Corpay
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A payments company for businesses: it sends money abroad, pays suppliers with single-use card numbers, runs fuel cards for truck fleets and books hotel rooms.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↑
Growth without acquisitions is 10% and five quarters old, but reported growth of 21% is materially bought and helped by fuel and currency.
Business quality3/4 →
Retention of 93% on a network no rival can reuse is a real advantage, but its price is already moving against determined entrants.
Financial position3/4 ↑
Debt is real at 2.55 times but fully refinanced to 2031 and 2032, covered by about $1.8B of guided free cash flow.
Execution record3/4 ↑
Eight straight beats and guidance raised twice, but a material weakness remediated only last December and a $100M consumer-protection settlement.
Per share capture4/4 ↑
Share count down 7.1% in a year, acquisitions paid in cash, no convertibles, disposal proceeds recycled into buybacks.
Potential2/4 →
Nothing is contracted and the stated market is 33 times a bottom-up build; the upside needs price, capital returns and new products together.
Risk profile3/4 ↑
No customer concentration and four geographies, but a standing FTC order and money-transmitter licensing are one live regulatory dependency.
Valuation4/4 ↓
About 16.7 times operating profit, 73% of a three-stage value near $623 at an 8% return: cheap, past the 20% margin.
Evidence quality3/4 →
The central claim is corroborated by two independent filers, but no valuation cohort exists and the one independent ranking is paywalled.
The Verdict
We rate Corpay Attractive. It moves money for businesses: paying suppliers, sending money abroad and running fuel cards for truck fleets, and it wins on volume, so the business is solid. The price is under three-quarters of our value if management's growth plan works, and asks for almost no growth. The weak point is what each payment dollar earns, which keeps falling, though the fall eased to 5% in the September quarter; fuel prices, interest rates and adjusted profit also flatter the picture. The cushion and that easing keep it Attractive. A renewed slide would say the lower fee is the market's rate.
The long caseBusinesses are moving supplier payments off paper cheques onto cards and electronic rails; Corpay must keep its volume growing without the fee on each payment dollar falling further.
How we weighed it
The price against our value
In its favour
Price at 73% of our value
The price is under three-quarters of our value and asks for almost no growth.
The business
In its favour
Solid
It moves money for businesses and runs fuel cards for fleets, winning on volume.
Growth against what the price assumes
Cuts both ways
Volume grows fast, but each dollar earns less; the fall eased in the latest quarter.
What could go wrong
Against it
The price per dollar may keep falling, fuel and currency flatter growth, adjusted profit sits well above the official figure and the chief executive is named in a regulator's case.
Against competitors
Cuts both ways
Rivals in business payments win clients with lower prices, which is why the fall per dollar matters.
How its group is behaving
Cuts both ways
Payments and lending names move together on rates and credit; its own fact is the price per dollar.
The latest news and report
In its favour
The latest report showed the fall per dollar easing while that arm grew fast; part of the easing was one-off.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
- The fall is at least partly mix rather than price: management attributes it to 'new payables and cross-border enterprise clients', and large enterprise payables volume is structurally lower-rate than mid-market card spend, so a cohort effect could stabilise as it matures.
- The margin consequence is far smaller than the rate fall. Stripping depreciation and amortisation from the segment, Corporate Payments earned 46.8% of revenue in Q2 2026 against 48.4% a year earlier - 1.6 points, not 19%. The lower-rate volume is arriving at close to no incremental cost.
- Segment operating profit still grew 27% year over year, so the compression has not stopped the segment compounding profit.
- The enterprise value depends on which of Corpay's borrowings are financing and which are operating. A $2.3B securitisation facility is secured on receivables it also carries, and $8.9B of customer deposits are matched by restricted cash, so a stricter reading of net debt would lower the multiple.
- Operating profit after the amortisation of what the company bought is the conservative lens by construction; on the cash basis the market actually quotes, the same price is about $14.90 for each $1 of guided 2026 earnings.
- Analysts do not model unannounced buybacks and acquisitions, which is exactly where management says the gap between low-teens pre-tax profit growth and over 20% earnings per share growth comes from. The consensus shortfall may be a modelling convention rather than a verdict.
- Operating profit after acquisition amortisation is the conservative lens by construction. On the cash basis the market actually quotes, the same price is about $14.90 for each $1 of guided 2026 earnings and about $13.00 for each $1 of the 2027 estimate, which is not a demanding price for a business earning 44% operating margins.
- Trailing enterprise value to earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation of 14.0 sits barely above its own six-year median of 13.6, and enterprise value to sales is below its median - so on two of the three series the price is not extended at all.
- The same explanation has now been available for several quarters while the rate has kept falling, and a mix effect that persists across successive cohorts is indistinguishable from a price level.
- A listed competitor in the same job publishes its own price falling on the same shape of growth - Wise's business cross-border take rate went 0.51% to 0.39% over eight quarters while volume grew 31% - which is what a market price doing this looks like rather than one company's mix.
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the chief executive adds better monetization (debit cards, paid ACH) to the mix explanation for the quarter.
- Wise is not selling the same product. Its volume is heavily small-business and consumer remittance on a self-service platform; Corpay sells hedging, forward contracts, multi-currency accounts and relationship service to mid-market corporates, which is a different service at a different price.
- Wise cuts price deliberately as a strategy - its mission is explicitly to lower the price - so its take rate is partly a choice rather than a market clearing level.
- Corpay still earns 0.57%, roughly 46% above Wise's business rate, which is evidence the two are not yet competing for the same dollar.
