AppLovin
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An automated ad broker for phone games: in milliseconds it decides which advertisement each player sees, and keeps a cut of every one it places.
The scores
Growth3/4 ↓
Three years of roughly 70% growth, none of it bought - but management names one driver, and the quarter it failed sales barely moved.
Business quality3/4 ↓
A data-scale advantage an independent attribution firm ranks first in tier-one markets, but the named rival's model has accelerated four quarters running.
Financial position4/4 →
Net debt of 0.08 times EBITDA, nothing due before 2029, an undrawn billion-dollar facility, and every plan funded from operations.
Execution record3/4 ↓
Five straight beats, then a quarter below its own guided EBITDA floor and unflagged - one slip, not yet a pattern.
Per share capture4/4 →
Share count fell from 338 to 335 million in six months; buybacks ran 8.9 times stock compensation and no convertible exists.
Potential2/4 →
The pond is large and nothing in it is signed; the consumer route needs creative tools, data density and awareness it does not yet have.
Risk profile3/4 →
Several disclosed concentrations - mobile gaming, three distribution platforms, 67% voting control, a live class action - and none of them binary.
Valuation3/4 ↓
About 85% of a base-case fair value of about $480 at an 8% required return: fair, just inside the 20% margin of safety.
Evidence quality4/4 →
Both filings, both releases, the call and the proxy, six outside filers, and two outside measurers for the moat, the threat and the prize.
If it works 1.7× · if it fails you keep about 100%.
The Verdict
We rate AppLovin Neutral. It runs an automated ad broker for phone games and other apps, one of the most profitable businesses we cover. In June its growth nearly stalled and the shares halved; in September sales beat the top of its own forecast, settling the main doubt. Valued on growth that slows over ten years, the shares are worth about $480 against $384, just short of the 20% cushion we ask for. A rival catching up, growth nobody can schedule and two shareholder lawsuits keep us from accepting a thinner one. Another quarter like September would make it Attractive.
The long caseIf online shops follow game makers into AppLovin's auction, the same machine that matched games to players can sell their products to a billion daily users.
How we weighed it
The price against our value
Cuts both ways
Price at 85% of our value
The price is inside the margin of safety, with the bear case far below it.
The business
In its favour
Solid
An automated ad broker for apps, among the most profitable businesses we cover.
Growth against what the price assumes
In its favour
Growth returned above the company's own forecast after nearly stalling.
What could go wrong
Against it
A rival's ad business grew faster for a quarter, growth depends on research nobody can schedule, and two lawsuits are open.
Against competitors
In its favour
It is the cheapest of the rivals its own report names on the measure we price it by.
How its group is behaving
Cuts both ways
It sits in none of our ranked groups; advertising budgets and app spending move it.
The latest news and report
In its favour
The latest report beat the top of its own forecast, the test the case turned on.
The evidence under this - 14 claims
- The coverage names three objections at once and a software sell-off beside them, so the February fall cannot be pinned on the one objection this thesis is about.
- A recovery says the market changed its mind after the next print; it does not say the objection was wrong, and the same shares then halved again from 1 June.
- 2026-09-23editedMultiples refreshed with the pack on 23 September 2026, at a price 10.1% higher.
- It is the explanation most favourable to the company, offered by the company, for the first guidance-midpoint miss in its public history, and no filed document corroborates the timing of a model release.
- Bank of America had already flagged in July that new e-commerce sign-ups cooled in June, which is a demand-side account of the same quarter and is not what management describes.
- A complaint filed in September 2026 puts a competing account of the same quarter on the record: it alleges the constancy of the model improvement was overstated throughout a class period ending on the day of that print. It is an allegation and decides nothing, and it is the second named account of this quarter that is not management's.
- Unity's advertising segment, running on its rival model, grew 10.6% sequentially in the same quarter against AppLovin's 4.4% - a filed figure for a competitive account of the quarter, where the others are an analyst note and a pleading.
- The chief technology officer since 2020 stepped down on 1 July, the day the quarter closed; the handover was announced in April and the successor already ran engineering, so it explains nothing by itself, but management's account of the quarter does not mention it.
- 2026-09-21editedThe counter-evidence held one outside account of the quarter. A second class action now alleges the opposite of what management said about the model cadence, which belongs beside it.
- 2026-09-23editedTwo facts about the same quarter had not been read against the claim: a filed rival figure that grew faster, and a change of technical leadership on the day it closed.
- 2026-11-04editedtested by the Q3 2026 print: sales rose 13.6% sequentially and beat the guide, as the timing account predicts; stays a management claim until a second quarter confirms it
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the chief executive says the new model generation is in partial rollout and performing.
- AppLovin's revenue is 4.95 times Unity's whole segment and grew faster year on year in every one of the four quarters - 52.8% against 35.4% in the last.
- One quarter is one quarter: in the first quarter of 2026 Unity grew 4.0% sequentially against AppLovin's 11.1%, so the June reading may be Unity's own lumpiness as much as a shift.
- On sales it is the dearest of the same five at 16.2 times against a median of 8.75, so the answer inverts with the metric and the choice of metric is doing the work.
- A free cash flow multiple flatters a company whose free cash flow has just grown 58% and would look very different against the flat figure the bear case expects.
- 2026-09-23editedCohort refreshed with the pack on 23 September 2026: AppLovin still ranks cheapest, and the peer figures moved.
- The July fall came first and on a different cause - an analyst note flagging cooled e-commerce sign-ups in June - so the drawdown is at least two events and only one of them is the print.
- A stock priced at 54 times earnings does not need a large miss to lose a fifth of its value; the magnitude is a function of where the multiple started.
The consumer split is not disclosed (C65); if consumer sales are larger than assumed, the core is smaller and the option less free.
A run rate of advertiser spend is not revenue, which is spend less what publishers are paid, and 'much bigger' is not a figure; nothing filed corroborates either.
- One quarter: Q1 grew 11.1% and Q4 2025 18.0% sequentially before Q2's 4.4%, so the pace is volatile and the Q4 guide midpoint implies about 8.9% sequential growth, single digits again.
- Unity's September quarter, the check on whether a rival is catching up, was not yet reported.
The shares rose 44% in the two sessions after the results, from $271.75 on 2026-11-04, so the multiple moved more on the print than the cash did; the 331M share count is the release's end of quarter figure. By 9 November the shares were a further 4.8% higher than the 6 November close.
- 2026-11-09editedRe-struck at the 6 November close after the shares rose 44% on the results.
- 2026-11-10editedre-struck at the 9 November close, $410.00; trailing free cash flow and the share count did not move
Nothing is contracted (C19): if the model stalls again or Unity keeps outgrowing it (C58), growth of 10% and 5% after 2026 gives about $219. The base case's 25% for 2027 is below what the last quarter's 55% would suggest, so the value may understate a business that keeps compounding.
- 2026-11-09editedRe-struck on the upgraded method: every view read at 9%, the return on new capital set by the moat, and capital per dollar of sales read from the filings.
- 2026-11-09editedRe-struck at the 8% required return the owner chose after the roll-out screen: the market priced the median name on the roster at about 7.7%, so 9% on top of a 20% margin read most of it Unattractive.
- 2026-11-09editedRe-struck on the decaying fade the owner chose on 9 November: after the stated path each year closes 30% of the gap to 4%, and an analysts' margin is cut by their gap to the filed operating profit.
