Firefly's Blue Ghost landerPriced against it: Yes | Lunar missions and the lunar data network | On sale | Yes |
| Private | Blue Origin's Mark 1 landerPriced against it: Private | Lunar missions and the lunar data network | Announced | Private |
| SPCX | SpaceX, a CLPS 2 vendor and the company's own launch supplierPriced against it: Not checked | Lunar missions and the lunar data network | Announced | Not checked |
| RKLB | Rocket Lab and York satellite busesPriced against it: Yes | Satellites and space systems (Lanteris) | On sale | Yes |
| NOC | Northrop Grumman, Airbus and Thales Alenia geostationary satellitesPriced against it: Not checked | Satellites and space systems (Lanteris) | On sale | Not checked |
| VOYG | Voyager TechnologiesPriced against it: Yes | - | On sale | Yes |
How big it could get
How big this could get
NASA's new lander contract has a $10B ceiling over ten years shared among eight vendors, so at most about $1B a year, or about seven orders at today's $150M each. The relay contract adds a $4.82B ceiling over up to ten years. Against that, the lunar business brings about $185M a year now; nobody has priced the relay minutes yet.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Selection awards no mission: each task order is competed among the eight.
A ceiling is not a budget: CLPS 1 was capped at $2.6B with $2.19B proposed through 2028, and heavier landers will cost more per order.
The $150M per order is the chief executive's figure; filed contract values range from $68.6M to $160.1M.
The ceiling is a maximum; NSN revenue fell $8.9M over nine months on schedule delays and a worse cost estimate.
NASA's release gives no date for the first CLPS 2 order, how many missions or how much of the ceiling it will use.
Who has signed
NASA holds task orders for IM-3 to IM-6, worth about $445M with an option on IM-5, and the relay contract. Orders waiting to be delivered were $1.867B in September, though $586.8M of it is one commercial satellite programme not yet firm.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Firm remaining performance obligations were $1.00B, and nearly all government contracts can be cancelled for convenience.
The $150M per order is the chief executive's figure; filed contract values range from $68.6M to $160.1M.
The ceiling is a maximum; NSN revenue fell $8.9M over nine months on schedule delays and a worse cost estimate.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 221% over the twelve months to Sep 2026, faster than the −7.9% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is −22%, up from −77% in the year to Dec 2023.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from −8.7% to +187% over the last 3 years, with sales falling in 2 of them.
It used $135M of cash over the last twelve months, so the $464M it holds lasts about 3.4 years at that pace.
It holds $464M of cash against $337M of debt, $127M more cash than it owes.
The share count rose 578% in 2.8 years, and pay in shares costs 4.5% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-11-17. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Sep 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | |||||
| Sales | $87.1M | $79.6M | $228M | $210M | $707M |
| Sales growth | - | −8.7% | +187% | −7.9% | +221% |
| Profit | |||||
| Operating margin | −7.7% | −77% | −25% | −42% | −22% |
| Net margin | −0.2% | 78% | −124% | −40% | −18% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | |||||
| General and admin | 18% | 43% | 23% | 44% | 33% |
| Pay in shares | 0.7% | 5.4% | 3.9% | 4.1% | 4.5% |
| Capital spending | 19% | 38% | 4.4% | 20% | 12% |
| Cash | |||||
| Cash from operations | $784K | −$45.3M | −$57.6M | −$14.3M | −$53.0M |
| Free cash flow | −$15.6M | −$75.2M | −$67.7M | −$56.0M | −$135M |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $25.8M | $4.50M | $208M | $583M | $464M |
| Debt | $20.0M | $8.00M | $0 | $335M | $337M |
| Net cash | $5.80M | −$3.50M | $208M | $247M | $127M |
| Returns and shares | |||||
| Shares (diluted) | - | 25.6M | 61.4M | 115M | 173M |
What growth costs
Growth has been bought, not earned. Revenue tripled with Lanteris, and running costs fell from 44% of revenue in 2025 to 29%, but the company still loses money before interest and tax, and adds back stock pay, deal and legal costs to show a small profit.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Almost all of the rise is the Lanteris purchase; the business owned before it shrank.
The 2026 costs include $37.5M of deal costs and $10.3M of legal expense that should not recur.
The measure leaves out stock pay, which this thesis treats as a cost; the $9.5M EchoStar reserve stayed in.
The last report (12 Nov)
Quarter ended September 2026, filed figures.