- One quarter is not a trend: the fall was 19% in Q2 2026 and 5% in Q3 2026 on the same basis, and the pro forma volume base is rebuilt each quarter, so the comparison depends on how acquired and macro effects are adjusted.
- The call was not yet available, so management's account of why the fall eased (mix of large new clients maturing, or pricing) is not read.
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the finance chief says about 100 basis points of Corporate Payments growth was one-off, putting the normalised rate near 17% and organic near 10%.
The company
Corpay sells four things to businesses. Payments abroad with currency exchange, and supplier payments by single-use virtual card, were 41% of revenue in the June quarter. Fuel and toll cards for fleets were 43%, and hotel booking and payment 9%.
What it replaces is the slow way of paying: a paper cheque, a bank wire, a fuel receipt typed into a spreadsheet. Cheques in America are falling by both number and value, and cards already carry over three quarters of noncash payments by number.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
How it makes money
It keeps a small cut of each dollar it moves: in business payments, 0.58 cents per dollar of spend in the June quarter, down from 0.70. On fuel cards part of the fee rises and falls with the price of fuel, about 8% of revenue in 2025. What keeps it coming is that customers stay: management says 93% of them do each year.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The fall is at least partly mix rather than price: management attributes it to 'new payables and cross-border enterprise clients', and large enterprise payables volume is structurally lower-rate than mid-market card spend, so a cohort effect could stabilise as it matures.
- The margin consequence is far smaller than the rate fall. Stripping depreciation and amortisation from the segment, Corporate Payments earned 46.8% of revenue in Q2 2026 against 48.4% a year earlier - 1.6 points, not 19%. The lower-rate volume is arriving at close to no incremental cost.
- Segment operating profit still grew 27% year over year, so the compression has not stopped the segment compounding profit.
- None of these figures is filed or audited. Retention, same-store sales and bookings appear in no 10-K or 10-Q and cannot be checked against any statement; they are management's own operating measures on management's own definitions.
- Retention measures whether a customer stays, not what it pays. A 93% retention rate is consistent with the same customers renewing at a 19% lower rate per spend dollar, which is what the filed exhibit shows happening.
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (Q2 2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Vehicle Payments | 43% | Fuel, toll and parking cards for fleets in the US, Brazil and the UK, earning interchange, fees, fuel price spreads and late fees. |
| Corporate Payments | 41% | Cross-border payments with currency exchange and supplier payments by virtual card, earning the currency spread, interchange and float on customer funds. |
| Lodging Payments | 9% | Hotel booking and payment for crews and workforces, earning the gap between what the customer pays and what the hotel is paid. |
| Other | 6% | Gift cards, outsourced card processing and payroll cards, earning transaction processing fees. |
Who runs it
Ronald Clarke has run the company since 2000 and owns under 5% of it, counting options. His yearly bonus comes in shares: a third on sales, a third on earnings, and a third on how much he spends on deals, which paid the maximum last year. His big new award pays if the share price clears set levels. Nothing rewards a good return on the money spent. A new finance chief joined in 2025.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- The deal leg is measured on transaction value, including divestitures and joint ventures, not on what a deal earns, so it pays for activity; the committee says it can reduce the bonus for overall company performance.
- The adjusted EPS goal of $21.07 was met almost exactly, at $21.06, so the headline earnings target was not loose.
The 300,000 shares are about 0.45% of the 66.3M diluted count, small against a buyback that removed 7.1% in a year (C13), so the dilution is not the issue; what it rewards is a share price on five days rather than any operating measure.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
A virtual card works only where the supplier has agreed to accept it, and that agreement is negotiated by each card issuer separately. In Corpay's words, other issuers' cards "are not interchangeable". So a rival starts from zero, while a new customer often finds its suppliers already signed up.
WEX, its closest listed rival, describes the same kind of closed network in its own annual report. Management puts the result at 96% to 97% of business-payments customers staying each year.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- It protects only the virtual card line. The fuel proprietary network, which sits behind 43% of revenue, is being attacked by entrants issuing on general-purpose networks where no enrolment is needed at all.
- American Express and the large banks have built the same enrolment asset, so it is a barrier against fintech entrants rather than against the incumbents Corpay names first in its own competition section.
- The same sentence in the same filing records the attack: WEX names 'smaller, newer players which have introduced specialized products designed for distinct customer groups' alongside the five it lists, so the short named list is not the whole field.
- If the asset protected returns, WEX's would not be shrinking. Its Mobility segment adjusted operating income fell from $599.4M in 2023 to $541.1M in 2025 and its Corporate Payments segment from $277.2M to $213.3M, on the same two businesses.
- None of these figures is filed or audited. Retention, same-store sales and bookings appear in no 10-K or 10-Q and cannot be checked against any statement; they are management's own operating measures on management's own definitions.
- Retention measures whether a customer stays, not what it pays. A 93% retention rate is consistent with the same customers renewing at a 19% lower rate per spend dollar, which is what the filed exhibit shows happening.
The threat
The pressure is on the fee. Wise publishes its price for sending money abroad, and its rate for business customers fell from 0.51% to 0.39% in two years. AtoB sells a fleet card that runs on Visa and works almost anywhere, and advertises against the fees older fuel cards charge. None of them yet reaches the suppliers Corpay has signed up.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- Wise is not selling the same product. Its volume is heavily small-business and consumer remittance on a self-service platform; Corpay sells hedging, forward contracts, multi-currency accounts and relationship service to mid-market corporates, which is a different service at a different price.
