Arm Holdings
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The company that designs the brains of nearly every phone chip, and is paid a fee and a royalty each time one is made.
The scores
Growth3/4 →
Revenue grew 23% in fiscal 2026 and 27% in Q2 fiscal 2027, but fiscal 2023 fell and last year's licence growth leaned on related parties.
Business quality4/4 →
Over 99% of phone processors for years, surviving Intel's mobile push; a regulator calls it a critical input; RISC-V and its own chip test that.
Financial position4/4 →
No debt, $3.6B of cash and short-term investments, and trailing operating cash flow of $1.7B.
Execution record3/4 →
Beat its revenue guide in Q2 fiscal 2027 and grew over 20% for five quarters, but the AGI CPU has not yet shipped.
Per share capture2/4 →
Stock pay is 23% of revenue and SoftBank controls the board while buying from Arm, so owners' share of profit leaks.
Potential3/4 ↑
The server shift is measured from outside, rising toward a third of the market, but the AGI CPU's size rests on management's word.
Risk profile2/4 →
Arm China and SoftBank's affiliate bring about 30% of revenue, the top five 57%, and the largest phone licensee is suing.
Valuation1/4 ↑
About 199.5 times GAAP operating profit, 357% of a three-stage value near $49 at an 8% return and above the bull case: priced for perfection.
Evidence quality3/4 →
Revenue, stock pay and cash are filed; data centre growth, server share at cloud providers and the AGI CPU are management's figures.
If it works 0.8× · if it fails you keep about 74%.
The Verdict
We rate Arm Unattractive. The business is solid: its designs sit in nearly every phone, data centres are moving to them, and it has no debt. But stock pay takes nearly a quarter of revenue, so the profit left for owners is thin, and about a third of sales comes from Arm China and SoftBank's own affiliate. Counting stock pay as a cost, the price is about 357% of our value of about $49 and far above our best case. As a bet on its own server chip it is priced for success: even if the chip works, today's price is not covered.
The long caseIf data centres need many more processors and Arm can make enough of its own, it earns the whole chip price rather than a royalty.
How we weighed it
The price against our value
Against it
Price at 357% of our value
The price sits far above our value and above our bull case.
The business
In its favour
Solid
Software built for Arm keeps phone and device makers, and cloud providers are moving their servers to it.
Growth against what the price assumes
Cuts both ways
Data centre royalties are growing fast, but phones are shrinking this year and the price needs more than even the analysts expect.
What could go wrong
Against it
Arm China and SoftBank's affiliate are large customers, the largest phone licensee is suing, and stock pay keeps owners' profit thin.
Against competitors
Cuts both ways
No one licenses CPU designs at its scale, but free RISC-V is spreading and its own chip competes with licensees.
How its group is behaving
Against it
It ranks with the AI chip names, which have sold off together on doubts about AI spending.
The latest news and report
Cuts both ways
The last report beat its guide on licences, but royalties grew slowly and the shares fell on the day.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
The normal margin keeps stock pay at today's share of sales; if it fell to a mature 6% the base value would be near $51 and the bull near $99, still far below the price.
On management's non-GAAP operating income, which adds back stock pay, the multiple is far lower, near 75 times (C03).
The licences may be real use of Arm designs by SoftBank's chip projects; the 20-F gives no terms beyond the statements of work (C04).
No revenue has been recognised yet, the purchase orders are not filed, and the CFO said supply of wafers, substrates and memory is the constraint (S03).
The company
Every phone, laptop and data-centre server has a processor that runs its programs. Arm does not make those chips. It designs the blueprint they follow and the building blocks inside them, and sells the right to use them to chip makers such as Apple, Qualcomm and NVIDIA.
Partners shipped over 10 billion chips built on its designs in one quarter, and almost every smartphone uses one. In March 2026 Arm also began selling a server chip of its own, the Arm AGI CPU.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
Chip counts come from licensees' royalty reports, which Arm estimates and audits; Arm China's data has been late before (C07).
No revenue has been recognised yet, the purchase orders are not filed, and the CFO said supply of wafers, substrates and memory is the constraint (S03).