In the quarter to September 2026 revenue was $269.3M, up 35.8% on the same quarter a year before counting Lanteris both years. About $19M of the profit on sales came from one-time contract gains, and operations brought in $66.2M of cash, helped by early payments.
The operating loss was still $34.2M, with deal and legal costs, a $9.5M reserve for a bankrupt customer, a flaw in accounting controls and a Justice Department civil demand. The year's revenue range narrowed to $920M to $950M.
What it did to the thesisIt strengthened the case that the satellite factory is real and growing, and weakened the case that profit is near: the cash and margin gains leaned on one-time items while the loss, the legal demand and the accounting flaw stayed.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures. The company has restated its own history, so a quarter either side of the restatement may describe a different business; n/c marks one that does not compare.
Earnings per share $-0.02 against $-0.10 expected; $-0.02 as filed, with no adjustments.
The evidence under this - 11 claims
Almost all of the rise is the Lanteris purchase; the business owned before it shrank.
The nine-month figure is the fairer read: the quarter carries new awards booked in the second and third quarters and one-time adjustments.
The quarter carried $9.574M of deal costs, $10.304M of legal expense and a $9.5M bad-debt reserve; without them it was still a loss.
Without the $19M the quarter's gross margin is about 19%, close to the 19% of the fourth quarter of 2025.
The measure leaves out stock pay, which this thesis treats as a cost; the $9.5M EchoStar reserve stayed in.
The chief financial officer tied the quarter's inflow partly to early payments on new contracts and to working-capital timing.
Firm remaining performance obligations were $1.00B, and nearly all government contracts can be cancelled for convenience.
The range was narrowed below its old midpoint, and nine months' adjusted EBITDA was still minus $2.983M.
Management says the statements are fairly stated and the errors were immaterial.
The company says the inquiry is preliminary and it cannot estimate a loss; the quarter carried $10.3M of non-recurring legal expense.
Management says the reserve covers its exposure; part of the receivables is securitised.
What management did with the money
It paid $853.3M for Lanteris, about half in cash and half in new shares, and bought Goonhilly's ground stations and KinetX. In 2026 it sold $175.0M of new shares in February and $331.8M more into the market.
Insiders in 2026Q3: 8 purchases and 30 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The programme's shares sold at an average of $23.90, about twice today's price.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Full. The price needs profit the company has never earned, and the factory that does make money explains only about a third of it.
The shares closed at $11.73 on 16 November, 65% below their level six months earlier, while sales per share rose 80%: buyers now pay about a fifth as much for each dollar of sales. More than a quarter of the shares available to trade were sold short.
The next test is the full-year report, due around 18 March 2027, with the 2027 outlook. IM-3, carrying the first relay satellite, is planned for March or April 2027, and NASA's first orders under the new lander contract should start in 2027.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The range was narrowed below its old midpoint, and nine months' adjusted EBITDA was still minus $2.983M.
The plan changed in 2026 from one launch per lander; no service revenue figure for the relay has been given.
NASA's release gives no date for the first CLPS 2 order, how many missions or how much of the ceiling it will use.
How we value it
No fair value: Intuitive Machines has filed an operating loss in every year and analysts expect a loss per share through 2028, so a value built on earnings would rest on a guess; the bet prices it instead.
How we read the multiple
With no profit to price, we ask what the price needs once the business is mature.
- The whole company, with all its shares and debts and netting its cash, is worth about $2,710M.
- A rule of thumb: a buyer wants 8% a year and a mature business grows 4%, so 4% must come back as cash.
- That is about $108M a year after stock pay, about 8% of the sales analysts expect for 2028.
- Over the last four quarters operations used $53.0M of cash and capital spending took $82.3M more.
Against its own history. Buyers pay about a fifth of what they did six months ago for each dollar of sales, while sales per share rose: the price fell because the multiple collapsed.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The pack's bridged figure is $3,393M because it adds the founders' units at book; counted at market as here, Class C shares are priced like Class A.
Analysts still expect a loss per share in 2028, so the price asks for more profit than they forecast.
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on company value for each $1 of sales, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | company value for each $1 of sales |
|---|---|---|
| LUNR | Intuitive Machines | 4.8× |
| VOYG | Voyager Technologies | 8.0× |
| FLY | Firefly Aerospace | 9.3× |
| RKLB | Rocket Lab | 35.9× |
The middle of the other 3 is 9.3. Intuitive Machines, Inc. is cheapest of 4.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
Cheapest of four listed space builders on sales, but the group is priced on launch and constellation hopes, so cheap here means cheap within a rich group.