- 2026-11-10editedprice re-read at the 9 November close, $410.00; the inputs and the $508 base case did not move
- 2026-11-10editedre-valued on the owner's rules of 10 November: the return on new capital glides to its terminal level over years six to ten
The company
App developers find new players through advertisements shown inside other people's games. AppLovin runs the auction that places them.
An advertiser tells it what return it needs. Its software then decides which advertisement each player sees, and at what price. Without it, the advertiser buys by hand on Meta, Google or Unity and guesses the price itself. After paying for the computers, AppLovin keeps about 88 cents of every dollar it charges.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
How it makes money
It is paid for each advertisement it places. No advertiser is under contract, so every dollar has to be won again at the next auction. What brings advertisers back is results, and the results are what the auction's model produces.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
Where the money comes from, stream by stream
| Stream | Share of sales (Q2 2026) | How it earns it |
|---|---|---|
| Advertising, United States users | 51.4% | Fees from advertisers whose campaigns Axon bids and clears, net of what publishers are paid, for ads shown to users in the United States. |
| Advertising, rest of the world | 48.6% | The same auction fees for ads shown to users outside the United States. |
| Other services (Adjust measurement, Wurl) | not material, per the 10-Q | Measurement and streaming-TV tools sold alongside the auction; the filing says their revenue is not material and gives no figure. |
Who runs it
Adam Foroughi co-founded AppLovin and has run it since 2011; Matthew Stumpf has run finance since 2024, and a new technology chief took over in July. Insiders own about an eighth of the company and, through extra-vote shares, control it. Executives get no cash bonus: their pay is shares that vest within a year, sized at the board's judgement rather than against any target.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The change was announced on 7 April, three months ahead, and the successor had already run the engineering and product teams for seven months, so the title moved on 1 July but the person running the work did not.
- A transition in the quarter the research output slipped is a coincidence of timing until something connects them, and management gave no such connection on the call; it is recorded because the ledger's timing account had never been read against it.
- The chief executive sells about 100,000 shares each window at his own discretion and no insider bought in the year (C41), so the stake is shrinking slowly rather than growing.
- Of the other large insider holdings, a director's 6,963,289 Class A shares include 550,000 pledged under a prepaid variable forward due in May 2027.
- 2026-09-23editedRe-sourced from the 2026 proxy, which gives the voting-agreement percentage at 31 March 2026 rather than the annual report's year-end figure.
- The committee states it sizes each year's grant on the past year's company and individual performance, so the rewards are tied to results, but by discretion rather than to any stated metric.
- The 2023 performance units, which paid on the share price alone, were fully earned in 2024 and created most of the executives' wealth, so the stake already held matters more than the annual grant.
Why it wins, and who could beat it
Why customers come back
AppLovin sits on both sides of the same auction, so every advertiser's results train the model that serves all the others: the more it places, the better it places.
The evidence comes from outside the company. AppsFlyer, which measures app installs for its own clients, ranked it first in North America and Western Europe in December 2025, and it earns the highest margin of the five rivals its annual report names.
The evidence under this - 4 claims
- The index ranks media sources by installs AppsFlyer's own clients attribute to them, ordinally and with a weighting it does not publish, so it says where AppLovin stands and not by how much.
- Its latest edition predates the June 2026 quarter, so it describes the moat before the stall and cannot say whether the stall moved it.
The threat
Unity rebuilt its own model. Its advertising business has sped up every quarter since, reaching 35% growth in June. That quarter it also grew faster than AppLovin from one quarter to the next, although from a base a fifth the size.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Unity's own MD&A attributes the increase to the Vector migration and says the IronSource Ad Network declined, so the Vector-exposed network grew faster than 2.4% and a second, shrinking network masked it.
- Unity Vector shipped in the first quarter of 2025, so a full-year comparison contains three quarters of it at most and the exit rate is not readable from an annual figure.
- The year is no longer the reading: the same segment grew 35.4% year on year by June 2026 and outgrew AppLovin sequentially in that quarter (C58), so 2.4% measured the model's first year rather than what it produces.
- 2026-09-23editedThe counter-evidence said the Vector-exposed network was masked by a shrinking one; Unity's 2026 quarters now show the masking lifting, which belongs beside the annual figure.
- AppLovin's revenue is 4.95 times Unity's whole segment and grew faster year on year in every one of the four quarters - 52.8% against 35.4% in the last.
- One quarter is one quarter: in the first quarter of 2026 Unity grew 4.0% sequentially against AppLovin's 11.1%, so the June reading may be Unity's own lumpiness as much as a shift.
The rivals: U, GOOGL, GOOGL, META, APPS, AMZN, and 1 more that is private, in-house or listed abroad.
Who else does this, rival by rival
| Ticker | Rival | Where it competes | How far along | Priced against it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| U | Unity Software (Unity Vector)Priced against it: Yes | AppLovin Ads for mobile-game advertisers, bid by Axon | On sale | Yes |
| GOOGL | Alphabet (Performance Max)Priced against it: Yes | AppLovin Ads for web and e-commerce advertisers, the consumer vertical | On sale | Yes |
| Alphabet (AdMob mediation) | MAX, the publisher-side in-app bidding auction | On sale | ||
| META | Meta (self-service performance ads)Priced against it: Yes | AppLovin Ads for web and e-commerce advertisers, the consumer vertical | On sale | Yes |
| APPS | Digital TurbinePriced against it: Yes | AppLovin Ads for mobile-game advertisers, bid by Axon | On sale | Yes |
| Private | MolocoPriced against it: Private | AppLovin Ads for mobile-game advertisers, bid by Axon | On sale | Private |
| AMZN | Amazon.comPriced against it: Shown, not counted | - | On sale | Shown, not counted |
How big it could get
How big this could get
Americans spent $162B on advertising bought by automatic auction in 2025, up 20.5%, while advertising sold by negotiation shrank. AppLovin's American sales are 1.7% of that pool. Nobody measures its share of phone-game advertising itself.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- AppLovin's geographic split is by user location, not by where the advertiser buys, so a US impression sold to a foreign advertiser counts here and may not count in the IAB survey the same way.
- IAB's programmatic line excludes search but includes social, and Meta and Alphabet own most of the latter, so the pond an independent bidder can actually reach is smaller than 1.74% implies.
The results
The numbers
Sales grew 70% in the year to Dec 2025, slower than the 75% in the year before.
Operating margin is 76%, up from −1.7% in the year to Dec 2022.
Running costs take 12¢ of each sales dollar, down from 59¢ in the year to Dec 2021.
Each dollar put into the business earns 70% a year after tax, up from 3.4% in the year to Dec 2021.
The business brought in $3.97B of cash from operations, 72% of sales, before capital spending, which the filer does not tag.
It owes $1.03B more than the cash it holds, about 0.3 years of the cash its operations bring in.
The share count barely moved in 4.0 years, and pay in shares costs 3.9% of sales.