- Wise cuts price deliberately as a strategy - its mission is explicitly to lower the price - so its take rate is partly a choice rather than a market clearing level.
- Corpay still earns 0.57%, roughly 46% above Wise's business rate, which is evidence the two are not yet competing for the same dollar.
- A marketing comparison table is the seller's own characterisation of a competitor it does not name, and there is no way to check which incumbent's fee schedule it describes.
- Riding a general-purpose network buys acceptance and gives up the point-of-sale data capture and direct merchant economics that Corpay's 10-K says its proprietary networks produce, so it is a different product at a different quality rather than a straight substitute.
- AtoB is private and discloses no volume, revenue or customer count, so nothing establishes that it is taking share rather than merely offering to.
The rivals: JPM, WEX, and 2 more that are private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wise Group plc (Wise Business)Priced against it: Listed abroad | On sale | Listed abroad | |
| Private | AtoBPriced against it: Private | On sale | Private |
| JPM | J.P. Morgan Kinexys (private blockchain settlement)Priced against it: One segment only | On sale | One segment only |
| WEX | WEXPriced against it: Same product | On sale | Same product |
How big it could get
How big this could get
The two largest card networks carry about $3.14 trillion a year of business card spending. At the 0.58 cents Corpay earns on each dollar, that is a pool of about $18.2B, and its business-payments arm, at about $2.19B a year, has roughly 12% of it. It leaves out fuel, hotels and money sent abroad by bank transfer.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- The two figures are on different bases and different periods. Visa's payments volume excludes cash volume; Mastercard's gross dollar volume includes it. Adding them gives an order of magnitude rather than a measurement.
- It omits American Express, which is the fourth largest network globally by purchase volume and a large commercial issuer, and it omits every closed-loop and proprietary network - including Corpay's own fuel networks, which carry volume neither Visa nor Mastercard sees.
- The fall is at least partly mix rather than price: management attributes it to 'new payables and cross-border enterprise clients', and large enterprise payables volume is structurally lower-rate than mid-market card spend, so a cohort effect could stabilise as it matures.
- The margin consequence is far smaller than the rate fall. Stripping depreciation and amortisation from the segment, Corporate Payments earned 46.8% of revenue in Q2 2026 against 48.4% a year earlier - 1.6 points, not 19%. The lower-rate volume is arriving at close to no incremental cost.
- Segment operating profit still grew 27% year over year, so the compression has not stopped the segment compounding profit.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 21% over the twelve months to Sep 2026, faster than the 14% in the year to Dec 2025.
Operating margin is 44%, about where it was (44%) in the year to Dec 2023.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from +5.8% to +21% over the last 5 years.
Each dollar put into the business earns 12% a year after tax, about where it was (14%) in the year to Dec 2021.
It turned 25% of sales into free cash, $1.33B over the last twelve months.
It owes $8.16B more than the cash it holds, about 5.3 years of the cash its operations bring in.
The share count fell 21% in 4.8 years, and pay in shares costs 2.3% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-11-10. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | 12 mo to Sep 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $2.83B | $3.43B | $3.76B | $3.97B | $4.53B | $5.23B |
| Sales growth | +19% | +21% | +9.6% | +5.8% | +14% | +21% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Operating margin | 44% | 42% | 44% | 45% | 44% | 44% |
| Net margin | 30% | 28% | 26% | 25% | 24% | 24% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Sales and marketing | 9.2% | 9.0% | 9.1% | 9.6% | 11% | 11% |
| General and admin | 17% | 17% | 16% | 16% | 16% | 16% |
| Pay in shares | 2.8% | 3.5% | 3.1% | 2.9% | 2.3% | 2.3% |
| Capital spending | 3.9% | 4.4% | 4.1% | 4.4% | 4.4% | 3.7% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $1.20B | $755M | $2.10B | $1.94B | $1.50B | $1.53B |
| Free cash flow | $1.09B | $603M | $1.95B | $1.77B | $1.30B | $1.33B |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $1.52B | $1.44B | $1.39B | $1.55B | $2.41B | $3.07B |
| Debt | $5.98B | $7.04B | $6.72B | $8.00B | $10.0B | $11.2B |
| Net cash | −$4.46B | −$5.60B | −$5.33B | −$6.44B | −$7.59B | −$8.16B |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | 14% | 12% | 13% | 12% | 11% | 12% |
| Shares (diluted) | 84.1M | 76.9M | 74.4M | 71.8M | 71.1M | 66.4M |
What growth costs
Growing has not made Corpay more profitable. Selling costs rise faster than sales as it chases business customers, while most other costs keep pace with sales, so the profit kept from each dollar has stayed about level for five years.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- Corpay reports no research and development line and no cost of revenue; its expenses are by nature (processing, selling, general and administrative, depreciation and amortisation), so technology spending sits inside several lines and cannot be read on its own.
- The years include large acquisitions, Alpha Group from November 2025, which bring their own cost structures, so the ratios mix organic leverage with what was bought.
The last report (4 Nov)
Quarter ended September 2026, filed figures.
Revenue grew 18% to $1.38B in the September quarter, and 11% from the businesses Corpay already owned. In business payments, spend grew 24% on a like-for-like basis while revenue grew 18%, so each dollar moved earned 5% less, against 19% less in June.
Management raised the year's outlook and guided the fourth quarter to about $1.37B. On the call the finance chief said about 1 percentage point of Corporate Payments growth was a one-off, so the lasting rate is nearer 17% and overall about 10%.