How it makes money
Arm is paid twice. A chip maker pays a licence fee up front to use a design, then a royalty on each chip it ships, often for decades. In the year to March 2026 licence fees were $2,307M and royalties $2,613M, and phones were about 43% of royalties. Its own server chip would add a third kind of revenue: the whole price of a chip.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
In Q2 fiscal 2027 revenue from outside customers rose 43% to $1,019M while related-party revenue was flat at $424M (C03).
No revenue has been recognised yet, the purchase orders are not filed, and the CFO said supply of wafers, substrates and memory is the constraint (S03).
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (fiscal 2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Royalties | 53% | A fee on substantially every chip licensees ship with Arm's designs, a percentage of the chip's price or a fixed amount per unit. |
| Licences and other | 47% | Up-front and subscription fees for the right to use Arm's designs, plus support, software tools and services; lumpy with the timing of large deals. |
Who runs it
Rene Haas has run Arm since February 2022, after leading its product group from 2017; he also sits on SoftBank's board and runs a SoftBank unit. Jason Child has been finance chief since November 2022.
Directors and managers own well under 1% of the shares. Haas was paid $60.6M for fiscal 2026, mostly in shares, and bonuses pay on revenue and on a profit measure that leaves stock pay out, so pay rewards growth more than profit per share.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
Software for phones and servers is written for Arm's instruction set, the language a processor understands. Moving a product line to another means rewriting and retesting years of software, so chip makers stay. Arm has held over 99% of smartphone processors for years.
The US competition regulator called Arm's technology a critical input that rival chip makers rely on, because it is licensed to all of them on neutral terms.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
The share includes Arm's own AGI CPU and the cloud providers' chips; AMD's share is also forecast to rise to about 27% (S05).
The threat
RISC-V is a free, open alternative to Arm's designs, and many of Arm's own customers back it. In servers Intel and AMD still sell most processors. Qualcomm, about 9% of revenue, is suing Arm over its licences. And now that Arm sells its own chip, it competes with the customers who license its designs, who could move elsewhere.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
The share includes Arm's own AGI CPU and the cloud providers' chips; AMD's share is also forecast to rise to about 27% (S05).
The rivals: INTC, AMD, QCOM, AMZN, GOOG, MSFT, NVDA, and 1 more that is private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Private | RISC-V, the open instruction set, and core designers such as SiFivePriced against it: Private | IP licensing and royalties | On sale | Private |
| INTC · AMD | Intel and AMD x86 server and PC processorsPriced against it: Different product | IP licensing and royalties | On sale | Different product |
| QCOM | Qualcomm's own cores designed under its architecture licencePriced against it: Not checked | IP licensing and royalties | On sale | Not checked |
| AMD | AMD's EPYC server processorsPriced against it: Different product | Arm AGI CPU, Arm's own server chip | On sale | Different product |
| AMZN · GOOG · MSFT · NVDA | Cloud providers' own Arm chips: Graviton, Axion, Cobalt and NVIDIA's VeraPriced against it: Not checked | Arm AGI CPU, Arm's own server chip | On sale | Not checked |
How big it could get
How big this could get
Arm is already in almost every phone, and shipments are forecast to fall by about a sixth in 2026, so growth there comes from higher royalty rates. Servers are where units can still rise: a researcher puts Arm's share of server processors at just over a tenth in 2025 and above a fifth in 2026.
Nobody publishes how much chip makers spend on processor designs in total, so the market Arm sells into cannot be counted from outside.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
Arm's royalty per phone rises with Armv9 and its compute subsystems, so revenue can grow while units fall (C26).
The share includes Arm's own AGI CPU and the cloud providers' chips; AMD's share is also forecast to rise to about 27% (S05).
In Q2 fiscal 2027 revenue from outside customers rose 43% to $1,019M while related-party revenue was flat at $424M (C03).
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 24% over the twelve months to Sep 2026, about the same pace as the 23% in the year to Mar 2026.
Operating margin is 17%, up from 3.4% in the year to Mar 2024.
Running costs take 81¢ of each sales dollar, up from 72¢ in the year to Mar 2022.
Each dollar put into the business earns 8.9% a year after tax, down from 15% in the year to Mar 2022.
It turned 22% of sales into free cash, $1.21B over the last twelve months.
Yearly sales growth has ranged from −0.9% to +24% over the last 4 years, with sales falling in 1 of them.