All the numbers
Filed figures from the company's 10-K and 10-Q, read 2026-11-10. Fiscal years end in December.
| Dec 2021 | Dec 2022 | Dec 2023 | Dec 2024 | Dec 2025 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Size and growth | |||||
| Sales | $2.79B | $2.82B | $1.84B | $3.22B | $5.48B |
| Sales growth | +92% | +0.9% | −35% | +75% | +70% |
| Profit | |||||
| Gross margin | 65% | 55% | 81% | 84% | 88% |
| Operating margin | 5.4% | −1.7% | 42% | 59% | 76% |
| Net margin | 1.3% | −6.8% | 19% | 49% | 61% |
| What growth costs, per sales dollar | |||||
| Research and development | 13% | 18% | 18% | 12% | 4.1% |
| Sales and marketing | 40% | 33% | 12% | 7.8% | 3.7% |
| General and admin | 5.7% | 6.4% | 8.2% | 5.1% | 4.3% |
| Pay in shares | 4.8% | 6.8% | 20% | 12% | 3.9% |
| Capital spending | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.2% | 0.1% | - |
| Cash | |||||
| Cash from operations | $362M | $413M | $1.06B | $2.10B | $3.97B |
| Free cash flow | $360M | $412M | $1.06B | $2.09B | - |
| Balance sheet | |||||
| Cash and short-term investments | $1.52B | $1.08B | $502M | $697M | $2.49B |
| Debt | $3.25B | $3.25B | $3.34B | $3.51B | $3.51B |
| Net cash | −$1.73B | −$2.16B | −$2.83B | −$2.81B | −$1.03B |
| Returns and shares | |||||
| Return on capital | 3.4% | - | 14% | 41% | 70% |
| Shares (diluted) | 343M | 372M | 363M | 348M | 342M |
What growth costs
Growth has made AppLovin far more profitable: sales nearly tripled in two years while its costs barely moved, so each new dollar of sales costs much less to win. Computing power is the one cost that rises with sales. Part of the drop was smaller stock awards, and those are climbing again.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Most of 2025's 40% fall in research and development was a $151.1 million drop in stock-based payroll costs, not fewer engineers doing more, and research stock pay quadrupled year on year in the June 2026 quarter (C34).
- The three years are the advertising business restated without the Apps business; the numbers card's 2021 and 2022 columns still carry the games and are a different company.
- The same call says a materially larger model would be pushed live regardless, so the ratio is a policy the company can abandon in a quarter rather than a constraint on it.
- Cost of revenue rose 46% year on year against revenue growth of 53%, which is consistent with the ratio and does not isolate compute from the rest of network infrastructure.
The last report (4 Nov)
Quarter ended September 2026, filed figures.
Sales grew 55% to $2.19B and 13.6% from the June quarter, against 4.4% a quarter earlier, and landed above the top of the company's forecast. Operating profit was 78 cents of every sales dollar and earnings per share were $4.30.
The company bought back $1.4B of shares and guided the December quarter to $2.37B to $2.40B. On the call it said a larger prediction model is partly rolled out and already in that guide, along with higher computer costs.
What it did to the thesisThis is the test the case turned on, and it came in on the supporting side: growth returned and beat the company's own forecast, as management said it would. One quarter does not remove the rival and lawsuit risks; conviction rose to medium.
The quarter in detail
Sales growth from the previous quarter, filed figures. The company has restated its own history, so a quarter either side of the restatement may describe a different business; n/c marks one that does not compare.
Earnings per share $4.30 against $4.03 expected.
The evidence under this - 7 claims
- Adjusted EBITDA is a different matter and does carry add-backs: $1,613,823 thousand for Q2 2026 against $1,494,277 thousand of income from operations, the difference being mostly $85,783 thousand of stock compensation.
- The August 2025 print had adjusted EPS of $2.26 against a filed $2.39, so the two series have not always agreed - though that gap ran in the shareholder's favour.
- The July fall came first and on a different cause - an analyst note flagging cooled e-commerce sign-ups in June - so the drawdown is at least two events and only one of them is the print.
- A stock priced at 54 times earnings does not need a large miss to lose a fifth of its value; the magnitude is a function of where the multiple started.
- One quarter: Q1 grew 11.1% and Q4 2025 18.0% sequentially before Q2's 4.4%, so the pace is volatile and the Q4 guide midpoint implies about 8.9% sequential growth, single digits again.
- Unity's September quarter, the check on whether a rival is catching up, was not yet reported.
- It is the explanation most favourable to the company, offered by the company, for the first guidance-midpoint miss in its public history, and no filed document corroborates the timing of a model release.
- Bank of America had already flagged in July that new e-commerce sign-ups cooled in June, which is a demand-side account of the same quarter and is not what management describes.
- A complaint filed in September 2026 puts a competing account of the same quarter on the record: it alleges the constancy of the model improvement was overstated throughout a class period ending on the day of that print. It is an allegation and decides nothing, and it is the second named account of this quarter that is not management's.
- Unity's advertising segment, running on its rival model, grew 10.6% sequentially in the same quarter against AppLovin's 4.4% - a filed figure for a competitive account of the quarter, where the others are an analyst note and a pleading.
- The chief technology officer since 2020 stepped down on 1 July, the day the quarter closed; the handover was announced in April and the successor already ran engineering, so it explains nothing by itself, but management's account of the quarter does not mention it.
- 2026-09-21editedThe counter-evidence held one outside account of the quarter. A second class action now alleges the opposite of what management said about the model cadence, which belongs beside it.
- 2026-09-23editedTwo facts about the same quarter had not been read against the claim: a filed rival figure that grew faster, and a change of technical leadership on the day it closed.
- 2026-11-04editedtested by the Q3 2026 print: sales rose 13.6% sequentially and beat the guide, as the timing account predicts; stays a management claim until a second quarter confirms it
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the chief executive says the new model generation is in partial rollout and performing.
- 2026-11-04editedthe Q3 guide resolved above its top; the Q4 guide from the Q3 release added
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the chief financial officer says the December guide already includes live model updates, normal seasonality and higher data-centre cost.
What management did with the money
It bought back shares, cutting the count from 338 to 335 million in six months while spending 8.9 times what it paid staff in stock. Borrowings are covered almost entirely by cash.
Insiders in 2026Q2: 9 purchases and 180 sales, from their Form 4 filings.
The evidence under this - 2 claims
- 2026-10-04editedThe 2025 figure said 6.4 million shares were retired for $2.58 billion; the release (S04) says 'repurchased and withheld', and the 10-K equity note (S01) gives 5,511,519 shares repurchased and retired for $2.2 billion, the rest being shares withheld for employees' taxes.
- The denominator is adjusted EBITDA, which adds back $169,252 thousand of stock compensation in the half; on income from operations the same net debt is a higher multiple, though still under 0.1 times.
- The trailing figure spans the Apps divestiture, so the FY2025 component includes a company AppLovin no longer owns - the same perimeter problem the pack refuses to compute a revenue figure across.
The price, and where we disagree
In short. Fair. After the jump on the results, the price is about 85% of what we think the business is worth.
The question the case turned on has now been answered once. In September AppLovin's sales beat the top of its own range, which is what a timing stall predicts. The last time the shares halved, in February, the next results sent them back up within four months.
What is left to prove is repetition: the December quarter is guided to $2.37B to $2.40B, and Unity's September quarter is not yet out.
Underneath, the market keeps moving its way: advertising bought by automatic auction grew 20.5% in 2025, while the negotiated kind shrank 13.9%.
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The coverage names three objections at once and a software sell-off beside them, so the February fall cannot be pinned on the one objection this thesis is about.
- A recovery says the market changed its mind after the next print; it does not say the objection was wrong, and the same shares then halved again from 1 June.
- 2026-11-04editedthe Q3 guide resolved above its top; the Q4 guide from the Q3 release added
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the chief financial officer says the December guide already includes live model updates, normal seasonality and higher data-centre cost.