What it did to the thesisIt supported the test we wrote down: the price earned on each dollar fell by much less and that arm still grew fast. Part of the easing was a one-off, so one quarter does not settle whether the fall is mix or market price.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $7.54 against $7.20 expected.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
- Both figures are management's own, measured against management's own unpublished internal plan. No filed document carries either, so the split between macro and underlying performance cannot be checked by anyone outside the company.
- The filed reconciliation points the other way on scale: Exhibit 5 puts $67.2M of macro in the year-over-year revenue increase, more than twice the $30M management attributes to macro in the beat. They are different measurements, and the larger one is the filed one.
- Buying back stock with free cash flow is a real transfer of value to the remaining holders, not an accounting effect, so treating it as lower-quality growth than operating growth is a judgement rather than arithmetic.
- The repurchases were partly funded by disposal proceeds - $421.7M from PayByPhone - which is a one-off source, so the same contribution is not automatically repeatable at this scale.
- About $30M of the deceleration is the EPICS divestiture, which the guide nets out at $40M from a 1 September close. Adding it back, implied Q4 revenue growth is about 11.0% rather than 8.6%.
- The comparison also gets harder for a reason that is not the business: Q4 2025 was the first quarter carrying Alpha, and the fuel and currency tailwind that added 28% of Q2 2026's growth begins to lap.
- Management pre-empted the point on the call, stating that the second-half climb was set deliberately and that revenue grows about $100M and earnings over $1.50 a share from Q1 to Q4.
- 2026-11-04editedre-struck on the November 2026 guide: Q4 revenue about $1.37B and adjusted EPS $7.65 at the midpoint
- One quarter is not a trend: the fall was 19% in Q2 2026 and 5% in Q3 2026 on the same basis, and the pro forma volume base is rebuilt each quarter, so the comparison depends on how acquired and macro effects are adjusted.
- The call was not yet available, so management's account of why the fall eased (mix of large new clients maturing, or pricing) is not read.
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the finance chief says about 100 basis points of Corporate Payments growth was one-off, putting the normalised rate near 17% and organic near 10%.
What management did with the money
It bought back $1.11B of stock in the first half of 2026, more than in all of 2025. It has made over 100 acquisitions and is now selling small ones, PayByPhone for $421.7M. The return on all that capital has slipped to 8.9% from a six-year norm of 10.1%.
Insiders in 2026Q2: 8 purchases and 16 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Cheap. The price is about 73% of what we think the business is worth, at an 8% yearly return.
The question is timed. The September-quarter results answered the first half: the price of each business-payment dollar fell 5%, against 19% in June.
The next test is the fourth quarter and the 2027 guide, expected in early February: whether the fall stays under 10% while that arm keeps growing 16% or better. The call said to expect about 17% once a one-off drops out.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- The fall is at least partly mix rather than price: management attributes it to 'new payables and cross-border enterprise clients', and large enterprise payables volume is structurally lower-rate than mid-market card spend, so a cohort effect could stabilise as it matures.
- The margin consequence is far smaller than the rate fall. Stripping depreciation and amortisation from the segment, Corporate Payments earned 46.8% of revenue in Q2 2026 against 48.4% a year earlier - 1.6 points, not 19%. The lower-rate volume is arriving at close to no incremental cost.
- Segment operating profit still grew 27% year over year, so the compression has not stopped the segment compounding profit.
- One quarter is not a trend: the fall was 19% in Q2 2026 and 5% in Q3 2026 on the same basis, and the pro forma volume base is rebuilt each quarter, so the comparison depends on how acquired and macro effects are adjusted.
- The call was not yet available, so management's account of why the fall eased (mix of large new clients maturing, or pricing) is not read.
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the finance chief says about 100 basis points of Corporate Payments growth was one-off, putting the normalised rate near 17% and organic near 10%.
- The matter dates from a 2017 civil investigative demand and a 2019 lawsuit, so it is a legacy exposure being closed rather than a new one opening, and settling it removes an overhang. The money was charged in Q2 2026, so approval releases no further cash.
- The fees at issue are a small part of the business: late fees and finance charges together were about 3% of fiscal 2025 consolidated revenue.
- 2026-09-21editedThe claim described a preliminary settlement subject to Commission approval and the Commission has approved it. The regulator's own release also carries the 2026 appellate affirmance, the redress purpose and the remaining procedure, none of which the claim held.
