nLIGHT
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A maker of powerful lasers, now mostly for defence, whose price assumes laser weapons the Pentagon has not yet ordered in numbers.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↑
Revenue up 31.6% in 2025 and 31.3% in nine months of 2026 on defence; Q3 2026 slowed to 10.5% on parts shortages.
Business quality3/4 ↑
High-power coherent lasers and own chips win the leading laser weapon programs, but primes build their own and Chinese makers took its industrial lasers.
Financial position4/4 ↑
About $314M of cash and securities, no debt and positive operating cash flow over four quarters.
Execution record2/4 ↑
Beat its range three quarters running and lifted margins, but missed the August outlook on parts, deferred orders twice and never earned an operating profit.
Per share capture2/4 →
Diluted shares up 15.1% in a year after an offering, and stock pay near 13% of sales exceeds Adjusted EBITDA.
Potential3/4 ↑
A real path from development contracts to fielded laser weapons, but nobody sizes it and no program of record exists.
Risk profile3/4 →
The US government is 39% of revenue and RTX 11%; supply depends on Chinese optics and a few single sources; cash covers years of losses.
Valuation1/4 ↑
At 6 times sales the price needs cash after stock pay near a quarter of sales, from a business whose figure is negative today.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Revenue, margins, cash and losses are filed; JLWS terms, the defence split and the supply outlook rest on management and trade press.
If it works 1.0× · if it fails you keep about 45%.
The Verdict
We rate nLIGHT Unattractive. The business is solid: its own laser chips and fiber win the leading laser weapon programs, and its product lasers now keep about 48 cents of each sales dollar. But it has never earned an operating profit, and stock pay is larger than its cash profit. The price is stretched: at about 6 times sales it needs cash near a quarter of sales, paying for laser weapons in production when the Pentagon has none on order and only $44M of the JLWS award is signed. As a bet it is expensive. A production order with a real profit would argue against us.
The long caseMilitaries move laser weapons from prototypes into production, and nLIGHT's high-power lasers and combining become the parts and systems they buy.
How we weighed it
The price against our value
Against it
No fair value is drawn: no operating profit after stock pay. The price needs cash near a quarter of sales from a business whose cash after stock pay is negative.
The business
In its favour
Solid
Its own chips and fiber, record product margins and the leading high-power laser programs make the product business strong; the weapons work earns little so far.
Growth against what the price assumes
Cuts both ways
Revenue grew about a third this year on defence, but parts shortages deferred orders twice and the price assumes a production business nobody has ordered.
What could go wrong
Against it
Half of revenue comes from the US government and one prime; optics still depend on China; laser weapons have no production program yet.
Against competitors
Cuts both ways
nLIGHT leads in the highest-power lasers, but Lockheed builds its own, AeroVironment sells lower-power laser weapons, and missiles still do the job.
How its group is behaving
In its favour
Defence buyers want cheap ways to stop drones and missiles, and the Pentagon is pushing laser weapons toward fielding.
The latest news and report
Cuts both ways
The latest quarter beat its range with record product margins, but another block of orders was deferred for parts, and officers kept disposing of shares on schedule.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
The CFO called the Q3 2026 product margin a quarter where a few things went right, and guided products to 40% to 46% for Q4 2026.
Only $44M is awarded; the rest depends on options the government may never exercise, and nothing about it appears in the 10-Q.
Before stock pay and restructuring the company reports Adjusted EBITDA of $11.1M in Q3 2026 and guides $12M to $18M for Q4.
Product gross margins above 45% and flat operating costs mean revenue growth would lift cash fast, and the inventory build will partly reverse.
The company
nLIGHT, based in Camas, Washington, was founded in 2000 by its chief executive, Scott Keeney. It grows its own laser chips and makes its own optical fiber, then builds them into lasers that other companies put inside weapons, sensors and machines.
In 2026 it left China and stopped selling lasers for cutting and welding metal, to focus on defence and on lasers for 3D metal printing and chip making.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Building whole weapons puts nLIGHT against the prime contractors that also buy its lasers, and its system work earns development margins near 8%.
The CRS adds that rain, fog and the size, weight and cooling of the systems limit what lasers can do, and experts disagree on feasibility.
He also said other players have coherent combining technology, and that spectral combining suits lower-power systems against simpler threats.
How it makes money
In the September 2026 quarter, $48.0M came from selling lasers and parts, which kept about 48 cents of each dollar after product costs, and $25.7M from government-funded development work, which kept about 8 cents.
The US government paid 39% of the quarter's sales and RTX, a large weapons maker, 11%.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Management says about $15M of product orders could not ship in Q3 2026 for want of parts, so the quarter understates demand.