- It is the explanation most favourable to the company, offered by the company, for the first guidance-midpoint miss in its public history, and no filed document corroborates the timing of a model release.
- Bank of America had already flagged in July that new e-commerce sign-ups cooled in June, which is a demand-side account of the same quarter and is not what management describes.
- A complaint filed in September 2026 puts a competing account of the same quarter on the record: it alleges the constancy of the model improvement was overstated throughout a class period ending on the day of that print. It is an allegation and decides nothing, and it is the second named account of this quarter that is not management's.
- Unity's advertising segment, running on its rival model, grew 10.6% sequentially in the same quarter against AppLovin's 4.4% - a filed figure for a competitive account of the quarter, where the others are an analyst note and a pleading.
- The chief technology officer since 2020 stepped down on 1 July, the day the quarter closed; the handover was announced in April and the successor already ran engineering, so it explains nothing by itself, but management's account of the quarter does not mention it.
- 2026-09-21editedThe counter-evidence held one outside account of the quarter. A second class action now alleges the opposite of what management said about the model cadence, which belongs beside it.
- 2026-09-23editedTwo facts about the same quarter had not been read against the claim: a filed rival figure that grew faster, and a change of technical leadership on the day it closed.
- 2026-11-04editedtested by the Q3 2026 print: sales rose 13.6% sequentially and beat the guide, as the timing account predicts; stays a management claim until a second quarter confirms it
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the chief executive says the new model generation is in partial rollout and performing.
- One quarter: Q1 grew 11.1% and Q4 2025 18.0% sequentially before Q2's 4.4%, so the pace is volatile and the Q4 guide midpoint implies about 8.9% sequential growth, single digits again.
- Unity's September quarter, the check on whether a rival is catching up, was not yet reported.
How we value it
- Method
- Cash the business will produce, in three stages
- Required return
- 8%
- Long-run growth
- 4%
- Moat
- An average moat
| Bear | Base | Bull | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | 49%, 10%, 5% | 49%, 25%, 20% | 49%, 32%, 28% |
| Normal operating margin | 65% | 75% | 80% |
| Return on new capital after year ten | 8% | 12% | 15% |
| Value a share | $219 | $480 | $696 |
- Price
- $410
- Priced on
- 9 Nov
- Price as a share of the base value
- 85%
- Starting growth the price pays for
- 33%
- Yearly return the price offers on the base case
- 8.7%
Where each figure comes from
| Figure | Source | Where exactly |
|---|---|---|
| Sales, the last full year | Filed report | Annual report (10-K) for the period to 31 Dec 2025, filed 19 Feb 2026; the full year. |
| Operating margin today | Filed report | Annual report (10-K) for the period to 31 Dec 2025, filed 19 Feb 2026; the full year. |
| Tax rate | Filed report | Annual report (10-K) for the period to 31 Dec 2025, filed 19 Feb 2026; the full year. |
| Sales per dollar of new capital | Filed report | Annual report (10-K) for the period to 31 Dec 2025, filed 19 Feb 2026: the year's sales over its operating capital, held to between 0.5 and 6. |
| Shares | Filed report | Annual report (10-K) for the period to 31 Dec 2025, filed 19 Feb 2026; the diluted share count. |
| Cash and investments | Filed report | Read by hand from the filed statements; the period it was read from was not recorded. |
| Debt | Filed report | Annual report (10-K) for the period to 31 Dec 2025, filed 19 Feb 2026; the balance sheet on that date. |
| Sales growth, years 1 to 3 | Our judgement | Our reading of the evidence, set against the company's guidance; the base case below says where it follows it and where it departs. FMP's consensus of 17 to 24 analysts read 51.4%, 26.5%, 21.6%. |
| Normal operating margin | Our judgement | Our reading of the evidence; each case below names it. FMP's consensus, less stock pay, read 70%. |
| Return on new capital after year ten | Our method's rule | Set by our reading of the moat: the 8% rate with none, 12% with an average one, 15% with a strong one; the bear case earns the rate. |
| The bear and bull cases | Our judgement | Our reading of the evidence; each case below names it. |
| Price | Market price | FMP's closing price on 9 Nov 2026. |
What each case rests on
Bear caseNo advertiser is under contract (C19), so a model that stalls again or Unity outgrowing it holds growth to 10% and 5% after 2026, the margin falls to 65%, and new capital earns only 9%.
Base case2026 grows 49% to about $8.2B: nine months reported and the Q4 guide of $2,365M to $2,395M (C24, C69); then 25% and 20% as e-commerce ads add to gaming, below the 55% of the September quarter; the operating margin stays near 75%, about 2025's 75.8% and under the 78.2% of Q3.
Bull caseE-commerce ads keep compounding at 32% and 28%, near the analysts' path, on about $0.10 of compute per extra dollar of revenue (C26), and the margin reaches 80%.
What moves the base value
| Lower | Higher | |
|---|---|---|
| Growth in years 1 to 3, a quarter lower or higher | $375 | $607 |
| The normal margin, 15% lower or higher | $412 | $548 |
| Capital per dollar of growth, a quarter more or less | $478 | $481 |
| Return on new capital after year ten, at the rate or one step up | $383 | $519 |
| The rate, a point higher or lower | $384 | $640 |
| Long-run growth a point lower | $433 | - |
Value a share as growth and margin change
| Normal margin ↓ · growth → | 50% | 75% | 100% | 125% | 150% |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 60% | $236 | $305 | $389 | $492 | $616 |
| 67.5% | $263 | $340 | $435 | $550 | $689 |
| 75% | $290 | $375 | $480 | $607 | $762 |
| 82.5% | $317 | $410 | $525 | $665 | $835 |
| 90% | $344 | $445 | $571 | $723 | $907 |
Growth is shown as a share of the base case's. Green: the price is at or under 80% of that value. Red: at or over 120%.
How we read the multiple
Buyers pay about 27.8 times the spare cash AppLovin produced over the last twelve months, a 3.6% yearly return against 1.8% normally, after the shares rose 44% in two days.
Valued on growth that starts near 49% and slows to 4% over ten years, the shares are worth about $480. The price is about 85% of that: just inside our 20% margin of safety.
Against its own history. Far cheaper than this company has ever been, while the business is bigger and more profitable than it was, so the cheapness is not decay.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
The shares rose 44% in the two sessions after the results, from $271.75 on 2026-11-04, so the multiple moved more on the print than the cash did; the 331M share count is the release's end of quarter figure. By 9 November the shares were a further 4.8% higher than the 6 November close.
- 2026-11-09editedRe-struck at the 6 November close after the shares rose 44% on the results.
- 2026-11-10editedre-struck at the 9 November close, $410.00; trailing free cash flow and the share count did not move
Nothing is contracted (C19): if the model stalls again or Unity keeps outgrowing it (C58), growth of 10% and 5% after 2026 gives about $219. The base case's 25% for 2027 is below what the last quarter's 55% would suggest, so the value may understate a business that keeps compounding.
- 2026-11-09editedRe-struck on the upgraded method: every view read at 9%, the return on new capital set by the moat, and capital per dollar of sales read from the filings.
- 2026-11-09editedRe-struck at the 8% required return the owner chose after the roll-out screen: the market priced the median name on the roster at about 7.7%, so 9% on top of a 20% margin read most of it Unattractive.
- 2026-11-09editedRe-struck on the decaying fade the owner chose on 9 November: after the stated path each year closes 30% of the gap to 4%, and an analysts' margin is cut by their gap to the filed operating profit.