How we value it
- Method
- Cash the business will produce, in three stages
- Required return
- 8%
- Long-run growth
- 4%
- Moat
- An average moat
| Bear | Base | Bull | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | 4.2%, 4.6% | 8.4%, 9.2% | 10.5%, 11.5% |
| Normal operating margin | 45.4% | 56.7% | 62.4% |
| Return on new capital after year ten | 8% | 12% | 15% |
| Value a share | $307 | $623 | $824 |
- Price
- $455
- Priced on
- 6 Nov
- Price as a share of the base value
- 73%
- Starting growth the price pays for
- 0.9%
- Yearly return the price offers on the base case
- 9.2%
- Risk check: valued at 10%, the rate for a cyclical or indebted business
- $384
Where each figure comes from
| Figure | Source | Where exactly |
|---|---|---|
| Sales, the last twelve months | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Operating margin today | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Tax rate | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Sales per dollar of new capital | Filed report | Annual report (10-K) for the period to 31 Dec 2025, filed 27 Feb 2026: the year's sales over its operating capital. |
| Shares | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the diluted share count. |
| Cash and investments | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Debt | Filed report | Quarterly report (10-Q) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 5 Nov 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus for the years to 31 Dec 2026 and 31 Dec 2027, as it stood when the value was struck on 10 Nov 2026: the average of 5 to 12 analysts' revenue estimates, 8.4%, 9.2%. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Normal operating margin | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus operating margin for the year to 31 Dec 2028, the average of 10 analysts' estimates, 62%, less stock pay of 2.3% of sales and less the 2.7% the analysts add back on their adjusted basis: 57%, which the base case takes as 56.7%. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Return on new capital after year ten | Our method's rule | Set by our reading of the moat: the 8% rate with none, 12% with an average one, 15% with a strong one; the bear case earns the rate. |
| The bear and bull cases | Our method's rule | Our method's spread: the bear case takes half the growth and a fifth off the margin, the bull a quarter more growth and a tenth more margin. |
| Price | Market price | FMP's closing price on 6 Nov 2026. |
What each case rests on
Bear caseGrowth runs at half the analysts' path, 4% and 5%, the margin settles a fifth lower at 45.4%, and new capital earns only the 8% rate: the downturn test.
Base caseRevenue grows 8% and 9% over three years, the analysts' path (C51), then fades toward 4%, closing 30% of the gap each year; the margin moves to 56.7%, the analysts' year-three figure after stock pay and on the filed basis (2.7% less).
Bull caseGrowth runs a quarter above the analysts' path, 10% and 12%, the margin reaches 62.4%, and new capital earns 15%.
What moves the base value
| Lower | Higher | |
|---|---|---|
| Growth in years 1 to 3, a quarter lower or higher | $568 | $681 |
| The normal margin, 15% lower or higher | $518 | $728 |
| Capital per dollar of growth, a quarter more or less | $620 | $625 |
| Return on new capital after year ten, at the rate or one step up | $485 | $678 |
| The rate, a point higher or lower | $480 | $860 |
| Long-run growth a point lower | $549 | - |
Value a share as growth and margin change
| Normal margin ↓ · growth → | 50% | 75% | 100% | 125% | 150% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 45.4% | $398 | $439 | $483 | $529 | $579 |
| 51% | $458 | $504 | $553 | $605 | $661 |
| 56.7% | $517 | $568 | $623 | $681 | $743 |
| 62.4% | $577 | $633 | $693 | $757 | $826 |
| 68% | $636 | $698 | $763 | $833 | $908 |
Growth is shown as a share of the base case's. Green: the price is at or under 80% of that value. Red: at or over 120%.
How we read the multiple
Buyers pay about 24.5 times a year's profit, a little above its own six-year normal of 21.4. Counting debt too, the whole company costs about 15.5 times its operating profit, the profit from the business itself.
Analysts expect profit per share on the company's own measure to grow about 15% in 2027, below management's target of over 20%. What keeps the price from cheap: the return on money spent buying companies has slipped, to 8.9% from a normal 10.1%.
Against its own history. Close to its own normal on most measures and a little dearer on earnings, so the price assumes neither a turn for the better nor a problem.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The enterprise value depends on which of Corpay's borrowings are financing and which are operating. A $2.3B securitisation facility is secured on receivables it also carries, and $8.9B of customer deposits are matched by restricted cash, so a stricter reading of net debt would lower the multiple.
- Operating profit after the amortisation of what the company bought is the conservative lens by construction; on the cash basis the market actually quotes, the same price is about $14.90 for each $1 of guided 2026 earnings.
- Analysts routinely decline to model unannounced buybacks and acquisitions, which are exactly where management says the gap between low-teens pre-tax profit growth and over 20% earnings per share growth comes from - so the shortfall may be a modelling convention rather than a judgement.
- The 2028 estimate of $36.92 implies 17.5% growth on 2027, so the consensus path is not flat: it is below the algorithm and rising toward it.
- Analysts do not model unannounced buybacks and acquisitions, which is exactly where management says the gap between low-teens pre-tax profit growth and over 20% earnings per share growth comes from. The consensus shortfall may be a modelling convention rather than a verdict.
- Operating profit after acquisition amortisation is the conservative lens by construction. On the cash basis the market actually quotes, the same price is about $14.90 for each $1 of guided 2026 earnings and about $13.00 for each $1 of the 2027 estimate, which is not a demanding price for a business earning 44% operating margins.
- Trailing enterprise value to earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation of 14.0 sits barely above its own six-year median of 13.6, and enterprise value to sales is below its median - so on two of the three series the price is not extended at all.
Priced against its rivals
Only WEX sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
Also checked and set aside: American Express Company (a substitute, not the same product); Global Business Travel Group (a substitute, not the same product); Fiserv (a substitute, not the same product).
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Edenred SE, Sodexo S.A., DKV Mobility, Radius Payment Solutions, Coupa Software, U.S. Bank Voyager Fleet Systems, ConectCar, Veloe (Alelo) and Repom (Edenred), ParkMobile, ParkHub, Parking BOXX and FLASH.
Where we disagree with the market
A proven compounder shifting into business payments, which deserves a higher rating than it has.
Both halves are true about different things: volume is compounding, but buyers pay 19% less for each dollar moved.
The market reads the 16% revenue growth in business payments as the number that matters. We think it is the cut earned on each dollar of spend; that fall eased to 5% in the September quarter.