The CFO called the Q3 2026 product margin a quarter where a few things went right, and guided products to 40% to 46% for Q4 2026.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (Q3 2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Laser Products | 65% | Semiconductor and fiber lasers, amplifiers, beam-combining parts and laser sensing products, sold to defence buyers and manufacturers. |
| Advanced Development | 35% | Government-funded research, design and prototyping of high-energy lasers and laser weapons, billed as the work is done. |
Who runs it
Scott Keeney has run nLIGHT since founding it in 2000; Joseph Corso, a former investment banker, is finance chief. Officers and directors own 3.1% of the shares, and over the past year insiders sold 1.54M shares, nine tenths of them under plans set in advance, and bought none.
The bonus pays on sales and on a profit measure that leaves out stock pay. Keeney's 2025 pay was $37.3M, mostly a special share award earned if the share price passes set levels.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Scheduled sales after share awards vest are routine, and the discretionary sales were small.
The annual performance shares vest on shareholder return against the Russell 2000, which ties some pay to owners' outcomes.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
To reach weapon power, dozens of fiber lasers must be run in step and joined into one beam that stays sharp through the air. nLIGHT says it leads this approach at the highest powers, and the Pentagon has picked it for its laser scaling program and now for JLWS.
The Pentagon plans to raise laser weapons from about 150 kilowatts toward 500 kilowatts by 2030, which is the job these programs fund.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
He also said other players have coherent combining technology, and that spectral combining suits lower-power systems against simpler threats.
Only $44M is awarded; the rest depends on options the government may never exercise, and nothing about it appears in the 10-Q.
The Congressional Research Service says the department is not known to have any directed-energy program of record.
The CRS adds that rain, fog and the size, weight and cooling of the systems limit what lasers can do, and experts disagree on feasibility.
The threat
Lockheed Martin builds its own high-energy lasers, and AeroVironment sells smaller laser weapons against drones. Missiles and guns still do the job without trouble from rain or fog. In factory lasers, Chinese makers and IPG Photonics compete, and Chinese prices pushed nLIGHT out of cutting and welding.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Exiting also removes the industrial volume that filled nLIGHT's chip factory, and IPG still sells into those markets.
The rivals: LMT, AVAV, RTX, IPGP, COHR, and 1 more that is private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| LMT | Lockheed Martin's own high-energy lasersPriced against it: Different product | High-energy laser weapon systems | On sale | Different product |
| AVAV | AeroVironment's LOCUST laser weaponsPriced against it: One segment only | High-energy laser weapon systems | On sale | One segment only |
| RTX · LMT | Missiles and gunsPriced against it: Different product | High-energy laser weapon systems | On sale | Different product |
| IPGP | IPG Photonics and Chinese fiber laser makersPriced against it: One segment only | Lasers, amplifiers and laser sensing products | On sale | One segment only |
| In-house | Defence customers' own laser sourcesPriced against it: In-house | Lasers, amplifiers and laser sensing products | On sale | In-house |
| COHR | CoherentPriced against it: One segment only | - | On sale | One segment only |
How big it could get
How big this could get
The Pentagon asked for about $789.7M for laser and microwave weapons in fiscal 2025, down from $1.1B approved for 2024. nLIGHT's development work, about $71M in nine months of 2026, is roughly a tenth of that, loosely.
The bigger prize, buying laser weapons in numbers, does not exist yet: the Pentagon has no such program of record, so nobody can size it.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The CRS adds that rain, fog and the size, weight and cooling of the systems limit what lasers can do, and experts disagree on feasibility.
Management says about $15M of product orders could not ship in Q3 2026 for want of parts, so the quarter understates demand.
Who has signed
JLWS awarded $44M in July 2026, with options up to $627M if the government chooses to continue. At the end of 2025 nLIGHT had $161.6M of firm orders and funded contracts, plus $184.4M of contract value not yet funded.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
Only $44M is awarded; the rest depends on options the government may never exercise, and nothing about it appears in the 10-Q.
Backlog is disclosed only once a year, so it predates the JLWS award and the 2026 orders.
Where the growth is coming from, business by business
Where the growth is coming from
| Business | Share of revenue | Growth: last quarter | Last half-year | Last year |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aerospace and Defense | 69% | +40.8% | +53.2% | +60.1% |
| Microfabrication | 16% | +17.3% | +22.8% | +19.0% |
| Industrial | 15% | +23.6% | +29.4% | +12.7% |
| Whole company | 100% | +33.8% | +43.5% | +43.2% |
The filed split through 2026-06-30. These rates are not carried forward: the reading below says why.