- 2026-11-10editedprice re-read at the 9 November close, $410.00; the inputs and the $508 base case did not move
- 2026-11-10editedre-valued on the owner's rules of 10 November: the return on new capital glides to its terminal level over years six to ten
- 2026-09-23editedMultiples refreshed with the pack on 23 September 2026, at a price 10.1% higher.
- On sales it is the dearest of the same five at 16.2 times against a median of 8.75, so the answer inverts with the metric and the choice of metric is doing the work.
- A free cash flow multiple flatters a company whose free cash flow has just grown 58% and would look very different against the flat figure the bear case expects.
- 2026-09-23editedCohort refreshed with the pack on 23 September 2026: AppLovin still ranks cheapest, and the peer figures moved.
- Free cash flow is a trailing figure struck before the compute step-up management has already put into guidance, so the denominator may be about to stop growing at the rate that makes the multiple look low.
- A cheap multiple on a business whose central input is unpredictable research output is exactly what a value trap looks like from the outside, and the last six quarters of multiple compression are the market saying so.
- 2026-09-23editedRefreshed with the pack on 23 September 2026.
- 2026-11-09editedRe-struck at the 6 November close after the results lifted the shares 44%; what the price assumes is now read off the three-stage fair value.
- 2026-11-04editedthe Q3 guide resolved above its top; the Q4 guide from the Q3 release added
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the chief financial officer says the December guide already includes live model updates, normal seasonality and higher data-centre cost.
Priced against its rivals
The competitors its own annual report names, each confirmed against the rival's filing. Measured on price for each $1 of spare cash, cheapest first:
| Ticker | Company | price for each $1 of spare cash |
|---|---|---|
| APP | AppLovin | 24.5× |
| U | Unity Software | 35.0× |
| META | Meta Platforms | 45.8× |
| APPS | Digital Turbine | 69.6× |
| GOOGL | Alphabet | 79.1× |
| AMZN | Amazon.com not in the median | not meaningful |
The middle of the other 4 is 57.7. Amazon.com, Inc. competes with it in one product line inside a much bigger company, so its price says little about this business and it is not counted in the middle. AppLovin Corporation is cheapest of 5.
Rivals' figures come from a data provider, so read the spread of the group rather than any single pair.
The cheapest of the rivals its own report names, on the measure this thesis prices it by. That position is its own, not the group's.
Private or foreign rivals that cannot be priced: Moloco, Voodoo, various private companies.
The bet: what it pays if it works
The bet is on adverts for online shops, opened to every advertiser only in June and not reported apart from games, so the game adverts and the publisher auction are counted separately, at the price per dollar of spare cash this thesis would call neutral.
Counted that way, the game business alone is worth more than the whole company today. If shops sign up as management hopes, they add less than double on top; if they stay with Meta and Google, nothing is lost on them.
| AppLovin Ads for web and e-commerce advertisers, the consumer vertical revenue in two to three years | Consumer advertisers needed | At the stated multiple |
|---|---|---|
| $3.00B (the big win) | about 85.7K at 50% kept | 1.7× |
| $6.00B | about 171.4K at 50% kept | 2.3× |
To pay 2× (a Fair bet) it would need about $4.32B of AppLovin Ads for web and e-commerce advertisers, the consumer vertical revenue (about 123.3K consumer advertisers at 50% kept); to pay 5× (a Cheap bet), about $19.92B of AppLovin Ads for web and e-commerce advertisers, the consumer vertical revenue (about 569.1K consumer advertisers at 50% kept), at the same multiple.
Each row is AppLovin Ads for web and e-commerce advertisers, the consumer vertical alone, plus the rest of the company (Gaming ads and MAX) counted at about $140.00B.
The steps it has to take
- Done Consumer platform opened to all advertisers
- Done Consumer spend above its December-quarter peak
- In progress Self-serve advertisers beyond the mid-market due 2027-06
- Not started Consumer sales quantified in a filing or release due 2027-12
The detail behind the label
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- The claim is the company reporting what its own customers tell it, on the one subject where a seller has the strongest reason to be optimistic, and no third-party spend data corroborates it.
- An analyst put the same question the other way - whether the merchants saying this are a positively biased sample - and management did not produce a figure in reply.
A run rate of advertiser spend is not revenue, which is spend less what publishers are paid, and 'much bigger' is not a figure; nothing filed corroborates either.
The figure comes from the first, referral-chosen cohort; management itself says small shops struggle to reach their goals (C46), so later advertisers may spend less.
The consumer split is not disclosed (C65); if consumer sales are larger than assumed, the core is smaller and the option less free.
- Management said the same thing about creative a quarter earlier, when the self-service funnel converted 57% of qualified leads and lack of creative was named as the leak - so the gap has been open for at least two quarters with no shipped fix.
- Conceding that the long tail does not work today is also the most disarming way to present it, and no third party has measured how much of the addressable merchant base the mid-market actually is.
- The gap management concedes is what a September 2026 complaint alleges was understated: that the generative video creative feature faced significant development delays making release on the stated timeline unlikely. Conceding a hurdle and being accused of understating it are different claims about the same feature, and only the first is on the record as fact.
- 2026-09-21editedA new complaint alleges the creative delay this claim records as a conceded hurdle was understated, which is the counter-account the field was missing.
Where we disagree with the market
The model improvements have run out, and the promised 30% a year was a story.
June was mostly timing: the marketplace still grew and consumer spending set a record.
The market priced the June stall as permanent: shares far below their December high, three brokers cutting within a week, and fewer analysts positive than in May. The September quarter, above the top of the company's range, is the first evidence against that.
The case against us is real, and we found it by reading both companies' filings quarter by quarter. Unity grew 10.6% from the quarter before while AppLovin grew 4.4% in June; Unity's September quarter is not out, and no insider bought after the fall.
What analysts say, and the evidence
The evidence under this - 5 claims
- It is the explanation most favourable to the company, offered by the company, for the first guidance-midpoint miss in its public history, and no filed document corroborates the timing of a model release.
- Bank of America had already flagged in July that new e-commerce sign-ups cooled in June, which is a demand-side account of the same quarter and is not what management describes.
- A complaint filed in September 2026 puts a competing account of the same quarter on the record: it alleges the constancy of the model improvement was overstated throughout a class period ending on the day of that print. It is an allegation and decides nothing, and it is the second named account of this quarter that is not management's.
- Unity's advertising segment, running on its rival model, grew 10.6% sequentially in the same quarter against AppLovin's 4.4% - a filed figure for a competitive account of the quarter, where the others are an analyst note and a pleading.
- The chief technology officer since 2020 stepped down on 1 July, the day the quarter closed; the handover was announced in April and the successor already ran engineering, so it explains nothing by itself, but management's account of the quarter does not mention it.
- 2026-09-21editedThe counter-evidence held one outside account of the quarter. A second class action now alleges the opposite of what management said about the model cadence, which belongs beside it.
- 2026-09-23editedTwo facts about the same quarter had not been read against the claim: a filed rival figure that grew faster, and a change of technical leadership on the day it closed.
- 2026-11-04editedtested by the Q3 2026 print: sales rose 13.6% sequentially and beat the guide, as the timing account predicts; stays a management claim until a second quarter confirms it
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the chief executive says the new model generation is in partial rollout and performing.
- Both figures are stated on the call and appear in no filing, so neither can be checked against a filed number; the CFO had to correct the CEO from 26% to 28% live on the call.