The share count rose 5.2% in 4.5 years, and pay in shares costs 23% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-11-17. Fiscal years end in March.
| Mar 2022 | Mar 2023 | Mar 2024 | Mar 2025 | Mar 2026 | 12 mo to Sep 2026 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | ||||||
| Sales | $2.70B | $2.68B | $3.23B | $4.01B | $4.92B | $5.46B |
| Sales growth | - | −0.9% | +21% | +24% | +23% | +24% |
| Profit | ||||||
| Gross margin | 95% | 96% | 95% | 97% | 98% | 97% |
| Operating margin | 23% | 25% | 3.4% | 21% | 18% | 17% |
| Net margin | 20% | 20% | 9.5% | 20% | 18% | 17% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | ||||||
| Research and development | 37% | 42% | 61% | 52% | 56% | 57% |
| Selling, general and admin | 33% | 28% | 30% | 25% | 23% | 23% |
| Pay in shares | 1.0% | 12% | 33% | 20% | 21% | 23% |
| Capital spending | 1.3% | 2.4% | 2.8% | 5.5% | 11% | 9.6% |
| Cash | ||||||
| Cash from operations | $458M | $739M | $1.09B | $397M | $1.52B | $1.73B |
| Free cash flow | $424M | $675M | $998M | $178M | $979M | $1.21B |
| Balance sheet | ||||||
| Cash and short-term investments | - | $2.21B | $2.92B | $2.83B | $3.60B | $3.62B |
| Returns and shares | ||||||
| Return on capital | 15% | 14% | 2.4% | 14% | 9.3% | 8.9% |
| Shares (diluted) | 1.03B | 1.03B | 1.04B | 1.06B | 1.07B | 1.08B |
What growth costs
Growth has made Arm less profitable on the official measure. From fiscal 2022 to 2026 revenue rose 82%, but research grew from about a third to over half of revenue and stock pay from almost nothing to about a fifth, so the official operating margin fell from 23.4% to 18.3%. Only selling and admin costs shrank as a share.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Part of the research rise builds the AGI CPU and compute subsystems, which management expects to earn later (C11).
The last report (4 Nov)
Quarter ended September 2026, filed figures.
In the quarter to September 2026 revenue rose 27% to $1,443M. Licence fees rose 50% and royalties 8%; management says data-centre royalties doubled. Official operating profit was $201M, 13.9% of revenue, because stock pay is counted; management's own measure, which leaves it out, was 44.2%.
Cash from operations fell to $207M from $567M a year earlier, as fees owed by Arm China and SoftBank's affiliate built up unpaid. The guide for the next quarter is $1.54B. The shares fell 13.1% the next day.
What it did to the thesisIt supported the business: licence fees and data-centre royalties grew fast and the next guide is higher. It did not ease our worries: royalties slowed, cash fell, and related parties still drive the fees. Nothing in it closes the gap to the price.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures.
Earnings per share $0.52 against $0.48 expected; $0.12 as filed, the gap being what the company adds back.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
TrendForce puts Arm-based CPUs at just over a tenth of the whole server CPU market in 2025 and above a fifth in 2026 (C13); the top cloud providers are a subset.
License revenue swings with the timing of large deals, so one quarter can miss on timing alone (C03).
Contract assets from SoftBank's affiliate and Arm China were $617M of related-party contract assets at September, cash that lags the revenue (S02).
A sector-wide chip sell-off moved many names those days; the reaction is observed, not caused (S09).
What management did with the money
Insiders in 2026Q3: 5 purchases and 6 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Priced for perfection. The price is about 357% of what we think the business is worth at an 8% yearly return, and far above our best case.
The shares are 61% below their high of the past year: they fell 13.1% after the September-quarter report and 8.1% more on 16 November in a chip sell-off. Revenue per share kept rising, so the price per dollar of sales has fallen, but from a very high level.
The next test is the December-quarter report, due about 3 February 2027, then the first deliveries of Arm's own server chip, promised by the end of March 2027.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
A sector-wide chip sell-off moved many names those days; the reaction is observed, not caused (S09).
No revenue has been recognised yet, the purchase orders are not filed, and the CFO said supply of wafers, substrates and memory is the constraint (S03).