The bet: what it pays if it works
This bet is on the Moon: landers and the relay network. If the company kept winning lander task orders at the pace of 2026, and buyers paid an ordinary price for that business, the lunar half plus the factory would still be worth less than today's price.
If the lunar line fails, owners keep the satellite factory and cash roughly equal to the notes ahead of them, which is about a third of today's value.
| Lunar missions and the lunar data network revenue in two to three years | Lunar lander task orders a year needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $185.00M | about 1 at 100% kept | 0.5× |
| $300.00M (the big win) | about 2 at 100% kept | 0.6× |
| $450.00M | about 3 at 100% kept | 0.7× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $2.24B of Lunar missions and the lunar data network revenue (about 15 lunar lander task orders a year); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $6.30B of Lunar missions and the lunar data network revenue (about 42 lunar lander task orders a year), at the same multiple.
Each row is Lunar missions and the lunar data network alone, plus the rest of the company (Satellites and space systems (Lanteris)) counted at about $949.00M.
The steps it has to take
- Done Two lunar landings reached the surface
- Done Lunar relay contract won and Lanteris bought
- In progress IM-3 lands upright with Altus-1 due 2027-04
- Not started First CLPS 2 task order won due 2027-12
- Not started Relay service revenue reported due 2028-12
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 7 claims
The $150M per order is the chief executive's figure; filed contract values range from $68.6M to $160.1M.
A ceiling is not a budget: CLPS 1 was capped at $2.6B with $2.19B proposed through 2028, and heavier landers will cost more per order.
Selection awards no mission: each task order is competed among the eight.
The third quarter alone ran at $860M a year with one-time gains in it.
Capped calls up to $20.98 offset dilution if the notes convert.
Cash rose $97M in the third quarter only with $97M of new shares sold.
The pack's bridged figure is $3,393M because it adds the founders' units at book; counted at market as here, Class C shares are priced like Class A.
Where we disagree with the market
A space company with record orders and NASA contracts, cheap after a two-thirds fall, about to grow into profit.
The factory is real but thin, and the rest of the price pays for lunar work that has not yet made money.
Ten of eleven analysts rate it a buy, pointing to record orders and a seat on NASA's next lander contract. We see a factory earning about 9%, worth about a third of the price, and a lunar business that loses money on its landers and shares NASA's budget with seven rivals.
The evidence against us: an operating profit in 2027 and an upright IM-3 landing would show the lunar half can pay.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 7 claims
The 2028 figure rests on four analysts and the profit line on fewer.
Firm remaining performance obligations were $1.00B, and nearly all government contracts can be cancelled for convenience.
Selection awards no mission: each task order is competed among the eight.
The third quarter alone ran at $860M a year with one-time gains in it.
The quarter carried $9.574M of deal costs, $10.304M of legal expense and a $9.5M bad-debt reserve; without them it was still a loss.
IM-3's accrued losses fell $10.5M over the same nine months.
The pack's bridged figure is $3,393M because it adds the founders' units at book; counted at market as here, Class C shares are priced like Class A.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Losses continue. The company has never earned an operating profit, and its lander contracts are booked at a loss.
- More new shares. Losses and the purchase were paid with new shares, and the sales programme allows more.
- Legal and accounting trouble. The Justice Department served a civil demand in October, and an accounting control flaw is not yet fixed.
- Few customers. Three customers were 76% of the quarter's revenue.
- Debt that converts. $345.0M of notes convert into shares at $13.1125, close to today's price.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
The quarter carried $9.574M of deal costs, $10.304M of legal expense and a $9.5M bad-debt reserve; without them it was still a loss.
IM-3's accrued losses fell $10.5M over the same nine months.
The programme's shares sold at an average of $23.90, about twice today's price.
The company says the inquiry is preliminary and it cannot estimate a loss; the quarter carried $10.3M of non-recurring legal expense.
Management says the statements are fairly stated and the errors were immaterial.
Capped calls up to $20.98 offset dilution if the notes convert.
What we still do not know
- What the Justice Department is investigating at the company itself.
- How much NASA will pay for lunar relay minutes once the satellites fly.
- How many lander orders NASA will issue each year under the new contract.
- Who the buyer of the $586.8M multi-satellite programme is.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The company says the inquiry is preliminary and it cannot estimate a loss; the quarter carried $10.3M of non-recurring legal expense.
The ceiling is a maximum; NSN revenue fell $8.9M over nine months on schedule delays and a worse cost estimate.
Selection awards no mission: each task order is competed among the eight.