- A publisher marketplace growing is consistent with AppLovin losing share inside a growing market, since the statistic measures the pond rather than the catch.
- The competitive explanation now has a filed figure behind it: Unity's segment grew 10.6% sequentially in the quarter these two figures describe (C58).
- 2026-09-23editedThe claim argued its two figures tell against a competitive explanation; a named rival's filing for the same quarter now argues for one.
- The July fall came first and on a different cause - an analyst note flagging cooled e-commerce sign-ups in June - so the drawdown is at least two events and only one of them is the print.
- A stock priced at 54 times earnings does not need a large miss to lose a fifth of its value; the magnitude is a function of where the multiple started.
- AppLovin's revenue is 4.95 times Unity's whole segment and grew faster year on year in every one of the four quarters - 52.8% against 35.4% in the last.
- One quarter is one quarter: in the first quarter of 2026 Unity grew 4.0% sequentially against AppLovin's 11.1%, so the June reading may be Unity's own lumpiness as much as a shift.
- 2026-09-23editedPrice refreshed with the pack on 23 September 2026.
What could go wrong, and how we would know
The risks
- Demand, not timing. An outside analyst flagged cooling e-commerce sign-ups a month before the results.
- A rival catching up. Unity's advertising business outgrew AppLovin's from one quarter to the next in June; its September quarter is not out yet.
- Growth nobody can schedule. The engine is research output, and management said as much on the call.
- Two shareholder lawsuits. The newer one says the company overstated how steadily its models improved.
- A gap in the new business. The e-commerce side still cannot make the video advertisements its smaller customers need.
The evidence under this - 6 claims
- It is the explanation most favourable to the company, offered by the company, for the first guidance-midpoint miss in its public history, and no filed document corroborates the timing of a model release.
- Bank of America had already flagged in July that new e-commerce sign-ups cooled in June, which is a demand-side account of the same quarter and is not what management describes.
- A complaint filed in September 2026 puts a competing account of the same quarter on the record: it alleges the constancy of the model improvement was overstated throughout a class period ending on the day of that print. It is an allegation and decides nothing, and it is the second named account of this quarter that is not management's.
- Unity's advertising segment, running on its rival model, grew 10.6% sequentially in the same quarter against AppLovin's 4.4% - a filed figure for a competitive account of the quarter, where the others are an analyst note and a pleading.
- The chief technology officer since 2020 stepped down on 1 July, the day the quarter closed; the handover was announced in April and the successor already ran engineering, so it explains nothing by itself, but management's account of the quarter does not mention it.
- 2026-09-21editedThe counter-evidence held one outside account of the quarter. A second class action now alleges the opposite of what management said about the model cadence, which belongs beside it.
- 2026-09-23editedTwo facts about the same quarter had not been read against the claim: a filed rival figure that grew faster, and a change of technical leadership on the day it closed.
- 2026-11-04editedtested by the Q3 2026 print: sales rose 13.6% sequentially and beat the guide, as the timing account predicts; stays a management claim until a second quarter confirms it
- 2026-11-05editedQ3 call read: the chief executive says the new model generation is in partial rollout and performing.
- The July fall came first and on a different cause - an analyst note flagging cooled e-commerce sign-ups in June - so the drawdown is at least two events and only one of them is the print.
- A stock priced at 54 times earnings does not need a large miss to lose a fifth of its value; the magnitude is a function of where the multiple started.
- Nothing is contracted behind it - see the absence of any long-term client agreement - so it is an aspiration about an auction that is re-run every day.
- Three brokers cut the stock within a week of the print citing exactly this: diminished visibility into whether the 30% trajectory is sustainable.
- 2026-09-21editedThe claim counted one class action. A second was filed in September 2026 on different allegations, so a claim naming one had become false.
- Management said the same thing about creative a quarter earlier, when the self-service funnel converted 57% of qualified leads and lack of creative was named as the leak - so the gap has been open for at least two quarters with no shipped fix.
- Conceding that the long tail does not work today is also the most disarming way to present it, and no third party has measured how much of the addressable merchant base the mid-market actually is.
- The gap management concedes is what a September 2026 complaint alleges was understated: that the generative video creative feature faced significant development delays making release on the stated timeline unlikely. Conceding a hurdle and being accused of understating it are different claims about the same feature, and only the first is on the record as fact.
- 2026-09-21editedA new complaint alleges the creative delay this claim records as a conceded hurdle was understated, which is the counter-account the field was missing.
- AppLovin's revenue is 4.95 times Unity's whole segment and grew faster year on year in every one of the four quarters - 52.8% against 35.4% in the last.
- One quarter is one quarter: in the first quarter of 2026 Unity grew 4.0% sequentially against AppLovin's 11.1%, so the June reading may be Unity's own lumpiness as much as a shift.
What we still do not know
- AppLovin's share of phone-game advertising. Nobody publishes it, so its lead has to be read from a rival's accounts.
- How big the e-commerce business is. It is not reported separately, yet it carries much of the growth case.
The evidence under this - 3 claims
- Meta and Alphabet each sell more performance advertising than both of them together, so 'largest' holds only among the companies whose whole business is bidding on somebody else's inventory.
- Moloco and Voodoo are private and file nothing, so the denominator of any share statement is unknowable from filings alone.
- The claim is the company reporting what its own customers tell it, on the one subject where a seller has the strongest reason to be optimistic, and no third-party spend data corroborates it.
- An analyst put the same question the other way - whether the merchants saying this are a positively biased sample - and management did not produce a figure in reply.
What would change our view
- Neutral→AttractiveThe price falls 20% under fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price falls to about $384, 80% of what we think the business is worth.about $383.45 today, -8% below the last close
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe stall turns out to be the model
It needs any of:
- ○A fourth quarter with sales growth from the quarter before below 7%.checked at the next results, due in Feb 2027
- ○December-quarter sales below the $2.37B the company promised as its floor.checked at the next results, due in Feb 2027
- ○The accounting lawsuit survives the company's request to dismiss it.watched as it happens
- ○Unity's advertising business outgrows AppLovin's from one quarter to the next for a second quarter running.checked at the next results, due in Feb 2027
- Neutral→UnattractiveThe price runs 20% above fair value
It needs:
- ○The share price rises to about $576, 20% above what we think the business is worth.about $576.65 today, 62% above the last close
We would also be wrong if
- Operating profit falls below 70 cents in the dollar because computing costs rise faster than sales.
What is coming
- 16 November 2026 Lead plaintiff deadline in the second securities class action: Who leads the 2026 class-period case; a ruling on the first case's long-briefed motion to dismiss may come at any time.
Every dated event ahead
- 16 November 2026 Lead plaintiff deadline in the second securities class action: Who leads the 2026 class-period case; a ruling on the first case's long-briefed motion to dismiss may come at any time.
- 30 November 2026 Unity's Q3 2026 results: Whether Unity's advertising segment outgrows AppLovin sequentially a second quarter, the competitive reading of June against the timing one.
- December 2026 AppsFlyer Performance Index, next edition: Whether an outside measurer still ranks AppLovin first in tier-one markets after a year of Unity's acceleration.
- February 2027 Q4 2026 results: Revenue against the $2,365-2,395 million guide and whether sequential growth holds at 7% or better, the second proof of the timing account.
- February 2027 FY2026 10-K and the 2027 guide: A full year of the advertising-only company, the first trailing figure free of the restatement, and the 2027 guide against the 30% compounding claim.