License revenue swings with the timing of large deals, so one quarter can miss on timing alone (C03).
How we value it
- Method
- Cash the business will produce, in three stages
- Required return
- 8%
- Long-run growth
- 4%
- Moat
- A strong moat
| Bear | Base | Bull | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | 15.9%, 17.2%, 21.2% | 31.8%, 34.5%, 42.5% | 39.8%, 43.1%, 53.1% |
| Normal operating margin | 13.2% | 16.5% | 18.2% |
| Return on new capital after year ten | 8% | 15% | 15% |
| Value a share | $16.18 | $49.01 | $74.20 |
- Price
- $175
- Priced on
- 16 Nov
- Price as a share of the base value
- 357%
- Yearly return the price offers on the base case
- 5.3%
- Risk check: valued at 10%, the rate for a cyclical or indebted business
- $30.55
Where each figure comes from
| Figure | Source | Where exactly |
|---|---|---|
| Sales, the last twelve months | Filed report | Interim report (6-K) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 4 Nov 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Operating margin today | Filed report | Interim report (6-K) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 4 Nov 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Tax rate | Filed report | Interim report (6-K) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 4 Nov 2026; the four quarters to that date. |
| Sales per dollar of new capital | Filed report | Annual report (20-F) for the period to 31 Mar 2026, filed 26 May 2026: the year's sales over its operating capital. |
| Shares | Filed report | Interim report (6-K) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 4 Nov 2026; the diluted share count. |
| Cash and investments | Filed report | Interim report (6-K) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 4 Nov 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Debt | Filed report | Interim report (6-K) for the period to 30 Sep 2026, filed 4 Nov 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus for the years to 31 Mar 2027, 31 Mar 2028, 31 Mar 2029 and 31 Mar 2030: the average of 12 to 24 analysts' revenue estimates, 31.8%, 34.5%, 42.5%. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Normal operating margin | Analysts' forecasts | FMP's consensus operating margin for the year to 31 Mar 2029, the average of 12 analysts' estimates, 44.9%, less stock pay of 23.2% of sales and less the 5.3% the analysts add back on their adjusted basis. FMP publishes how many analysts, not who they are. |
| Return on new capital after year ten | Our method's rule | Set by our reading of the moat: the 8% rate with none, 12% with an average one, 15% with a strong one; the bear case earns the rate. |
| The bear and bull cases | Our method's rule | Our method's spread: the bear case takes half the growth and a fifth off the margin, the bull a quarter more growth and a tenth more margin. |
| Price | Market price | FMP's closing price on 16 Nov 2026. |
What each case rests on
Bear caseGrowth at half the analysts' path, 16%, 17% and 21%, the margin a fifth lower at 13.2%, and new capital earning only the 8% rate: the downturn test, phones falling and the AGI CPU slipping.
Base caseRevenue grows 32%, 35% and 43% over three years, the analysts' path with the AGI CPU in it (C20), then fades toward 4%; the margin moves to 16.5%, the analysts' fiscal 2029 margin less stock pay at today's 23% of sales and their adjusted-basis gap.
Bull caseGrowth a quarter above the analysts' path, 40%, 43% and 53%, the margin a tenth higher at 18.2%, and new capital earning 15%.
What moves the base value
| Lower | Higher | |
|---|---|---|
| Growth in years 1 to 3, a quarter lower or higher | $35.90 | $66.79 |
| The normal margin, 15% lower or higher | $41.34 | $56.67 |
| Capital per dollar of growth, a quarter more or less | $46.48 | $50.53 |
| Return on new capital after year ten, at the rate or one step up | $33.19 | $49.01 |
| The rate, a point higher or lower | $37.86 | $67.85 |
| Long-run growth a point lower | $42.46 | - |
Value a share as growth and margin change
| Normal margin ↓ · growth → | 50% | 75% | 100% | 125% | 150% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 13.2% | $21.55 | $28.80 | $38.79 | $52.35 | $70.49 |
| 14.9% | $23.97 | $32.35 | $43.90 | $59.57 | $80.53 |
| 16.5% | $26.39 | $35.90 | $49.01 | $66.79 | $90.57 |
| 18.2% | $28.81 | $39.46 | $54.12 | $74.01 | $101 |
| 19.8% | $31.23 | $43.01 | $59.23 | $81.23 | $111 |
Growth is shown as a share of the base case's. Green: the price is at or under 80% of that value. Red: at or over 120%.