Firm remaining performance obligations were $1.00B, and nearly all government contracts can be cancelled for convenience.
What would change our view
- Unattractive→NeutralThe lunar line and the factory both pay
It needs all of:
- ○A quarter ends with an operating profit, after deal and legal costs.checked at the next results, due by 18 Mar
- ○IM-3 lands upright and the company wins its first order under NASA's new lander contract.watched as it happens
- Unattractive→NeutralThe price falls to what the factory earns
It needs:
- ○The company's value falls to about 2 times the last year's sales, with the business unchanged.about ≈$6.13 today, 48% below the last close
We would also be wrong if
- The 2027 outlook shows an operating profit after stock pay, with no new share sales.
- NASA prices relay minutes high enough to make the network pay on its own.
What is coming
- 18 March 2027 Q4 and full-year 2026 results with 2027 guidance: Whether 2026 met the guided range and whether 2027 is guided to an operating profit.
Every dated event ahead
- 18 March 2027 Q4 and full-year 2026 results with 2027 guidance: Whether 2026 met the guided range and whether 2027 is guided to an operating profit.
- 30 April 2027 IM-3 launch and landing, carrying Altus-1: Whether a Nova-C lander finally lands upright and works, and whether the first relay satellite reaches lunar orbit.
- 31 December 2027 First CLPS 2 task orders: How many missions NASA buys a year and how many go to Intuitive Machines.
Since we wrote this
- 17 NovThesis writtenUnattractive, medium convictionWritten five days after the Q3 2026 results and the CLPS 2 selection, with the shares two thirds below their May level.
Sources 14
Sources - 14
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-03-19the business and its three lines, the named competitors, Lanteris' platforms and SDA work, headcount, the 2025 results and the lunar mission contractsbacksC01C02C05C14C17C20C21C38C44
- S02primarycompany filing2026-11-13the quarter's results, Lanteris' contribution and pro forma figures, customers, contract types, backlog, the convertible notes, share issuance, the material weakness, the Justice Department demand and the share countbacksC01C02C03C04C05C09C11C12C13C22C23C24C25C26C35C36C37C39C43C44C48
- S03primarycompany release2026-11-12the 2026 outlook, adjusted EBITDA and free cash flow reconciliations, and the quarter's awardsbacksC06C07C08C10C18C22C25
- S04primarytranscript2026-11-12the one-time gross margin items, the EchoStar reserve, lander task order prices, Altus timing, launch supply and the share count
approximately $19 million related to net favorable onetime program adjustments
backsC06C08C13C18C23C24C37C39C40C41C48 - S05primarycompany filing2026-04-24ownership and voting power, the leaders' tenure, the summary compensation table and the 2025 incentive planbacksC33C34
- S06primarycompany release2026-03-19the first 2026 outlook of $900M to $1B of revenue and the 2025 free cash flowbacksC10
- S07primarycompany release2026-08-03the ground station purchase and its role for IM-3 and Altus-1backsC39
- S08secondaryvendor data2026-11-17FMP market data in the research pack (close, returns, analysts, estimates, insiders, short interest)the 16 November close, returns, the price move split, analyst panel and estimates, insider sales and FINRA short interestbacksC29C30C31C32C50
- S09primarygovernment data2026-11-07the eight CLPS 2 vendors, the $10B ceiling, the CLPS 1 ceiling raised to $4.2B, and Blue Origin's PROMISE and lunar terrain vehicle deliveries
The CLPS 2 framework is a 10-year, multiple-award, indefinite-delivery/indefinite-quantity master contract with a combined maximum value of $10 billion.
backsC16C42 - S10primarygovernment data2024-09-17the lunar relay contract's ceiling, term and purpose
The contract has a base period of five years with an additional 5-year option period, with a maximum potential value of $4.82 billion.
backsC17 - S11primaryregulator2024-06-06CLPS delays and price increases, the original two-deliveries-a-year plan, and IM-1 tipping onto its side
Specifically, five of eight task orders have experienced both schedule delays and price increases since the initiative began in 2018.
backsC14C15 - S12primarycompany filing2026-03-20Firefly Aerospace Inc. Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 31 December 2025 Firefly Aerospace Inc.a rival lander maker's own claim to the only complete NASA lunar missionsbacksC19
- S13primarycompany filing2026-02-26Rocket Lab Corp Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 31 December 2025 Rocket Lab Corpa rival satellite builder selling complete spacecraft to government buyersbacksC49
- S14primarycompany release2026-10-22the new director and the departure of the director from the 2023 listingbacksC51