Since we wrote this
- 10 NovPrice moveNeutral: priced at 81% of a value near $508The price rose past route P1: 81% of the three-stage value is inside the 20% margin of safety, so the view moves to Neutral.
- 9 NovThesis reviewStill Attractive: priced at 77% of a value near $508Re-valued in three stages at an 8% return, the method now drawn on every thesis: the price sits more than 20% under the base case.
- 6 NovBet moveBet re-struck: Asymmetric to Safe, little upsideRe-priced at the 5 November close; the rating moved from Fair bet to Expensive bet.
- 5 NovEarningsCall: new model rolling out, inside the December guideManagement says the larger model is live in part and already in the guide; the repeat in December is the test. Attractive and Medium hold.
- 4 NovEarningsSales beat the guide; conviction rises to mediumSales grew 13.6% from June and beat the top of the forecast, as the timing account said; Unity and the lawsuit stay open.
- 12 OctBet moveBet re-struck: Safe, little upside to AsymmetricRe-priced at the 9 October close; the rating moved from Expensive bet to Fair bet.
- 11 OctThesis reviewOnline shop ads declared an early line, with a bet on themThe owner asked every thesis to name the lines its story rides; the consumer business carries assumption A2 and is not reported apart.
- 5 OctThesis reviewThe long case now sits under the verdictAfter the five-name pilot, the owner asked for the long case on every thesis.
- 4 OctThesis reviewOwner's checklist: revenue streams, cost of growth, management, catalystsThe owner's checklist found the method silent on who runs the company, what growth costs, where the money comes from and what is dated ahead; this pass fills those four blocks from the proxy and filings.
- 23 SepThesis reviewConviction cut from Medium to LowUnity's advertising business, the rival the moat is measured against, has sped up every quarter and outgrew AppLovin in June, the quarter we had called timing.
- 21 SepNewsA second shareholder lawsuit. View heldIt alleges the company overstated how steadily its models improve. That is an allegation, not a finding, and November's results test the same question.
- 15 SepThesis reviewLegal disclosures re-read. View heldOne undecided court motion now holds up both the accounting lawsuit and the shareholder suits filed after it. Nothing here touches the business case.
- 25 AugThesis writtenAttractive, medium convictionThree weeks after June's results sent the shares to a 52-week low.
Also checked 6 times with nothing new to act on.
Sources 32
Sources - 32
Every claim above cites one of these, or states the reasoning that derived it. The quote is frozen at the date it was read: a link can rot, and an agent fetch returns a reading of a page rather than the page. Backs counts the whole claim ledger, so it can name a claim this page does not surface.
- S01primarycompany filing2026-02-19Item 1 on the four products and the named competitor set, the flywheel the company states in its own words, FY2025 statements and the geographic split, employee count, the senior notes and the revolver, the three-class share structure and the 67% voting agreement, and Item 3 on the securities and derivative litigationbacksC01C02C03C07C11C12C17C18C19C27C28C32C33C42C45C55C59C60C64
- S02primarycompany filing2026-08-05the Q2 2026 income statement and per-share figures, the Apps divestiture note, the cloud-computing purchase commitment, stock compensation by line, the H1 buyback, cash and debt, the Tripledot related-party revenue, and the litigation statusbacksC01C02C03C06C08C09C19C20C21C50C29C30C31C32C33C34C38C39C42C44C49C58C68
- S03primarycompany release2026-08-05the quarter's headline figures, free cash flow, the share count and the third-quarter guidance range
Revenue $1,924 million, up 53%; Adjusted EBITDA $1,614 million, up 58%; Free Cash Flow $863.3 million
backsC24C50C31C36C37C38C48C67 - S04primarycompany release2026-02-11the full-year 2025 revenue, net income, adjusted EBITDA and free cash flow, the year's buyback and the closing share count, and the first-quarter 2026 guidance the year was launched on
Revenue $1,658 $999 66% $5,481 $3,224 70% Net Income $1,102 $599 84%
backsC27C31C33C36C37C48 - S05primarytranscript2026-08-05management's account of what went wrong in the quarter, the MAX marketplace and consumer figures that appear in no filing, the compute-per-revenue-dollar ratio, the close of the SEC inquiry, and the mid-market sequencing of the consumer launch
Our pace of meaningful model improvement was lighter than normal during the quarter and the next step-up in model performance landed just after quarter end.
backsC22C23C24C25C26C43C46C47C48 - S06primarycompany filing2026-02-11Unity Software Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 31 December 2025 Unity Software Inc.the rival's own description of the same auction and mediation product, the date its competing machine-learning model shipped, the names of the private attackers AppLovin's own filing hides behind a class, and the segment revenue that says what the attack produced
Examples of other companies we compete against include AppLovin, Voodoo, Moloco, and Digital Turbine.
backsC05C09C10C11C12C13C58 - S07primarycompany filing2026-05-26Digital Turbine Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 31 March 2026 Digital Turbine, Inc.a second listed rival's own description of the same buyer and the same job, its segment split, and the near-identical wording of its Competition section
App Developers and other performance-focused advertisers execute mobile user acquisition campaigns for their apps and products on the Company's direct mobile app inventory.
backsC14 - S08primaryindustry data2026-04-30IAB/PwC Internet Advertising Revenue Report, full-year 2025 results Interactive Advertising Bureau and PricewaterhouseCoopersthe size and growth of the pond measured by somebody other than an advertising company: the US total, the programmatic share of it, the commerce-media line and the shrinking non-programmatic remainder
U.S. digital advertising revenues, which rose 13.9% year over year (YoY) in 2025 to a record $294.6 billion. ... Programmatic advertising revenue grew by $27.6 billion to a total of $162.4 billion in 2025, a YoY increase of 20.5%. ... non-programmatic placements (excluding search) declined 13.9% but still totalled $18.0 billion ... Commerce media advertising revenues increased by $9.7 billion to $63.4 billion in 2025, representing 18.0% year-over-year growth, down from 23.0% ... Search revenues maintained the largest market share at 38.8% but grew more slowly YoY at 11.0% compared to 15.9%
backsC15C16C17C18 - S09primarycompany filing2026-02-05Alphabet Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 31 December 2025 Alphabet Inc.the largest rival's own separation of performance from brand advertising, the products a mid-market merchant weighs against AppLovin Ads Manager, and the share of Alphabet that advertising is
Performance advertising lets our advertisers connect with users while driving measurable results.
backsC04 - S10primarycompany filing2026-01-29Meta Platforms Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 31 December 2025 Meta Platforms, Inc.the perimeter test for the largest cohort member and its own account of a self-service auction sold to performance advertisers
The majority of our marketers use our self-service ad platform to launch and manage their advertising campaigns.
read, but no claim rests on it - S11primaryvendor data2026-09-23Research pack for APP, frozen beside this thesis (refreshed 2026-09-23)content/APP/research-pack.jsonprice, the 252-day range and returns, the analyst split and its dated series, price-target drift, short interest, insider filings, the six restatements the filer made, the cohort multiples struck on the filed competitor set, the company's own six-year multiple history, and the split of the year's price move into revenue per share and multiplebacksC09C21C28C29C30C35C36C37C38C39C40C41C67
- S12primarycompany release2026-05-06the guidance range the June quarter was actually measured against, the restated first-quarter 2025 comparative, and the $1.0 billion first-quarter buyback
Second Quarter 2026 Financial Guidance Summary Revenue $1,915 $1,945 Adjusted EBITDA 1,615 1,645
backsC50C54 - S13primarycompany filing2026-08-05that the motion was still undecided at the last filing, and that a second set of proceedings is stayed behind it - so one ruling gates both. It also gives the negative: the legal proceedings note discloses no SEC inquiry, open or closed, anywhere.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint in November 2025, and that motion was fully briefed as of February 2026. ... The Shareholder Derivative Complaints have been consolidated and stayed pending resolution of the defendants' motion to dismiss in the Brownback Action.