How we read it: The defence half carries the growth and the score believes it, but its recent rate includes one-off program shipments, so the filed rates are not carried forward.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 40% over the twelve months to Sep 2026, faster than the 32% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is −6.0%, up from −22% in the year to Dec 2023.
Running costs take 38¢ of each sales dollar, down from 40¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
Shareholders' money lost 3.9% a year, up from −11% in the year to Dec 2021.
It turned 6.9% of sales into free cash, $21.8M over the last twelve months.
It holds $314M of cash against $0 of debt, $314M more cash than it owes.
The share count rose 37% in 4.8 years, and pay in shares costs 14% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-11-17. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Sep 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $270M | $242M | $210M | $199M | $261M | $318M |
| Sales growth | +21% | −10% | −13% | −5.4% | +32% | +40% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 29% | 21% | 22% | 17% | 30% | 32% |
| Operating margin | −11% | −23% | −22% | −33% | −10% | −6.0% |
| Net margin | −11% | −23% | −20% | −31% | −9.0% | −4.0% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 20% | 22% | 22% | 23% | 18% | 16% |
| Selling, general and admin | 20% | 20% | 22% | 25% | 21% | 19% |
| Pay in shares | 14% | 11% | 12% | 13% | 13% | 14% |
| Capital spending | 7.2% | 8.8% | 2.5% | 4.0% | 3.5% | 4.1% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | −$7.44M | −$14.5M | $10.1M | −$2.36M | $21.3M | $34.8M |
| Free cash flow | −$26.8M | −$35.9M | $4.75M | −$10.3M | $12.3M | $21.8M |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $147M | $108M | $113M | $101M | $134M | $314M |
| Debt | $0 | - | - | $0 | $20.0M | $0 |
| Net cash | $147M | - | - | $101M | $114M | $314M |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Shares (diluted) | 42.1M | 44.4M | 46.1M | 47.9M | 50.0M | 57.9M |
What growth costs
Growth is paying off before stock pay: sales rose 31.6% in 2025 while research costs fell, and the operating loss shrank from $65.6M to $26.6M. But pay in shares grew to about 13 cents of each sales dollar, more than the cash profit.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Stock pay rose from $25.0M in 2024 to $43.4M over the last four quarters, offsetting much of the operating saving.
The last report (5 Nov)
Quarter ended September 2026, filed figures.
In the September 2026 quarter, sales rose 10.5% to $73.8M, above the company's range, and the product lasers kept a record share of each dollar. The operating loss was $9.2M, including $7.5M for leaving China. About $15M of orders could not ship for lack of parts.
For the December quarter it expects $84M to $90M, leaving out another $15M it hopes to ship in the first half of 2027. The shares rose 29.6% the next day.
What it did to the thesisIt helped the product case: margins rose and sales beat the range. It did not change the view, because orders were deferred for parts a second time and nothing moved laser weapons toward production.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $0.16 against $0.05 expected; $-0.12 as filed, the gap being what the company adds back.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Management says about $15M of product orders could not ship in Q3 2026 for want of parts, so the quarter understates demand.
The CFO called the Q3 2026 product margin a quarter where a few things went right, and guided products to 40% to 46% for Q4 2026.
In August management excluded $17M from Q3 and shipped only a couple of million of it, so the backlog of unshipped orders has rolled forward twice.
The guide already excludes about $15M of orders it cannot ship, so supply, not demand, sets the figure.
Before stock pay and restructuring the company reports Adjusted EBITDA of $11.1M in Q3 2026 and guides $12M to $18M for Q4.
What management did with the money
In February 2026 nLIGHT sold 4.6M new shares for $201.3M. It holds $279.4M of cash and $34.8M of securities with no debt, and is spending on stock of parts and on factories while it replaces suppliers in China.
Insiders in 2026Q3: 3 purchases and 20 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Management says the optical supply chain stays heavily concentrated in China and new sources take time to qualify.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Priced for perfection. The price needs cash near a quarter of sales from a company whose cash after stock pay is negative.
The shares are 56.5% below their high of the past year: they fell after parts held up orders in August, and buyers now pay about half as much for each dollar of sales as in May.
The next test is the December-quarter report, due around 25 February 2027: whether sales land between $84M and $90M with product margins above 40%, and whether the delayed orders start to ship.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
In August management excluded $17M from Q3 and shipped only a couple of million of it, so the backlog of unshipped orders has rolled forward twice.
How we value it
No fair value: nLIGHT has filed an operating loss every year since at least 2020 and stock pay near 13% of sales exceeds its Adjusted EBITDA, so a value built on earnings would rest on a guess; the bet prices it instead.