How we read the multiple
Management's profit measure adds stock pay back. We count it as a cost, because new shares paid to staff shrink each owner's slice.
- The whole company, cash taken off, is worth about $182.5B.
- Official operating profit over the past year was about $915M, after stock pay of about $1,266M.
- That puts the price at about 199.5 times profit.
- Even with the analysts' revenue path, which more than doubles sales in three years, we value it at about $49 a share.
Against its own history. Buyers pay less for each dollar of its sales than at the peak of the past year, but still far more than its own profit after stock pay can support.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
On management's non-GAAP operating income, which adds back stock pay, the multiple is far lower, near 75 times (C03).
The normal margin keeps stock pay at today's share of sales; if it fell to a mature 6% the base value would be near $51 and the bull near $99, still far below the price.
The later years carry the AGI CPU plan on management's word (C12), and fewer analysts forecast them.
Priced against its rivals
None of the listed rivals above sells the same thing to the same buyers as a large part of what it does. A price comparison needs at least two, so the price is judged against its own history instead.
Also checked and set aside: CEVA (a substitute, not the same product).
The bet: what it pays if it works
This bet is on Arm's own server chip, the Arm AGI CPU, which Meta and other buyers have ordered. Management plans up to $2B of sales over two years, then about $2B and $5B a year.
Valued alone, the licence and royalty business does not cover today's price, so part of it already rests on the chip. Even if the chip reaches management's plan, the shares would be worth less than today, and if it fails more is lost: a bet priced for success, and expensive.
| Arm AGI CPU, Arm's own server chip revenue in two to three years | Share points of the server CPU market needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $1.00B | about 1 at 100% kept | 0.8× |
| $2.00B (the big win) | about 2 at 100% kept | 0.8× |
| $5.00B | about 5 at 100% kept | 0.9× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $38.35B of Arm AGI CPU, Arm's own server chip revenue (about 38 share points of the server CPU market); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $129.62B of Arm AGI CPU, Arm's own server chip revenue (about 130 share points of the server CPU market), at the same multiple.
Each row is Arm AGI CPU, Arm's own server chip alone, plus the rest of the company (IP licensing and royalties) counted at about $135.00B.
The steps it has to take
- Done Arm AGI CPU launched with Meta as chief customer
- Done Purchase orders from several customers through calendar 2027
- In progress First commercial deliveries due 2027-03
- Not started Second-generation chip in production due 2028-12
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 3 claims
No revenue has been recognised yet, the purchase orders are not filed, and the CFO said supply of wafers, substrates and memory is the constraint (S03).
These are plans stated on a call, not guidance in a filing, and AMD raised its own server CPU outlook the same week (S03).
On management's non-GAAP operating income, which adds back stock pay, the multiple is far lower, near 75 times (C03).
Where we disagree with the market
The blueprint of AI data centres, with its own chip about to add billions: most analysts rate it a buy.
A rare franchise whose stock pay and related-party revenue leave owners thin profit, priced far above our best case.
Most analysts value Arm on management's profit, which leaves out stock pay, and expect revenue to nearly triple by fiscal 2030 as its own chip adds billions. Counted as a cost, stock pay leaves too little profit for that path to reach today's price.
The evidence against us: if the server chip reaches management's plan and stock pay falls fast, profit could grow into the price sooner than we model.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
The later years carry the AGI CPU plan on management's word (C12), and fewer analysts forecast them.
The normal margin keeps stock pay at today's share of sales; if it fell to a mature 6% the base value would be near $51 and the bull near $99, still far below the price.
These are plans stated on a call, not guidance in a filing, and AMD raised its own server CPU outlook the same week (S03).
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Related-party revenue. About a third of revenue comes from Arm China, which Arm does not control, and SoftBank's affiliate, and their fees are slow to arrive as cash.
- Own chip, own customers. Selling its own server chip puts Arm against the companies that license its designs, who may move away.
- A free rival. RISC-V costs nothing to use, and many of Arm's largest customers back it.
- Qualcomm's lawsuit. A customer bringing about 9% of revenue is suing Arm over its licences.