The case against us: management says the fall is the mix of large new clients, and Wise's own rate fell too, which could mean the whole market is repricing rather than Corpay losing ground. The September quarter leans toward management's reading; the market is right if the fall re-widens.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The fall is at least partly mix rather than price: management attributes it to 'new payables and cross-border enterprise clients', and large enterprise payables volume is structurally lower-rate than mid-market card spend, so a cohort effect could stabilise as it matures.
- The margin consequence is far smaller than the rate fall. Stripping depreciation and amortisation from the segment, Corporate Payments earned 46.8% of revenue in Q2 2026 against 48.4% a year earlier - 1.6 points, not 19%. The lower-rate volume is arriving at close to no incremental cost.
- Segment operating profit still grew 27% year over year, so the compression has not stopped the segment compounding profit.
- The same explanation has now been available for several quarters while the rate has kept falling, and a mix effect that persists across successive cohorts is indistinguishable from a price level.
- A listed competitor in the same job publishes its own price falling on the same shape of growth - Wise's business cross-border take rate went 0.51% to 0.39% over eight quarters while volume grew 31% - which is what a market price doing this looks like rather than one company's mix.
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the chief executive adds better monetization (debit cards, paid ACH) to the mix explanation for the quarter.
- Wise is not selling the same product. Its volume is heavily small-business and consumer remittance on a self-service platform; Corpay sells hedging, forward contracts, multi-currency accounts and relationship service to mid-market corporates, which is a different service at a different price.
- Wise cuts price deliberately as a strategy - its mission is explicitly to lower the price - so its take rate is partly a choice rather than a market clearing level.
- Corpay still earns 0.57%, roughly 46% above Wise's business rate, which is evidence the two are not yet competing for the same dollar.
- Analysts do not model unannounced buybacks and acquisitions, which is exactly where management says the gap between low-teens pre-tax profit growth and over 20% earnings per share growth comes from. The consensus shortfall may be a modelling convention rather than a verdict.
- Operating profit after acquisition amortisation is the conservative lens by construction. On the cash basis the market actually quotes, the same price is about $14.90 for each $1 of guided 2026 earnings and about $13.00 for each $1 of the 2027 estimate, which is not a demanding price for a business earning 44% operating margins.
- Trailing enterprise value to earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation of 14.0 sits barely above its own six-year median of 13.6, and enterprise value to sales is below its median - so on two of the three series the price is not extended at all.
- One quarter is not a trend: the fall was 19% in Q2 2026 and 5% in Q3 2026 on the same basis, and the pro forma volume base is rebuilt each quarter, so the comparison depends on how acquired and macro effects are adjusted.
- The call was not yet available, so management's account of why the fall eased (mix of large new clients maturing, or pricing) is not read.
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the finance chief says about 100 basis points of Corporate Payments growth was one-off, putting the normalised rate near 17% and organic near 10%.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- The price keeps falling. If the fall per dollar is the market's going rate rather than mix, revenue keeps growing ever more slowly than volume.
- Growth borrowed from fuel. Higher fuel prices and currency moves supplied 28% of June's revenue increase, and both can reverse.
- Profit after adjustments. The earnings per share the company guides to sit 39% above the official figure, after $644M of add-backs.
- The chief executive is named. He is jointly liable for the FTC's $100M, and a federal appeals court upheld the judgment against him.
- Lower interest rates. Corpay earns interest on $8.92B of customer money, and falling rates cut 1.8 points from business-payments growth in June.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- The fall is at least partly mix rather than price: management attributes it to 'new payables and cross-border enterprise clients', and large enterprise payables volume is structurally lower-rate than mid-market card spend, so a cohort effect could stabilise as it matures.
- The margin consequence is far smaller than the rate fall. Stripping depreciation and amortisation from the segment, Corporate Payments earned 46.8% of revenue in Q2 2026 against 48.4% a year earlier - 1.6 points, not 19%. The lower-rate volume is arriving at close to no incremental cost.
- Segment operating profit still grew 27% year over year, so the compression has not stopped the segment compounding profit.
- Wise is not selling the same product. Its volume is heavily small-business and consumer remittance on a self-service platform; Corpay sells hedging, forward contracts, multi-currency accounts and relationship service to mid-market corporates, which is a different service at a different price.
- Wise cuts price deliberately as a strategy - its mission is explicitly to lower the price - so its take rate is partly a choice rather than a market clearing level.
- Corpay still earns 0.57%, roughly 46% above Wise's business rate, which is evidence the two are not yet competing for the same dollar.
- The amortisation being added back is of intangible assets from acquisitions already paid for in cash, and Corpay's organic growth of 10% clears its own mid-term target without any acquisition at all - so the add-back is not obviously a recurring cost of maintaining the growth rate.
- Management's stated alternative use of the same capital is buying back stock, which would produce the same earnings growth and create no amortisation whatever, so the charge is a consequence of which option is chosen rather than of the business model.
- The gap narrows as the acquired intangibles run off: it was $6.35 a share in 2025 against $7.65 guided for 2026, but the 2026 figure carries a full year of Alpha where 2025 carried a quarter.
- 2026-11-04editedre-struck on the raised November 2026 outlook; the split of the adjustments was not re-read
- A chief executive named personally in an enforcement action over conduct the company was found liable for is the ordinary shape of such a case rather than a separate finding about him, and the appeal went partly his way: the injunction against him was vacated.
- The conduct at issue ran from before the 2019 lawsuit and concerns a fuel-card fee line worth about 3% of revenue, so it says little about how the rest of a company assembled from over a hundred acquisitions is run.
What we still do not know
- Whether the falling price per dollar is big new clients paying less, as management says, or the going rate for the whole market.