How we read the multiple
With no lasting profit to price, we ask what profit the price needs.
- The whole company, netting its cash and securities, is worth about $1.91B.
- A rule of thumb: a buyer wants 8% a year and a mature business grows 4%, so 4% must come back as cash.
- That is about $76M a year, 24% of the last four quarters' sales.
- Over those four quarters, cash after stock pay was about minus $21.6M.
- Analysts expect sales of $440.0M in 2028; even then the price needs 17% of sales.
Against its own history. Buyers pay about 6 times sales, half of May's level but about twice the company's own average of the past six years.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Product gross margins above 45% and flat operating costs mean revenue growth would lift cash fast, and the inventory build will partly reverse.
Inventory rose $15.1M and prepaid costs $21.8M in nine months as nLIGHT stocked parts ahead of demand, which depresses the cash figure.
The 2028 figure rests on four analysts, and the panel rated it a buy through the August fall too.
Priced against its rivals
None of the listed rivals above sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: BWT Ltd., Wuhan Raycus Fiber Laser Technologies Co., Ltd., Trumpf GmbH + Co. KG.
The bet: what it pays if it works
This bet is on nLIGHT's laser weapon systems. If the Pentagon and several services buy them in numbers, worth about $500M of sales a year, the company would be worth about what it is today, so the big win is already in the price.
If laser weapons stay in prototypes, the product lasers and the cash keep a little under half of today's value, so the bet is expensive.
| High-energy laser weapon systems revenue in two to three years | Million dollars of laser weapon revenue a year needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $250.00M | about 250 at 100% kept | 0.7× |
| $500.00M (the big win) | about 500 at 100% kept | 1.0× |
| $1.00B | about 1.0K at 100% kept | 1.7× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $1.25B of High-energy laser weapon systems revenue (about 1.3K million dollars of laser weapon revenue a year); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $3.54B of High-energy laser weapon systems revenue (about 3.5K million dollars of laser weapon revenue a year), at the same multiple.
Each row is High-energy laser weapon systems alone, plus the rest of the company (Lasers, amplifiers and laser sensing products) counted at about $687.00M.
The steps it has to take
- Done HELSI 300 kW laser delivered and a megawatt-class laser under way
- Done JLWS selected, $44M awarded of a $627M ceiling
- In progress First JLWS prototype systems delivered near 150 kW due 2027-12
- Not started JLWS options exercised beyond the first award due 2028-06
- Not started A laser weapon program of record with production orders due 2028-12
- Not started Four quarters of GAAP operating profit due 2027-12
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Only $44M is awarded; the rest depends on options the government may never exercise, and nothing about it appears in the 10-Q.
The CFO called the Q3 2026 product margin a quarter where a few things went right, and guided products to 40% to 46% for Q4 2026.
Where we disagree with the market
The leading laser weapon supplier, held back only by a temporary parts shortage.
A good laser parts maker whose price assumes weapon production nobody has ordered.
The market's analysts, all nine rating it a buy, see the leading laser weapon supplier held back only by a parts shortage. We see a good laser parts business carrying a weapons business that is still government-funded development at thin margins, priced as if production were ordered.
The evidence against us: a JLWS production order, or another laser weapon bought in numbers, with four quarters of operating profit.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The 2028 figure rests on four analysts, and the panel rated it a buy through the August fall too.
Only $44M is awarded; the rest depends on options the government may never exercise, and nothing about it appears in the 10-Q.
Before stock pay and restructuring the company reports Adjusted EBITDA of $11.1M in Q3 2026 and guides $12M to $18M for Q4.
The CFO called the Q3 2026 product margin a quarter where a few things went right, and guided products to 40% to 46% for Q4 2026.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- No production program. The Pentagon has no laser weapon program of record, and only $44M of JLWS is signed.
- Parts from China. About $15M of orders slipped twice for lack of optics.
- Few customers. The US government and RTX paid half of the latest quarter's sales.
- Stock pay. Pay in shares is about 13% of sales and exceeds the cash profit.
- Rivals. Lockheed builds its own lasers, and missiles still do the job.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
In August management excluded $17M from Q3 and shipped only a couple of million of it, so the backlog of unshipped orders has rolled forward twice.
Management says the optical supply chain stays heavily concentrated in China and new sources take time to qualify.
What we still do not know
- How much of the development revenue is JLWS, and whether its options get exercised.
- How much the Pentagon spends on lasers rather than microwave weapons.
- How much of the product business still depends on Chinese optics.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Only $44M is awarded; the rest depends on options the government may never exercise, and nothing about it appears in the 10-Q.
Management says the optical supply chain stays heavily concentrated in China and new sources take time to qualify.