- SoftBank's control. SoftBank owns most of the shares, has pledged most of them for a loan, and elects the board.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
The licences may be real use of Arm designs by SoftBank's chip projects; the 20-F gives no terms beyond the statements of work (C04).
What we still do not know
- How much profit the server chip will earn once it ships, and whether management's plan holds.
- Whether Arm China and SoftBank's affiliate keep paying on time, and how long their fees last.
- How fast stock pay falls as a share of revenue.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
No revenue has been recognised yet, the purchase orders are not filed, and the CFO said supply of wafers, substrates and memory is the constraint (S03).
These are plans stated on a call, not guidance in a filing, and AMD raised its own server CPU outlook the same week (S03).
What would change our view
- Unattractive→NeutralThe price falls back within 20% of fair value
It needs:
- ○The shares fall back within 20% above what we think the business is worth.about ≈$56.42 today, 68% below the last close
- Unattractive→AttractiveThe price falls 20% under fair value
It needs:
- ○The shares fall to 80% of what we think the business is worth.about ≈$36.41 today, 79% below the last close
- Unattractive→NeutralProfit after stock pay catches up
It needs all of:
- ○Official operating margin reaches 35% over four quarters.checked at the next results, due by 3 Feb
- ○Revenue growth over four quarters stays at 25% or more.checked at the next results, due by 3 Feb
We would also be wrong if
- Royalties grow below 10% a year in fiscal 2027 and 2028.
- Arm China falls below a tenth of revenue, or stops paying.
- A major phone or cloud customer moves its main processors to RISC-V.
What is coming
- 3 February 2027 Q3 fiscal 2027 results: Whether revenue reaches the $1.54B guide and phone royalties steady as memory costs bite.
Every dated event ahead
- 3 February 2027 Q3 fiscal 2027 results: Whether revenue reaches the $1.54B guide and phone royalties steady as memory costs bite.
- 31 March 2027 First Arm AGI CPU deliveries, fiscal Q4 2027: Whether the chip ships on time and starts the $2B plan.
- 30 June 2027 Arm's next investor event: Updated targets for the AGI CPU beyond fiscal 2028.
Since we wrote this
- 17 NovThesis writtenUnattractive, high convictionA near-universal chip design franchise, but after stock pay the price is about 357% of our value.
Sources 9
Sources - 9
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-05-26business, products, end markets, competition, customers, Arm China, SoftBank, litigation, management, pay, ownership and the statementsbacksC01C02C04C05C07C08C09C10C16C17C18C25C26C27C28C31C34C37
- S02primarycompany release2026-11-04the quarter's revenue split, profit, cash flow, balance sheet, contract value, Q3 guidance and the AGI CPU updatebacksC03C06C10C11C19C31C33C35C38
- S03primarytranscript2026-11-04the AGI CPU demand, customers and plan, data centre royalties, mobile outlook and royalty rates
So at Arm Everywhere Day, we talked about visibilities of $1 billion, and quickly, we have seen that to about a $2 billion number.
backsC06C11C12C26 - S05primaryindustry data2026-10-22server CPU shipments and Arm's share of the server CPU market, 2025 to 2027
The x86 segment, led by Intel and AMD, accounted for nearly 90% of the server CPU market in 2025, with AMD already gaining share. Arm-based processors, meanwhile, had only recently surpassed 10% of the market.
backsC13 - S06primaryindustry data2026-08-26smartphone units and prices in 2026 and the memory outlook
worldwide smartphone shipments will fall 16.7% in 2026 to just over 1 billion units.
backsC14 - S07primaryregulator2021-12-02the regulator's account of Arm as a neutral, critical input and the risk of a chip maker controlling it
Because Arm’s technology is a critical input that enables competition between Nvidia and its competitors in several markets
backsC15 - S08primaryindustry data2026-11-17what RISC-V is and how it is licensed
RISC-V combines a modular technical approach with an open, royalty-free ISA
backsC16 - S09secondaryvendor data2026-11-16the close, the price split into sales and multiple, analyst ratings and forecasts, insider transactionsbacksC20C21C22C23C24
- S10primarycompany filing2026-02-04a rival's account of data centre and PC competition, including Arm-based processorsbacksC36