- Whether the hundred-odd acquisitions earned more than the debt that paid for them.
- How much business card spending Corpay's cards can actually reach, since each supplier must first agree to take them.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The same explanation has now been available for several quarters while the rate has kept falling, and a mix effect that persists across successive cohorts is indistinguishable from a price level.
- A listed competitor in the same job publishes its own price falling on the same shape of growth - Wise's business cross-border take rate went 0.51% to 0.39% over eight quarters while volume grew 31% - which is what a market price doing this looks like rather than one company's mix.
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the chief executive adds better monetization (debit cards, paid ACH) to the mix explanation for the quarter.
- Wise is not selling the same product. Its volume is heavily small-business and consumer remittance on a self-service platform; Corpay sells hedging, forward contracts, multi-currency accounts and relationship service to mid-market corporates, which is a different service at a different price.
- Wise cuts price deliberately as a strategy - its mission is explicitly to lower the price - so its take rate is partly a choice rather than a market clearing level.
- Corpay still earns 0.57%, roughly 46% above Wise's business rate, which is evidence the two are not yet competing for the same dollar.
- It protects only the virtual card line. The fuel proprietary network, which sits behind 43% of revenue, is being attacked by entrants issuing on general-purpose networks where no enrolment is needed at all.
- American Express and the large banks have built the same enrolment asset, so it is a barrier against fintech entrants rather than against the incumbents Corpay names first in its own competition section.
What would change our view
- Attractive→NeutralThe price rises within 20% of fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price rises to about $498, 80% of what we think the business is worth, so it is no longer cheap enough.about ≈$487.87 today, 20% above the last close
- Attractive→UnattractiveThe price runs 20% above fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price rises to about $747, 20% above what we think the business is worth.about ≈$684.10 today, 68% above the last close
- Attractive→UnattractiveErosion or retention gives way
It needs any of:
- ○Fewer than 90% of customers stay each year, or fewer than 94% in business payments.checked at the next results, due by 3 Feb
- ○Fuel-card revenue from existing businesses shrinks for two quarters running.checked at the next results, due by 3 Feb
We would also be wrong if
- The price earned on each business-payment dollar keeps falling more than 10% a year through 2027.
- Growth from the businesses it already owns settles below 8% for two quarters running.
What is coming
- 31 December 2026 Buyback authorisation expires: Whether the board renews and enlarges it, the first test of management's plan to put about $15B into buybacks or deals.
Every dated event ahead
- 31 December 2026 Buyback authorisation expires: Whether the board renews and enlarges it, the first test of management's plan to put about $15B into buybacks or deals.
- February 2027 Q4 2026 results and 2027 guidance: Whether 2027 guidance reaches the 15% earnings growth analysts expect without fuel and currency help, and how much of it is the buyback.
- 3 February 2027 Q4 2026 results and 2027 guidance: Whether Corporate Payments revenue per spend dollar keeps falling by less than 10%, organic growth holds and the 2027 guide is given.
- July 2028 Option to buy the rest of the AvidXchange partnership: Whether Corpay pays about 2.5 times invested capital for the rest, or lets TPG sell with a guaranteed return: a test of deal discipline.
- 31 August 2028 CEO share-price award period ends: Whether the stock clears the hurdles; it tells you what the chief executive is paid for, not whether revenue per spend dollar recovered.
Since we wrote this
- 9 NovThesis reviewAttractive: priced at 70% of a value near $653Re-valued in three stages at an 8% return, the method now drawn on every thesis: the price sits past the 20% margin of safety.
- 5 NovEarningsCall: one point of the growth was a one-off; view holdsCorporate Payments grew 18% but about 17% without a one-off, still above the line. One partly flattered quarter cannot reach Attractive.
- 4 NovEarningsPrice per payment dollar fell only 5%; view heldThe price of each business-payment dollar fell 5% against 19% in June and that arm grew 18%, but one quarter and an unread call do not reach Attractive.
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 21 SepNewsFTC settlement accepted; chief executive named. View heldThe $100M repays harmed customers, and the liability was already lost on appeal. Neither answers what the view turns on: whether the price of each payment dollar stops falling.
- 13 SepThesis writtenNeutral, medium convictionSpend through its business-payments arm grew 43% while revenue grew 16%: volume is winning, but each dollar moved earns less.
Also checked 1 time with nothing new to act on.
Sources 20
Sources - 20
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-27Item 1 business and competition, the virtual card acceptance mechanism, the proprietary network description, fuel price and late fee revenue shares, the FTC matter, the material weakness and its remediation, the buyback programme, the absence of any customer concentration disclosurebacksC01C09C10C13C17C21C27C30C32C39C44C48C49
- S02primarycompany filing2026-08-10the segment note that places the $100.8M FTC charge inside Vehicle Payments, and segment expense detail the release does not carrybacksC22C23C48C49
- S03primarycompany filing2026-08-05the income statement, balance sheet and cash flow; Exhibit 2's revenue per spend dollar; Exhibit 5's macro reconciliation; Exhibit 1's adjusted earnings bridge; Exhibit 7's guidance reconciliationbacksC01C02C03C04C06C08C12C13C21C22C23C31C32C36C40
- S04primarytranscript2026-08-05Corpay Q2 2026 earnings call transcriptmanagement's retention, bookings and same-store sales figures, the $600 billion market and $15B capital statements, the Mastercard channel count, the macro contribution to the beat; and nine analysts' questions, which are a separate origin from the answers
So the portfolio repositioning you know, gives us a $600 billion revenue TAM for, you know, a $5 billion company today. So, look, it certainly gives us the potential to at least 10x this company to save $50 billion, over time. ... Retention remaining steady at 93%. Year over year sales or new bookings terrific, growing 30% and same store sales, in the plus column, +1%. ... Our line average is 93. That business is, you know, closer to 96% or 97%. ... We are now at 10. FIs that have been closed. On the last report I saw, we have got 100 active additional FIs in the pipeline.