backsC51C55 - S14secondarynews2026-09-17the class period, the lead plaintiff deadline and the four alleged misstatements of the second securities class action, which no company filing has yet described
Rosen Law Firm ... announces a class action lawsuit on behalf of purchasers of securities of AppLovin Corporation (NASDAQ: APP) between February 12, 2026 and August 5, 2026, inclusive (the "Class Period"). ... If you wish to serve as lead plaintiff, you must move the Court no later than November 16, 2026. ... According to the lawsuit, throughout the Class Period, defendants made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (1) the generative AI video creative feature for the company's AppLovin Ads platform was subject to significant development delays, making its release on AppLovin's timeline unlikely; (2) Defendants overstated the constancy with which AppLovin was improving its AI models; (3) for these reasons, among others, AppLovin had significantly overstated the benefits and reliability of the purportedly "virtuous cycle" and "compounding" value proposition that its AI models provided to customers and to AppLovin
backsC42C52 - S15primarycompany filing2026-04-07that the CTO since 2020 stepped down on 1 July 2026 to a non-executive Distinguished Engineer role, and that his successor, the Chief Product and Engineering Officer since November 2025, led the development of Axon 2.0
Basil Shikin informed the Company that he will step down from his role as Chief Technology Officer, effective as of July 1, 2026.
backsC53 - S16secondarynews2026-07-22the objections stated at the time of the early-2026 fall - Meta competing for untracked iOS traffic, Google's Project Genie for AI game creation, and a short-seller report from CapitalWatch - each reproduced verbatim on a second, independently phrased fetch
Meta Platforms was planning on competing for untracked ad traffic on Apple's iOS that it had historically ignored.
backsC54 - S17primaryvendor data2026-09-22the closing prices that date the three earlier drawdowns: 11 November 2021 to 27 December 2022, 14 February to 4 April 2025, and 22 December 2025 to 12 February 2026, and what followed eachbacksC54C55
- S18primaryindustry data2025-12-03AppsFlyer Performance Index, 2025 edition, press release AppsFlyer Ltd.an ordinal ranking of 88 mobile media sources from installs that an independent attribution firm measured for its own clients, 16.2 billion installs from 39,000 apps; the AppLovin sentence reproduced verbatim on a second fetch
Apple Ads remained the number one global media source for iOS gaming, with AppLovin narrowing the gap and leading in tier one North America and Western Europe.
backsC56 - S19primaryindustry data2024-10-14AppsFlyer Performance Index, 17th edition, press release AppsFlyer Ltd.the earlier reading from the same index, for the first half of 2024: second and third in gaming, from 13.5 billion non-organic installs of 35,000 apps
accelerated its ascent in the gaming realm, clinching second and third spots in the power and volume rankings
backsC56 - S20primarycompany filing2026-02-26Playtika Holding Corp. Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 31 December 2025 Playtika Holding Corp.a buyer's own account of what user acquisition costs it: $949.8 million of sales and marketing on $2,755.4 million of 2025 revenue, above its $758.5 million cost of revenue, bought from mobile ad networks, search and social on a payback rule
Our disciplined user acquisition strategy is centered on a payback period approach, which focuses on user monetization efforts that recoups our marketing spend during a reasonable timeframe.
backsC57 - S21primarycompany filing2026-04-21the beneficial ownership table at 31 March 2026 - the voting agreement at 66.9% of total voting power and the chief executive alone at 61.6% - and the executive officers as of that date
Shares subject to the Voting Agreement | 2,866,505 | * | 30,537,722 | 100 | 66.9
backsC41C45C53C61C62C63 - S22primarycompany filing2026-08-06Unity Software Form 10-Q, quarter ended 30 June 2026 Unity Software Inc.Grow Solutions revenue of $388,850 thousand in the June 2026 quarter against $287,162 thousand, and $740,441 thousand in the half against $571,784 thousand - so the first quarter too - with the growth credited to Unity Vector
primarily due to an increase in Grow Solutions revenue from growth in the Unity Ads Network, driven by “Unity Vector”, partially offset by decreases in revenue from the ironSource Ads Network
backsC58 - S23primarycompany filing2025-11-05Unity Software Form 10-Q, quarter ended 30 September 2025 Unity Software Inc.Grow Solutions for the third quarter and nine months of 2025 and 2024, from which the fourth quarter of each year follows by subtraction from the annual figures
Grow Solutions | 318,256 | 299,148 | 890,040 | 894,340
backsC58 - S24primarycompany filing2026-08-05Digital Turbine Form 10-Q, quarter ended 30 June 2026 Digital Turbine, Inc.the latest quarter of the second listed rival's demand-side business: $56,596 thousand, up 55.9%, mostly in Asia Pacific and China
App Growth Platform revenue increased by $20,304, or 55.9%, for the three months ended June 30, 2026 compared to the three months ended June 30, 2025, and was primarily driven by improved performance in the Asia Pacific and China regions
backsC14 - S25primarycompany filing2026-09-23every open-market sale with its plan flag - 579 sales of 1,064,402 shares, 52.4% of the shares under a plan, no purchases - the chief executive's discretionary sales in November, March and June, and the former CTO's 21 August notice of proposed sale
90,682 shares are being sold from Vasily SHIKIN individual
backsC41 - S26primarytranscript2026-05-06management's only sizing of the consumer business: the run rate a year earlier, and the spend it projects per new advertiser
So we talked about the $1 billion run rate a year ago. It's much bigger now. [...] Right now, we're projecting well over $70,000 a year from every new customer. So if you just want to size that, if we open up the platform and sign on 100,000 customers in the next year, first year revenue from them are ad spend -- advertising spend would be roughly $7 billion.
backsC65C66 - S27primarytranscript2026-02-11management declining to report the consumer business apart from gaming
On the breaking out e-commerce, we're not going to do that because we think of our platform as a unified platform.
backsC65 - S28primarytranscript2025-11-05the only figure for advertiser spend through the platform, against which revenue can be compared
what we reported, I think it was in Q1 was $11 billion plus of ad spend.
backsC68 - S29primarycompany filing2026-11-04third-quarter revenue, net income, adjusted EBITDA, free cash flow, buybacks, and fourth-quarter guidancebacksC24C69C70C71
- S30primarycompany filing2026-11-04income from operations, nine-month cash flow and free cash flow, and the status of the securities class actionbacksC69C70C71
- S31primarytranscript2026-11-05AppLovin Q3 2026 earnings call transcript (FMP), held November 4, 2026New model generation in partial rollout, December guide of 8% to 10% sequential growth including live model updates and higher data-centre cost, consumer ads growing triple digits, buyback stepped up opportunistically, referral programme early, no incremental data in Q3.
We are now starting to roll those out. We have seen good results. We cannot tell you or commit to when we can actually see a full rollout or how the progression of these models will go.
backsC22C24 - S32secondaryvendor data2026-11-10the 9 November close of $410.00backsC70C71