What would change our view
- Unattractive→NeutralA price that asks less
It needs:
- ○The whole company's value falls to 4 times its last four quarters of sales.about ≈$25.21 today, 33% below the last close
- Unattractive→NeutralLaser weapons become a production business
It needs all of:
- ○A JLWS production option or another laser weapon production order goes to nLIGHT.watched as it happens
- ○Operating income over four quarters turns positive.checked at the next results, due by 25 Feb
We would also be wrong if
- The delayed $15M of orders has not shipped by mid-2027.
- Product margins fall below 40% for two quarters.
- A rival is chosen to produce JLWS or another laser weapon.
What is coming
- 25 February 2027 Q4 2026 results: Whether revenue lands in the $84M to $90M guide with products margin above 40% and Adjusted EBITDA of $12M to $18M.
Every dated event ahead
- 25 February 2027 Q4 2026 results: Whether revenue lands in the $84M to $90M guide with products margin above 40% and Adjusted EBITDA of $12M to $18M.
- 31 May 2027 Q1 2027 results: Whether the deferred $15M of product orders ships as parts arrive from outside China.
- 31 December 2028 JLWS operational demonstrations and fielding decision: Whether laser weapons move from prototypes to production orders.
Since we wrote this
- 17 NovThesis writtenUnattractive, medium convictionWritten twelve days after the Q3 2026 results, with the shares 56.5% below their 52-week high.
Sources 13
Sources - 13
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-27the business, the two segments, the products, revenue by end market, customers, backlog, competitors, manufacturing, suppliers and the risk factorsbacksC01C02C13C15C16C19C20C23C26C32C34C35
- S02primarycompany filing2026-11-06segment revenue and gross profit, customer concentration, the February 2026 share offering, the restructuring and the new advanced manufacturing end marketbacksC01C03C04C05C15C22C23C27
- S03primarycompany release2026-11-05the quarter's revenue, margins, losses, Adjusted EBITDA, balance sheet, cash flows and the fourth-quarter outlookbacksC03C17C19C20C22C23C24C36
- S04primarytranscript2026-11-05defence and space and advanced manufacturing revenue, the deferred $15M, the exit from China and from cutting and welding, JLWS, HADES, and the answer on coherent against spectral beam combining
Importantly, this is a supply chain issue rather than a demand issue, and we expect to deliver these deferred product shipments in coming quarters.
backsC04C06C07C08C11C14C17C18C31C36 - S05primarycompany filing2026-04-24the executives' backgrounds, the 2025 bonus targets and payout, the special share award and the ownership tablebacksC28C29C30C34
- S06primarycompany filing2026-08-07China's new export declaration rules and the components held in Chinese customsbacksC18
- S07primarygovernment data2026-01-07the Pentagon's directed-energy budget, that there is no program of record, the power roadmap from 150 kW to 500 kW and the power each threat needs
DOD requested approximately $789.7 million for unclassified DE programs in FY2025-down from its $962.4 million request and $1.1 billion appropriation in FY2024
backsC09C10 - S08secondarynews2026-07-10the JLWS award: $44M initial, $627M ceiling, an Other Transaction agreement, 150 kW prototypes scaling to 300 kW to 500 kW
The company said the initial award is valued at $44 million, with a total program ceiling of up to $627 million including follow-on development, integration and potential production options.
backsC06C07 - S09primarycompany filing2026-06-29that AeroVironment sells complete low-power laser weapons against drones
The LOCUST X3 is a third-generation 20-35+ kilowatt directed energy laser weapon system designed to defeat
backsC12 - S10primarycompany filing2026-01-29that Lockheed builds laser systems inside its Rotary and Mission Systems segment
RMS designs, manufactures, services and supports various military and commercial helicopters, sea- and land-based missile defense systems, radar systems, laser systems
backsC12 - S11primarycompany filing2026-02-23an outside filer naming nLight among its materials-processing rivals beside Chinese fiber laser makers
In the materials processing market, we compete with makers of fiber lasers and other lasers, such as Coherent, Inc., JPT Opto-Electronics Co. Ltd., Laserline GmbH, Lumentum Holdings Inc., Maxphotonics Co., Ltd., MKS Instruments, Inc., nLight, Inc.
backsC13 - S12secondaryvendor data2026-11-17Research pack (FMP market data, FINRA short interest), frozen 2026-11-17content/LASR/research-pack.jsonthe close, market value, company value, analyst ratings and estimates, the price decomposition, the 52-week range and short interestbacksC24C26C27C33
- S13primarycompany filing2026-11-12every open-market sale by officers and directors over a year, and whether each was made under a Rule 10b5-1 planbacksC29