backsC07C11C16C17C24C25C31C40 - S05primarycompany filing2026-02-04the original 2026 guidance with its $2.90 a gallon fuel assumption and ~70M share count, FY2025 results, and the Q4 2025 float compression figurebacksC08C31
- S06primarycompany filing2026-05-22facility sizes, the five-year extensions to 2031, the Term Loan B cut to $2.9B maturing November 2032, and the 10 basis point rate reductionbacksC24
- S07primarycompany filing2026-02-13a competitor's own naming of Corpay, its description of why buyers choose a specialised card over a bank's, its closed-loop network language, and three years of segment adjusted operating incomebacksC35C39C41
- S08primarycompany filing2025-11-06commercial payments volume of $1,739B for the twelve months to 30 June 2025, with its US and international split and its definitionbacksC18C33
- S09primarycompany filing2026-02commercial credit and debit gross dollar volume of $1,405B, up 11% in local currency, on 174 million cards up 14%backsC18C33
- S10primarycompany filing2026-06-25the eight-quarter cross-border take rate series split personal and business, cross-border volume of $243.5B up 31%, and net revenue of $2,502.8MbacksC05
- S11primaryother2026-09-13a named fuel-card entrant's own statement that it needs no proprietary acceptance network, and its fee table pricing directly against incumbent transaction, out-of-network, administration and late fees
AtoB is powered by Visa, so you can make vehicle related purchases virtually everywhere and comes with some of the best discounts in the industry, without any limits on how much you can save. ... Miles ahead of the competition AtoB Flex AtoB Unlimited Other cards Account set-up fee $35 $35 $35-$50 Transaction fees $0 $0 50¢ Out-of-network fee $0 $0 $5 Account administration fee $0 $0 10¢/gal Late payment fee 5% 0% 12%
backsC20 - S12primarygovernment data2026-07-01the independent measure of the secular change, and the figure that cuts against it - ACH reaching almost three quarters of noncash payments by value
The study shows that the total number of noncash payments made by consumers and businesses increased to 236.6 billion in 2024. ... Cards accounted for over three quarters of payments by number. ... In 2024, ACH's share of noncash payments by value reached almost three quarters for the first time. ... The data also show that check payments and ATM cash withdrawals continued to decline by both number and value.
backsC34 - S13primaryvendor data2026-09-13Research pack, frozen at content/CPAY/research-pack.jsonprice, market value, the valuation series against its six-year medians, analyst consensus and its drift, the 2027 and 2028 estimates, short interest from FINRA, insider filings with the base rate, and the cohort resultbacksC16C26C28C37C38C39
- S14primaryregulator2026-09-17the regulator's own account of the settlement: the Commission vote, the Federal Register and comment procedure before the order is final, that the payment is redress rather than a penalty, the 2026 appellate affirmance on all counts against the company, and the chief executive's position as a named party
FleetCor and its CEO will pay $100 million to settle a Federal Trade Commission administrative action ... In 2026, a federal appeals court upheld the summary judgment against FleetCor on all counts and affirmed the permanent injunction against it. The court affirmed the judgment against Clarke on all but one count and vacated the injunction as to Clarke. ... FleetCor and Clarke will pay $100 million, which will be used to provide redress to the company's business customers harmed by its practices. FleetCor and Clarke have also agreed not to oppose reimposition of a federal court injunction against Clarke. The Commission vote to accept the consent agreement was 1-0-1.
backsC21C43 - S15primarycompany filing2026-04-10beneficial ownership as of February 17, 2026, the CEO's bonus metrics, weights, goals and 2025 payout, the 2021 and 2024 CEO equity grants, the 2025 chief financial officer transitions and the 2025 say-on-pay resultbacksC44C45C46C47
- S16primarycompany filing2026-07-24the July 22, 2026 grant of 300,000 stock-price-hurdle PSUs to the chief executive and 28,213 to Armando Netto, the three hurdles and the performance period to August 31, 2028backsC47
- S17primarycompany filing2026-11-04third-quarter revenue, organic growth, Corporate Payments revenue per spend dollar on the pro forma and macro adjusted basis, the raised 2026 outlook and the fourth-quarter outlookbacksC50
- S18primarytranscript2026-11-05Corpay Q3 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held November 4, 2026About 100 basis points of one-time monetization in Corporate Payments, normalised growth 17% and organic 10%, over $500M of new Corporate Payments sales giving a 7%-8% ramp in 2027, retention near 95%, divestitures of $1.5B-$2B in the market, M&A focus on spend management.
There's about 100 basis points of, call it, onetime monetization happening within Q3 that we don't know is necessarily repeatable in Q4. So Corporate Payments normalized is probably more like 17% and overall organic is more like 10%.
backsC04C50 - S19primarycompany filing2026-11-09trailing revenue, operating profit, stock pay, tax, debt, cash and the diluted share countbacksC52
- S20secondaryvendor data2026-11-09the analysts' average revenue and operating profit for the next three fiscal years, and the closebacksC51C52